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Abstract 
 
Underpinning the law on documentary credits and independent guarantees is a legal principle 
of autonomy which dictates that these financial instruments should, as a matter of law, be 
treated separately from a trader’s contractual agreement. However, despite this, fraudulent 
behaviour may still occur when these financial and legal instruments are used in practice. In 
response, a fraud exception to the autonomy principle has been recognised by many national 
and international courts in an attempt to mitigate the effects of fraudulent trade practices. The 
application of this exception within the English courts is, however, problematic owing to the 
narrowness of its construction and application. Additionally, the paucity of alternate legal 
instruments for regulating fraudulent trade practices means that Jordanian courts are not in 
any better position than their English counterparts, leaving traders confused as to their legal 
position when a fraud dispute arises. Given the large financial value of fraudulent transactions 
and the risks involved, the use of these legal instruments has declined as has the banks’ 
investment in this area creating a problem for legal policy makers. 
The aim of this dissertation is to, first, critically examine the fraud exception under English 
and Jordanian law by exploring the problems associated with the application of the fraud 
exception; and, second, to propose legal reforms which would alleviate both the legal and 
practical problems associated with the fraud exception as it stands currently. The thesis is that, 
whilst the autonomy principle plays a vital role in international trade, the courts should 
facilitate the fraud exception application and recognise other exceptions, such as the non-
genuinity and the underlying contract exception, where the former exception would be unable 
to prevent fraud occurrence. The approach is based upon a critical evaluation of Anglo-
American and Jordanian case law, supplemented by secondary sources and a qualitative 
examination of the Jordanian approach to the fraud exception based upon interviews with 
Jordanian judges. The dissertation concludes that an effective legal approach to fraudulent 
transactions using documentary credits and independent guarantees must be founded upon 
objective rather than subjective principles and that the courts’ use of injunctions should be 
different in cases involving holders in due course from those not involving such parties. These 
findings will impact upon legal policy debates within both English common law and 
international trade law more generally and the examination of the Jordanian position is 
instructive in that it is the first such study of its kind. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Context of the problem 
 
A key feature of current commerce is the proliferation of international contracts which 
involve parties located in different countries.
1
 Such proliferation has not been without 
its own problems as those involved parties may confront various fears as to the ability 
of each of them to discharge the contractual obligations assigned to them through their 
underlying contracts.
2
 On the one hand, a buyer of a certain quantity of goods would 
wish not to pay a distant seller the price of the goods without there being assurances 
that the desired goods will be delivered as agreed. On the other hand, a seller would 
not want to relinquish possession of his goods before obtaining payment. Taking into 
consideration that litigation in a foreign country might be time consuming, costly and 
of non-guaranteed results, mitigating such fears and facilitating the course of 
international commerce was one of the main reasons which motivated traders to 
develop documentary credits and independent guarantees.
3
  
In view of that, a seller, rather than disrupting the transaction, as a result of fear of 
sending the goods before receiving payment, would ask the buyer, pursuant to their 
contract, to obtain a documentary credit in the former’s favour before sending the 
goods. Obtaining such an instrument guarantees to the seller that the price of the 
                                                 
1
 For example: Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., 
London, 2007) at p. 10; Ellinger, E. “Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” 
(University of Singapore Press, Singapore, 1970) at p. 3 
2
 Hooley, R. & Sealy L. “Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials” (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed., 2009) at p. 848; Bulger, R. ‘Letters of Credit: A Question of Honor’ [1984] N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 
799 at p. 799 
3
 See, for example: Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at pp. 86-87; Harfield, H. “Bank Credits and Acceptances” (The Ronald Press 
Company, 5
th
 ed., New York, 1974) at p. 80; United Trading Corp SA and Murray Clayton Ltd v. 
Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyds Rep. 554 
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goods will be received from a third party, usually a bank,
4
 upon the former’s 
submission of documents which show that the required goods have been sent.
5
 By 
utilising a documentary credit the buyer in turn will receive assurances that the price 
of the goods will not be paid unless the seller shows evidence of discharging the 
obligations assigned to him under their contract of sale.
6
  
 
Figure 1: How documentary credits work 
 
Similarly, a buyer might fear that the sellers may not discharge their assigned 
commitments which exist as a result of their agreement. In such a case, the buyer 
might ask the seller to obtain an independent guarantee in order to provide an 
assurance that the latter will duly discharge his commitments.
7
 Like documentary 
credits, the seller would obtain such an instrument from a reliable third party, usually 
a bank, in return for a small fee.
8
 An independent guarantee gives the buyer a right to 
demand and obtain its amount once the seller breaches one or more of the obligations 
                                                 
4
 Banks are frequently asked to issue documentary credits and independent guarantees because of their 
creditworthiness. 
5
 For example: Carr, I. “International Trade Law” (Cavendish Publishing, 3rd ed., 2005) at p. 471 
6
 Howard QC, M. Masefield, R. & Chuah, J. “Butterworths Banking Law Guide” (Butterworths, 
London, 2006) at p. 495 
7
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 300 
8
 See, e.g.: Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2010) at p. 2; Sarna, L. “Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice” 
(Carswell Legal Publishers, 2
nd
 ed., Toronto, 1986) at p. 5 
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assigned to him under their contract. In an independent guarantee context the buyer 
does not need to prove that the seller has breached the underlying contract and a mere 
demand usually will be sufficient for the former to obtain the amount. Such an 
instrument provides the buyer with a prompt and secure source of compensation in 
case the seller breaches his contractual obligations.
9
  
 
Figure 2: How independent guarantees work 
 
1.2. The fraud problem  
 
The autonomy principle, which virtually dictates that the bank’s relationship with 
each of the seller and the buyer should be independent from the latter parties’ 
underlying contract, was developed by traders to facilitate and maintain these 
instruments’ effectiveness.10 Yet, whilst the autonomy principle facilitates these 
                                                 
9
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 300. The mechanism and functions of documentary credits and independent 
guarantees are described in more detail in the next chapter. 
10
 One of the early and oft-quoted statements to this effect is Lord Jenkins’ statement, in Hamzeh Malas 
& Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd. [1958] 1 A11 E.R. 262, where he provided: “We were referred to 
several authorities, and it seems to be plain that the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a 
bargain between the banker and the vendor of the goods, which imposes on the banker an absolute 
obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute which there may be between the parties on the question of 
whether the goods are up to contract or not”, at 263-64. See as well, e.g.,: Guest, A. “Benjamin’s Sale 
of Goods” (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed., London, 2006) at p. 2054; Fellinger, G. ‘Letters of Credit: The 
Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception’ [1990] 1 J.B.F.L.P. 4 at p. 9; RD Harbottle (Mercantile) 
Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] Q.B. 146 at 156. More about the autonomy principle is to 
be found in Chapter 2. 
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instruments’ function, it has been noticed that it may well in some cases put one of the 
parties at the mercy of other unscrupulous parties.
11
 In an independent guarantee 
context, as the buyer is able to request the guarantee amount where no breach of 
contract has occurred at all and as he does not need to show any evidence for such an 
inexistent breach, the autonomy principle in such cases could work to encourage 
fraudulent demands.
12
 Similarly, in a documentary credit context the autonomy 
principle may encourage unscrupulous sellers to send valueless or even no goods and, 
nonetheless, obtain fraudulent documents which falsely show that they have duly 
discharged their commitments.
13
 
In fact, fraud in such a context is not new.
14
 However, what is new is the large scale of 
fraud which has the capacity to have a negative effect on the use of such 
instruments.
15
 It is interesting to note that such a fraud is on the increase.
16
 Taking 
into consideration the huge amount of money involved in the fraud which are 
perpetrated through these instruments, it is not surprising to see that their use has been 
                                                 
11
 For example, Ellinger has noted that the buyer in some cases would be “at the mercy of the 
beneficiary’s judgement”. See: Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters 
of Credit” (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) at p. 318. See as well: Low, H.Y. ‘Confusion and 
Difficulties Surrounding the Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit: An English Perspective’ [2011] Int. J.L.M. 
17(6), 462 at p. 463; Bennett, H. ‘Performance Bonds and the Principle of Autonomy’ [1994] J.B.L. 
574 at p. 576 
12
 Gao, X. “The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: a Comparative Study” (London, 2002) at p. 
113 
13
 Demir-Araz, Y. ‘International Trade, Maritime Fraud and Documentary Credits’ [2002] Int. T.L.R. 
Vol. 8(4), 128 at p. 129; Goode, R. “Reflections on Letters of Credit-I” [1980] J.B.L. 291 at p. 294 
14
 For example, Spalding has noted that fraud was existent in this context on 1921. See: Spalding, W. 
“Banker’s Credits” (The Pitman Press, London, 1921) at p. 94 
15
 Zhang, Y. “Approaches to Resolving the International Documentary Letters of Credit Fraud Issue” 
(University of Eastern Finland, Finland, 2011) at p. 21. For example, fraud which is perpetrated in the 
contexts of documentary credits and independent guarantees was estimated to cost around 1 billion 
US$ per year in 2005. See: www.bolero.net, referred to in Carr, I. “International Trade Law” 
(Cavendish Publishing, 3
rd
 ed., 2005) at p. 503 
16
 Low, H.Y. ‘Confusion and Difficulties Surrounding the Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit: An English 
Perspective’ [2011] Int. J.L.M. 17(6), 462 at p. 463. See as well: Schulze, WG. ‘The UCP 600: A New 
Law Applicable to Documentary Letters of Credit’ [2009] 21 SA Merc LJ. 228 at p. 228 
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somewhat decreasing worldwide in the last few years and that banks’ willingness to 
invest in this field has dramatically declined lately.
 17
 
In order to protect parties who do utilise documentary credits and independent 
guarantees from fraud,
18
 a fraud exception to the autonomy principle has been 
recognised by different national and international courts.
19
 This exception allows 
banks and courts to override the autonomy principle and thus examine the different 
contracts involved in the arrangement of these instruments in order to maintain their 
utility, to mitigate fraud and to protect the different involved bona fide parties from 
other unscrupulous parties.
20
 
Nevertheless, it has been noticed that it is hard to find a scholarly work that has not 
criticised the English law application to the fraud exception in this particular area of 
law. Most commentators have found that the English courts have been reluctant to 
interfere in order to protect bona fide parties from those unscrupulous ones.
21
 It has 
been said that the ‘English approach’ “is excessive to the extent of defeating the 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. Into the same effect Todd has found that they “appear to be declining in popularity, losing 
ground to open account sales”. See: Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” 
(Informa Law, 4
th
 ed., London, 2007) at p. 32. According to Sifri: “Fraud is the most destructive illegal 
act banks face. Not only does it constitute a direct cost to the bank, it also entails large expenses for 
legal pursuits, investigations fees and cost of executives’ time spent on handling fraudulent 
transactions. Furthermore, fraud has devastating negative effects, that cannot be expressed in terms of 
money, on the bank’s reputation, public trust and staff morale”. See: Sifri, J. “Standby Letters of 
Credit: A Comprehensive Guide” (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008) at p. 195 
18
 ICC Publications, “Trade Finance Fraud” (Barking, 2002) at p. 19 
19
 Low, H.Y. ‘Confusion and Difficulties Surrounding the Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit: An English 
Perspective’ [2011] Int. J.L.M. 17(6), 462 at p. 463 
20
 Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 657 (TCC); [2011] B.L.R. 340; [2011] C.I.L.L. 
3009 (first instance) 
21
 For example: Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at p. 85; Demir-Araz, Y. ‘International Trade, Maritime Fraud and Documentary 
Credits’ [2002] Int. T.L.R. Vol. 8(4), 128 at p. 134; Pugh-Thomas, A. ‘Can a Buyer Bypass the 
Guarantor and Stop the Seller from Demanding Payment from the Guarantor?’ [1996] I.C.C.L.R. Vol. 
7(4), 149 at p. 149; Murray, D. ‘Letters of Credit and Forged and Altered Documents: Some Deterrent 
Suggestions’ (1993) 98 Com. L.J. 504 at p. 515; Kee, H. ‘The Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit 
Transactions’ (eds.) in Chinkin, C., Ho, P. & Chan, H. “Current Problems of International Trade 
Financing’ (National University of Singapore, 2nd ed., 1990) 188 at p. 189 
6 
 
objective of the exception”22 and that the fraud exception “exists under common law 
almost like a theoretical concept rather than a practical one.”23  
It is submitted that such an “unsatisfactory position” is leading to more and not less 
fraud in this context.
24
 Also it is suggested that such a position would lead to a loss in 
confidence in the use of English law and courts and would similarly affect badly other 
jurisdictions which do rely on English law because of the uncertainty and increased 
costs associated with such a loss of confidence.
25 
For example, different international 
traders would refuse to deal with English or other traders who would stipulate for 
English law to govern their contracts in order to avoid the English courts’ reluctance 
to interfere with fraud which might afflict them badly.
26
  
Similarly, the Jordanian law is not without its own shortfalls in this regard. Jordan 
suffers from a legislative vacuum and a shortage of supplementary law sources as 
regards documentary letters and independent guarantees in general and the fraud 
exception in particular.
27
 Equally, it is submitted that the existence of such a fact 
would cause harmful consequences on the reputation of the Jordanian courts, 
commerce and parties who are involved in the latter.
28
  
 
                                                 
22
 Low, H.Y. ‘Confusion and Difficulties Surrounding the Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit: An English 
Perspective’ [2011] Int. J.L.M. 17(6), 462 at p. 462 
23
 Demir-Araz, Y. ‘International Trade, Maritime Fraud and Documentary Credits’ [2002] Int. T.L.R. 
Vol. 8(4), 128 at p. 134  
24
 Ulph, J. “Commercial Fraud: Civil Liability, Human Rights, and Money Laundering” (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2006) at p. 535 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 This could be clearly seen in the light of statistics in this respect showing that 44 cases in the UK out 
of 72 have involved foreign parties in 2000. See: The Right honourable Lord Irvine of Lairg. ‘The 
Law: An Engine for Trade’ (2001) 64 Mod. L. Rev. 333 at p. 333 
27
 Al-Kilani, M. “Amaliat Al-Bonok” (Dar Al-Thakafa, Amman, 2009) at pp. 325-326; An interview 
with Judge Israa Al-kharabsheh, of the North Amman Court of First Instance, on 16-09-2011 
28
 Ibid. 
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1.3. Aim of the thesis 
 
As it has been mentioned above, the English law application of the fraud exception 
has been a subject of a prolonged argument.
29
 As one commentator observes:  
“Despite being the most well-established exception to the autonomy 
principle and the only exception recognised by nearly every jurisdiction in 
the world, the fraud rule is complicated, riddled with many difficulties and 
has its own shortcomings”.30  
 
On the other hand, because of the shortage of supplementary law sources which 
govern this area of law, the Jordanian law is not in a better position than that of its 
English counterpart in this regard. Legal uncertainty does prevail in such a jurisdiction 
leaving the parties who utilise documentary credits and independent guarantees in a 
confusing situation as to their legal rights and duties in case a fraud dispute comes up.    
Taking this into consideration, this work critically examines the fraud exception 
application to the autonomy principle of documentary credits and independent 
guarantees under the English and Jordanian law. This work seeks to explore the 
problems associated with the fraud exception application in both jurisdictions and 
consequently to propose some legal reforms which would solve such problems and so 
prevent or at least mitigate fraud occurrence. The importance of such an examination 
lies in the fact that independent guarantees and documentary credits are prolific in the 
international trade realm and that fraud could badly affect these instruments’ viability, 
parties which use them and commerce in general.
31
  
                                                 
29
 Horowitz, D. “Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment” (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at p. 234; Blair, W. ‘Commentary on ‘Documents Contractual Congruence in International 
Trade’’ (Eds.) in Worthington, S. “Commercial Law and Commercial Practice” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2003) 241 at p. 242 
30
 Low, H.Y. ‘Confusion and Difficulties Surrounding the Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit: An English 
Perspective’ [2011] Int. J.L.M. 17(6), 462 at p. 463 
31
 Ibid at p. 463. See as well: Schulze, WG. ‘The UCP 600: A New Law Applicable to Documentary 
Letters of Credit’ [2009] 21 SA Merc LJ. 228 at p. 228 
8 
 
The argument proposed in this work is that, whilst the autonomy principle plays a 
vital role in international trade, the courts should facilitate the fraud exception 
application and recognise other exceptions, such as the non-genuinity and the 
underlying contract exception, where the former exception would be unable to prevent 
fraud occurrence. Although too many works have examined the fraud problem in the 
documentary credit and independent guarantee context, the current author argues that 
such works have failed to identify all of the problems associated with the fraud 
exception application and accordingly have been unsuccessful in proposing the 
reforms needed. As far as the author is aware, this thesis is the first of its kind to offer 
a comprehensive examination to the fraud exception position in documentary credits 
and independent guarantees under the Jordanian law. 
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. After the introduction, chapter two 
introduces a background about the documentary credits and independent guarantees 
different basic legal principles and characteristics. It is submitted that such a 
background is necessary in order to understand the fraud exception application 
discussion which will follow later after this chapter. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
commence any work in this area of law without introducing these basic legal 
principles and characteristics. 
Chapter three explores the extent to which banks can successfully rely on the fraud 
exception to refuse tendered documents. This chapter questions the English courts’ 
application to the fraud exception in this regard and, consequently, it seeks to suggest 
reforms in order to relieve banks and applicants from being defrauded by 
unscrupulous beneficiaries. In this respect, the current author suggests that a non-
9 
 
genuinity defence is a more suitable defence to be applied rather than the fraud 
exception. 
Chapter four investigates whether the fraud exception application should be confined 
to fraud which is perpetrated in documentary credits and independent guarantees 
documents and whether it can be extended to apply where fraud is perpetrated in the 
underlying transaction, which through such instruments has ensued, in order to stop 
the payment process of these instruments.
32
 This work argues that the fraud exception 
application should include both kind of fraud in order to serve as an effective and 
practical rather than a theoretical weapon against fraudulent conducts.  
Chapter five examines the fraud standard which English courts do request to apply the 
fraud exception in order to restrain the payment of documentary credits and 
independent guarantees. It is argued in this chapter that the common law fraud 
standard which has been applied by the English courts in the context of documentary 
credits is so difficult to obtain and so would be unable to prevent fraud occurrence. 
Taking this into consideration, this work proposes an objective standard to replace the 
common law fraud standard which English courts do apply.
33
 Furthermore, this work 
suggests that neither a common law fraud standard nor an objective standard would 
mitigate fraud from being committed in an independent guarantee context. Hence, 
other potential exceptions which have the ability to combat fraud are discussed. These 
potential exceptions which are discussed in chapter five include the unconscionability 
exception and the underlying contract exception. While the unconscionability 
                                                 
32
 Fraud perpetrated in such a context can be distinguished, in terms of the place in which it might be 
perpetrated, into two main categories, namely, fraud in the documents and fraud in the underlying 
transaction. More about this point is to be found in chapter 4. 
33
 See, for example: Stoufflet, J. ‘Fraud in Documentary Credit, Letter of Credit and Demand Guaranty’ 
(2001) 106 Dick. L. Rev. 21 at p. 22 
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exception will be refuted because ambiguity is inherent in it, this work argues for the 
adoption of the underlying contract exception in this respect. 
Chapter six examines the English courts’ application of injunctions in the 
documentary credits and independent guarantees context. Such examination focuses 
on the conditions which the English courts stipulate for in order to grant an injunction 
based on the fraud exception to stop a documentary credit or an independent 
guarantee fraudulent payment. In this chapter, it is argued that the application of these 
conditions is unclear and sometimes contradictory and so an urgent reform is needed 
in order to make the fraud exception application practical rather than theoretical. 
Furthermore, in this work it is advocated that the conditions to grant an injunction 
based on the fraud exception in a documentary credit or an independent guarantee 
context should be applied differently in cases which involve holders in due course 
from those not involving such parties. The different application of these conditions 
could be understood if the special role which holders in due course play in this context 
is taken into consideration.   
Chapter seven seeks to explore the Jordanian law application of the fraud exception in 
the documentary credits and independent guarantees context in order to identify the 
problems it suffers from and propose the reforms needed.
34
 While the discussion in 
this chapter will begin with looking at the positions of the different Arabian Middle 
Eastern countries in this regard, later discussion will focus on Jordan in particular. 
Such limitation of focus in this chapter is attributed to the fact that the Jordanian 
                                                 
34
 It should be noted that this work is meant to study the Arabian countries which are located in what 
has been known as the Traditional Middle East and is not intended to study other Arabian countries 
which are located in what has been known as the Greater Middle East. Accordingly, Arabian countries, 
which are located in the Traditional Arabian Middle Eastern region and which this study is concerned 
with comprise: Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestinian Territories, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. 
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judiciary, in contrast to the other Arabian Middle Eastern countries,
35
 has heard some 
fraud cases in the last few years. In this chapter the current author argues that while 
some aspects of the fraud exception application are recommended in this region, a 
code of law should be articulated to address practices relating to documentary credits 
and independent guarantees and to address the fraud exception application in 
particular.  
1.5. Methods and methodology 
 
In order to examine the fraud exception application to the autonomy principle in 
documentary credits and independent guarantees under both the English and 
Jordanian Law, this work makes use of the secondary data available in this respect as 
the main method to complete such an examination.
36
 In addition to the secondary data, 
a large volume of English and Arabian Middle Eastern acts and cases have been used 
to constitute the legal basis of this work. By critically analysing and comparing the 
various opinions expressed in these materials the current author will identify the 
problems which the fraud exception application suffers from under the English and 
Jordanian law and accordingly to suggest the reforms needed.   
While some aspects of documentary letters and independent guarantees law, such as 
the autonomy principle, are well known, either through usage by the national laws or 
by reference to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rules, which have 
                                                 
35
 Indeed, the absence of dedicated legislation, the fact that no fraud cases were ever brought to courts 
and the lack of scholars and commentators in these countries, made examining their attitude to this area 
of law a difficult task. 
36
 The main sources for these materials are the library of the University of Central Lancashire, the 
Library of Manchester University, the Library of Birmingham University, the Library of Oxford 
University, the Library of Cambridge University, the British Library in London, the Library of the 
University of Jordan and the Library of Cairo University. Moreover, different publishers have been 
approached in order to obtain some of these materials. These publishers include: Sweet and Maxwell, 
LexisNexis, Hart Publishing, Butterworths and IIBLP “Institute of International Business Law and 
Practice”. In addition, many of these materials have been acquired through the internet and electronic 
data bases, namely, WestLaw UK, Lexis Library and HeinOnline Law Journal Library. Inter-library 
loan facilities, which the Library of the University of Central Lancashire provides to acquire materials 
unavailable in their library, have been frequently utilised. 
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developed in this context, in the Arabian Middle Eastern countries, other aspects are 
unclear as no international or national provisions have addressed it. One of these most 
challenging aspects is the fraud exception application to the autonomy principle.  
In general, these countries have not regulated provisions to tackle the fraud problem 
in the documentary credits and independent guarantees context. Moreover, no help in 
relation to this problem has been provided by the ICC different rules. These countries 
depend on case law, commercial customs and legal jurisprudence, whenever a dispute 
is heard by their courts where no legislation covers the disputed matter.
37
 Yet, as no 
case law regarding fraud in these instruments can be found in most of these countries, 
this supplementary source of law has proved unhelpful. Commercial customs also do 
not afford help because most of these Arabian Middle Eastern countries have not 
witnessed disputes regarding fraud in this context and so no customs have developed 
in his regard.
38
 Furthermore, Arabian Middle Eastern legal scholars have not paid 
much attention to this particular area of law and the publications published in this 
regard do not exceed the number of the fingers of one hand.
39
 It has been suggested 
that such inattention could be attributed to the fact that the fraud exception is still in 
its infancy age and that these academics have yet not acquired the necessary expertise 
in order to examine it.
40
 
However, the situation in Jordan is different from the other Arabian Middle Eastern 
countries in this respect. Whilst no Jordanian special legislation covers this area, the 
                                                 
37
 For example, Article 3 of the Jordanian Commercial Act (no. 12/1966) provides: “Where no legal 
provisions are available to be applied to the disputed matter, the judge can apply case law, legal 
jurisprudence, justice rules and commercial customs”. 
38
 Al-Kilani, M. “Amaliat Al-Bonok” (Dar Al-Thakafa, Amman, 2009) at pp. 325-326 
39
 For example: Al-Kilani, M. “Mo’amalat Albonok” (Dar Altahkafah, 2nd ed., Amman, 2009); Awad, 
A. “Alitimadat Almostanadieh”, (Dar Alnadha Alarabieh, 1st ed., Cairo, 1989); Awad, A. “Khitabat 
Aldaman” (Dar Alnahda Alarabieh, 3rd ed., Cairo, 2007); Abdel Hameed, R. “Alnidam Almali wa 
Mo’amalat Albonok” (Dar Abo El Majd, 1st ed., Cairo, 2000); Nassar, N & Nassar, S. “Khitabat 
Aldaman wa Alitimadat Almsotanadieh” (Dar Memfees, 1st ed., Cairo, 1997)  
40
 Al-Kilani, M. “Amaliat Al-Bonok” (Dar Al-Thakafa, Amman, 2009) at pp. 325-326 
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Jordanian judiciary, unlike its neighbours, has recently heard some documentary 
credits’ fraud disputes. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the relatively few cases 
relating to fraud in documentary credits heard by the Jordanian courts, did not tackle 
all the different aspects of the fraud exception application. For this reason, the current 
author conducted interviews with eight Jordanian judges in order to make a 
comprehensive examination of the Jordanian fraud exception a possible task.
41
  
Whilst this work is about the law relating to the fraud exception to the autonomy 
principle of documentary credits and independent guarantees in England and Jordan, 
however, in some areas it adopts a comparative approach and so examines other 
foreign systems’ approaches in order to assist evaluating different problems. Indeed, it 
is not uncommon to see references to and adoption of decided court cases of other 
jurisdictions in England’s case law and vice-versa.42 Therefore, with no 
comprehensive account of other foreign laws, it has been possible to highlight 
authorities from other countries which mainly include: Canada, Singapore, Australia 
and the United States. Moreover, relevant international initiatives in this regard are 
examined through the work. These international initiatives include: the UN 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit and the 
international practice as reflected by the International Chamber of Commerce 
publications, namely, the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
(UCP 600), the International Standby Practices (ISP98), the Uniform Rules for 
Contract Guarantees (URCG) and the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG 
758) which entered into effect on 1 July 2010. 
                                                 
41
 More about the different aspects and mechanisms of the interviews can be found in Appendix 1.  
42
 Sarna, L. “Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice” (Carswell Legal Publishers, 2nd ed., 
Toronto, 1986) at p. 9 
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Chapter Two: Documentary Credits and Independent 
Guarantees: Legal Basic Principles and Characteristics  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the legal basic principles and characteristics of 
documentary credits and independent guarantees. This chapter provides a general 
background for later discussions as issues examined and conclusions reached in this 
chapter will be necessary for the study of fraud and its implications in this context. In 
fact, it would be difficult to commence any work in this area of commercial law 
without consideration of such legal basic principles and characteristics.
1
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. After the introduction, the second section 
examines issues pertaining solely to documentary credits. The first part of this section 
seeks to illustrate the reasons behind the development of documentary credits by 
examining their early forms. The following parts of this section are meant to explain 
the mechanisms of documentary credits, their different types and the different legal 
relationships which they create. Such an examination is necessary in order to establish 
a clear understanding of how these instruments came about and the legal and 
commercial policies behind them. 
Similarly, the third section is concerned with issues pertaining solely to independent 
guarantees. It is suggested that the nomenclature of such instruments is surrounded 
with confusion for two reasons: firstly, the emergence of a great number of labels to 
denote such an instrument; secondly, the overlap with ordinary guarantees which, 
                                                 
1
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010); Malek, A & Quest, D. “Jack: Documentary Credits” (Tottel Publishing, 4th ed., Sussex, 
2009); King, R. “Gutteridge & Megrah’s Law of Bankers’ Commercial Credits” (Europa Publications 
Limited, 8
th
 ed., London, 2001); Dolan, J. “The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby 
Credits” (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, revised ed., Boston, 1996) 
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while similar in goals, are legally different from independent guarantees. The first part 
of this section is meant to clarify such terminological confusion. The second and third 
parts of this section are meant to explain the mechanisms of independent guarantees, 
their different types and the different legal relationships which they create. The fourth 
and last part of this section seeks to distinguish independent guarantees and ordinary 
guarantees which are legally different from each other.  
The fourth section focuses on issues related equally to both instruments. It is a 
distinctive legal characteristic of these instruments that, once they are issued, their 
issuer cannot revoke the obligation towards their beneficiary. The first part of this 
section seeks to illustrate the binding nature which these instruments enjoy. The 
second part of this section aims to examine the autonomy and strict compliance 
principles which govern documentary credits and independent guarantees. The 
rationale of such principles and the reasons behind their insertion into this context are 
discussed. In fact, different international initiatives have realised the importance of 
such instruments in the world trade realm. The last part of the fourth section examines 
the role which each of these different international initiatives has played in this 
regard. Whether the role which they played has helped in mitigating the fraud 
problem in such a context will be analysed. The conclusion is to be found in the fifth 
section.  
2.2. The legal basic principles and characteristics of documentary 
credits  
 
2.2.1. Early forms 
 
As noted by one commentator: 
“The history of commerce is the history of civilization. In his barbarous 
state man's wants are few and simple, limited to his physical existence, 
such as food, clothing and shelter, but as he advances in the scale of 
16 
 
intelligence his wants increase and he requires not only the comforts and 
conveniences of life but even the luxuries”.2  
 
Commerce is one of the ways through which different peoples have at different times 
supplied their needs. In fact, it is difficult to find a community which produces 
everything that it needs. Therefore, a portion of what it needs must be supplied 
through the interchange of products with other communities and this is the beginning 
of domestic and foreign commerce.
3
 Before the introduction of currency, commercial 
transactions were carried out using gold, silver and other minerals.
 
It was exhausting 
for a buyer to carry huge amounts of gold from the place where he was to the place 
where the seller was. The fact that not all of the buyers could travel to buy goods, due 
to different circumstances, made the situation more difficult, as did the possibility of 
mislaying these amounts of minerals or of them being stolen.  
These risks can be best observed in an international trade context. That is to say, how 
could a buyer, who did not wish to travel, get assured that the distant seller would 
send him his required goods with agreed quantities and qualities? On the other hand, 
how could the seller, who had no opportunity to meet the distant buyer and to get 
from him the price of the goods in person, be assured that he would get paid? Hence, 
one can see the need for a compatible payment system. Indeed, it is not the object of 
this subsection to present all the different early payment methods but rather to give a 
brief discussion which will illustrate the imperative needs behind developing 
documentary credits. 
                                                 
2
 Powers, O. “Commerce and Finance” (Powers and Lyons, 1903), see chapter one “History of 
Commerce: Ancient Commerce”. 
3
 Ibid. 
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2.2.1.1. Documents against acceptance 
Taking into consideration the above mentioned problems facing commerce in its early 
forms, merchants have devised various payment methods to facilitate their trade and 
surmount such problems.
4
 One of these early methods was the documents against 
acceptance system.
5
 In such a method the seller, after dispatching the goods, in order 
to get the purchase price attaches a bill of exchange to the goods’ documentation and 
sells them to an exchange house. As a result, the seller obtains the goods’ price before 
the buyer would, in ordinary course, pay. The exchange house would be reimbursed 
by the buyer when it presents the documents to the latter. The exchange house, until 
the time at which the documents are accepted by the buyer, has the security of a 
pledge in the form of these documents and the goods which they represent.
6
 
Yet such a system is not without its own shortcomings. From a seller’s point of view, 
such a payment system did not provide a secure payment method. The seller faces the 
peril of non-payment as he/she acts upon a mere promise from a distant buyer who at 
any point might change his mind.
7
 Therefore, the seller faces the risk of non-
acceptance of his documents by the exchange house through whose offices he intends 
to discount the draft. In such a context, the exchange house would not readily become 
embroiled in such a potential dilemma where it might accept the documents and pay 
but later the buyer refuses to pay for them.
8
 Such a situation pushed exchange houses 
into refraining from accepting such documents and this eventually resulted in an 
                                                 
4
 Bulger, R. ‘Letters of Credit: A Question of Honor’ [1984] N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 799 at p. 799 
5
 See, for example: Td Bailey, Son & Co v Ross T Smyth & Co Ltd (1940) 56 T.L.R. 825 at 828. 
According to Lord Wright: “The general course of international commerce involves the practice of 
raising money on the documents so as to bridge the period between the shipment and the time of 
obtaining payment against documents”.  
6
 Per Scrutton L.J. in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay $ Co. [1918] 2 K.B. 623 at 659-60 
7
 Hooley, R. & Sealy L. “Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials” (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed., 2009) at p. 848 
8
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 2 
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abandonment of the system as a whole. Moreover, under such a system, buyers are at 
risk as they would pay an exchange house and might receive nothing later. These 
observed troubles were the reasons which made traders seek a more secure and 
efficient way of payment.
9
 The next subsection is meant to illustrate another two early 
payment methods which preceded the emergence of documentary credits. 
2.2.1.2. Open letters of credit and buyer’s credit 
 
It has been suggested that open letters of credit and buyer’s credit are the origins from 
which documentary credits have emanated and developed.
10
 In an open letter of 
credit, an exchange house requests other persons to advance money to its customer 
and promises to repay such advanced money.
11
 The main aim of this payment method 
was to raise funds for buyers in their overseas travelling.
12
 However, such a method 
offered help to buyers who wished to travel but not to those who did not wish to travel 
for a variety of different reasons. Besides, such a payment method has been described 
as “…the document which…is lost more often than any other document in the 
world.”13 In addition, holding this letter in his hands does not mean that a seller would 
for sure accept the buyer’s offer. A seller might fear that the promisor would not 
perform his promise when he approaches him for the goods’ price. Buyers might find 
it difficult to find a person who would honour their request where he knows nothing 
about their or the distant promisor’s trustworthiness and solvency.  
                                                 
9
 Ellinger, E. “Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” (University of Singapore Press, 
Singapore, 1970) at pp. 3-4 
10
 Ibid. at pp. 24-38 
11
 Story, J. “Commentaries on the Law of Bills of Exchange, Foreign and Inland as Administrated in 
England and America” (2nd ed., Boston, 1860) at Ch. XIII Para. 459. Cited in Gao, X “The Fraud Rule 
in the Law of Letters of Credit”, (Kluwer Law International, 2002) at p. 9 
12
 Spalding, W. “Banker’s Credits” (The Pitman Press, London, 1921) at p.12 
13
 Ibid. 
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In a buyer’s credit, all that the seller gets is a promise from the buyer himself that he 
will get paid.
14
 In this method the buyer performs the role of an exchange house by 
sending a direct letter to the seller promising him that he will pay.
15
 Yet, such a 
method is not always welcomed by sellers who do not easily trust a distant buyer 
which with whose reputation and solvency they are not familiar and accordingly it is 
not always a guarantee that the buyer will get the required facilitation. In addition, 
such a method did not provide buyers who do not wish to travel with an adequate 
payment method. Also, it is possible that such a letter might get lost or stolen.  
2.2.2. Mechanism 
 
Some authors have suggested that a: “documentary credit therefore evolved as 
mechanism for payment, in order partially to overcome some of these difficulties.”16 
Compared to its early forms, documentary credits are “Fairly modern instruments.”17 
Furthermore, documentary credits have been described as “…the most common 
method of payment in international sales.”18 The great increase in world trade, 
fluctuations in foreign exchange, unstable economics and the involvement of 
dishonest people in commercial transactions were the reasons behind such growth.
19
 
This work adopts the ‘documentary credit’ concept rather than ‘letters of credit’ to 
denote the payment instrument which constitutes the main focus of this section as 
using the latter concept is misleading as one might create some confusion between it 
                                                 
14
 Malynes, “The Ancient Law Merchant”, (1629) at p. 104. cited in Kozolchyk, B. ‘The Legal Nature 
of the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit’ [1965] 14 Am J Comp L 395, at pp. 396-397  
15
 McCurdy, W. ‘Commercial Letters of Credit’ (1922) 35 Harv. L. R. 539 at p. 546  
16
 Howard QC, M. Masefield, R. & Chuah, J. “Butterworths Banking Law Guide” (Butterworths, 
London, 2006) at p. 495 
17
 Ellinger, E. “Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” (University of Singapore Press, 
Singapore, 1970) at p. 26 
18
 Hooley, R. & Sealy L. “Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials” (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed., 2009) at p. 849 
19
 Davis, A. “The Law Relating to Commercial Letters of credit” (The Pitman Press, 3rd ed., London, 
1963) at p. 10 
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and a standby letter of credit, the latter being one form of independent guarantees 
(which will be examined below). Moreover, the use of the concept of documentary 
credit is more appropriate as the word documentary denotes one of its main features, 
which is using documents. A commercial credit and a banker’s credit are synonyms of 
a documentary credit and in English law they can be used interchangeably.
20
 
However, and as has been suggested above, this work will use the documentary credit 
concept to denote one of the two instruments with which this work is concerned, 
independent guarantees being the other instrument. The concept ‘letters of credit’ will 
be used to denote both independent guarantees and documentary credits where 
discussion will be applicable to these two instruments. 
 
The current writer seeks to illustrate the mechanism of documentary credits by using 
the following example: B, a buyer located in the UK is eager to buy laptops’ 
consignment from S, a seller in Jordan. On the one hand, B does not know S very well 
and is not certain about S’s creditworthiness. Therefore, B is reluctant to send S the 
price for the laptops without an assurance that S will send them. On the other hand, S 
is in an unenviable position facing the same hesitation as B. In fact, S is unwilling to 
part with the laptops without assurance that he will get paid for them. Involving a 
third creditworthy person is one of the most successful solutions which might occur to 
B and S.
21
 In view of that, B will instruct his bank I (the issuing bank) to open a 
documentary credit in favour of S. I, in his turn, will instruct S that a documentary 
credit has been opened in his favour by B and that I is pleased to pay the amount of 
money stipulated in the documentary credit to S on behalf of B once S shows that he 
                                                 
20
 Hooley, R. & Sealy L. “Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials” (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed., 2009) at p.853; Sarna, L. “Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice” (Carswell Legal 
Publishers, 2
nd
 ed., Toronto, 1986) at p. 1  
21
 Davis, A. “The Law Relating to Commercial Letters of credit” (The Pitman Press, 3rd ed., London, 
1963) at p. 10 
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has complied with the credit terms supplied by B. These terms usually dictate the 
submission of documents which include: a bill of lading, a commercial invoice and an 
insurance policy which provide proof of the goods having been sent as B desires.  
In relation to this Mugasha has found that: “The interposition of a binding undertaking 
by a neutral third party makes the letter of credit a superior method of ensuring 
payment”.22 Both of the parties will be in a better position when compared with the 
earlier forms mentioned above. S obtains the shipped laptops’ price by presenting the 
stipulated documents to I who will pay once these have been submitted.
23
 B gains 
assurance that the laptops are on their way to the UK and that I will not pay unless it 
obtains documents ensuring such a fact. I in its turn will get a commission in return 
for its services.
24
 In addition, as observed by Todd: 
“…a documentary credit can be used to finance the entire transaction from 
the buyer’s viewpoint, resolving his cashflow problems entirely. 
Furthermore, sellers can use the credit as security to raise further capital, 
which may be required to ship or manufacture the goods in the first 
place”.25  
 
In such a context the buyer does not need to travel and the seller would not refuse to 
send the goods as he now relies on a bank’s promise rather than that of an unknown 
distant buyer or exchange house. Indeed, utilizing such an instrument brings 
satisfaction to all parties involved. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Mugasha, A. “The Law of Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees” (Federation Press, Sydney, 2003) 
at p. 10 
23
 Carr, I. “International Trade Law” (Cavendish Publishing, 3rd ed., 2005) at p. 471  
24
 See: Sarna, L. “Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice” (Carswell Legal Publishers, 2nd ed., 
Toronto, 1986) at p. 5; Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of 
Credit” (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) at p. 2 
25
 Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) 
at p. 13 
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2.2.3. Various relationships and types 
 
As can be noticed above, there are three relationships in a documentary credit context: 
firstly, the sale contract between the seller (known as the beneficiary) and the buyer 
(known as the applicant); secondly, the contract between the buyer and his bank 
(known as the issuing bank); thirdly, the documentary credit between the issuing bank 
and the seller.
26
 Normally a distant seller, who is located in a faraway country, prefers 
to get the goods’ price from a bank in his country.27 Consequently, the buyer will 
instruct the issuing bank to request a correspondent bank to represent it in the seller’s 
country. The involvement of a second bank gives rise to the need for a new contract 
between the issuing bank and the former.  
The obligations of such a bank differ according to the instructions that it receives 
from the issuing bank which usually emerges from the buyer’s contract with the 
seller. The corresponding bank might merely advise the seller that a documentary 
credit has been opened. The correspondent bank in such a context is called an 
‘advising bank’ and its worth mentioning that the seller does not acquire any rights 
against such a bank. However, the correspondent bank might, through the issuing 
bank’s instructions, add its confirmation to the documentary credit. Such a bank is 
called the ‘confirming bank’ and in such a context the sellers do acquire rights against 
this correspondent confirming bank which replaces the issuing bank vis-à-vis its 
obligations towards the seller but this time in the seller’s country. Moreover, the 
documentary credit might give the opportunity to the seller to choose any bank or 
                                                 
26
 Indeed, such a relationship does not acquire the elements which would allow its recognition as a 
contract. Different theories have been advocated to illustrate the nature of this relationship. Yet none 
has been accepted. See subsection 2.4.1. for more discussion in this point. 
27
 Many factors are behind such an inclination. Firstly, by getting the money from a bank in his 
country, the seller saves the costs of travelling and seeking the money from a foreigner bank or buyer 
which he is not familiar with. Secondly, if anything went wrong, the presence of such a bank in his 
country gives the seller a right to sue the bank in his country instead of chasing a bank or a buyer in a 
foreign country. 
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some banks in his country to obtain the price of the goods. In such a context the bank 
is called the ‘negotiating bank’. For now, it is noteworthy to point out that requesting 
these banks to enter such contracts is not without its own troubles.
28
 
It is worth noting that documentary credits themselves have many divergent types.
29
 
For this reason Harfield has described them as automobiles because of the variety of 
types which were created to serve various needs and purposes.
30
 Two of these types, 
concerning the documentary credit’s enforceability, are the revocable and irrevocable 
credits. Where a revocable credit is used, a bank can revoke its promise to the seller. 
However, where an irrevocable credit is used the bank cannot do so. Therefore, using 
revocable documentary credits is very rare as it does not provide the seller with the 
security that he needs.
31
 Other types of documentary credits are the confirmed and 
unconfirmed credits. These types of documentary credit indicate the bank’s 
obligations. If the credit is a confirmed one, the bank is obliged to pay as an issuing 
bank does. However, if the credit is an unconfirmed one then the bank is called an 
advising bank, and such a bank is merely required to notify the seller that a 
documentary credit has been opened in his favour.
32
  
According to their negotiability, documentary credits are divided into transferable and 
non-transferable credits.
33
 A transferable credit is rarely used or issued by banks as it 
would put them in a complicated position. Pertaining to the time of payment, deferred 
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 More about this point is provided in Chapter 6. 
29
 For a good discussion in the types of letters of credit see: Enonchong, N. “The Independence 
Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees” (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at pp. 
17 to 22 
30
 Harfield, H. ‘Who Does What to Whom: The Letter-of-Credit-Mechanism’ [1985] 17 UCCLJ 291, at 
p. 291 
31
 Traders are not using revocable documentary credits anymore. UCP 600 shows that documentary 
credits are confined to irrevocable forms. Article 2 describes this as: “Any arrangement, however 
named, that is irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing bank to honour a 
complying presentation”.  
32
 Unconfirmed documentary credits, like revocable ones, are rarely used. 
33
 It is noteworthy that documentary credits even if transferable can be transferred only once.  
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and on-acceptance credits are further types of documentary credits. Documentary 
credits can also be divided into straight and negotiated credits. A documentary credit 
is straight if available merely to the beneficiary. On the other hand, it is negotiated if 
it is available to people other than the beneficiary (e.g., negotiating banks). 
Given the scope of this work, it is not intended to examine the different relations and 
types of documentary credits in a detailed manner. This work’s main focus is the 
fraud exception in letters of credit, and accordingly the next chapters will examine the 
notion of fraud irrespective of the special type or relationship within which it exists. 
Whilst different types and relations are focused on in different parts throughout this 
work, it is the case that, unless otherwise indicated, irrevocable confirmed credits 
either issued merely by issuing banks or confirmed by correspondent banks, will 
constitutes the main focus of this dissertation. This fact emanates from traders’ 
predominant tendency to use those types of documentary credits which provide sellers 
with a prompt, certain and secure way of payment. After providing a background on 
documentary credits, the next section provides a similar background on independent 
guarantees, which is the other instrument with which this work is concerned.  
2.3. The legal basic principles and characteristics of Independent 
guarantees  
 
2.3.1. Terminology  
 
In Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v Barclays Bank International Ltd., Lord Denning 
MR., deciding an independent guarantee case, noted that “This case concerns a new 
business transaction called a ‘performance guarantee’ or ‘performance bond’”.34 It is 
suggested that to illustrate the nature of what the author has chosen to describe as an 
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independent guarantee, it will be important firstly to clear up some terminological 
confusion which arises from the lack of consistency in the use of labels which denote 
such an instrument.
35
 This subsection seeks to clear up one of two elements which are 
the reasons behind such confusion in this area. The other element is to be identified in 
subsection 2.3.4.  
It has been suggested that: “Both terminologically and conceptually the entire area of 
guarantees is, or at least was, marked by confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency”.36 
While an independent guarantee is ‘a new creature’,37 too many terms have been 
fashioned and used interchangeably in order to denote it. These terms include: 
‘performance bond’; ‘performance guarantee’; ‘demand guarantee’; ‘first-demand 
guarantee’; ‘on-demand guarantee’; ‘demand bond’; ‘first-demand bond’; ‘on-demand 
bond’; ‘bank guarantee’; ‘unconditional bond’ and ‘documentary guarantee’. 
However, while different from a business perspective, from a legal perspective there 
is no difference between these various terms as they are used interchangeably to 
denote the same functional instrument.
38
  
Furthermore, in the USA an independent guarantee is most commonly called a 
standby letter of credit.
39
 In fact, standby letters of credit were developed in the 1950s 
in the USA and have become widely used since that time.
40
 The reason behind the 
development of standby credits was “to circumvent legal restrictions on the 
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enforceability of guarantees in US law”.41 Indeed, while they might differ if looked at 
from a business perspective, standby letters of credit share the same legal 
characteristics as independent guarantees.
42
 It has been suggested that a standby letter 
of credit is a special type of independent guarantee
43
 and that distinguishing between 
both is “illusory or, perhaps of a semantic nature”.44 As has been advocated by Goode, 
it is important to appreciate that the differences between a standby credit and an 
independent guarantee: 
“lie in business practice, not in law, in much the same way as the labels, 
‘lease’, ‘rental’, ‘contract hire’ are used by leasing companies to 
distinguish transactions which in a business sense are different from each 
other though legally they are the same.” 45 
 
It is submitted that “Standby credits have been judicially recognised as functionally 
equivalent to [independent guarantees].”46 For instance, in Kvaerner John Brown Ltd 
v Midland Bank Plc & Anor,
47
 an obligation to provide an independent guarantee was 
satisfied by the procurement of a standby letter of credit.
48
 As has been noted, taking 
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the purpose of this work into consideration, standby letters of credit and different 
variations of independent guarantees mentioned above do serve the same purpose.
49
  
In this dissertation, to denote all of these variations and terms, the term ‘independent 
guarantees’ has been chosen. Into this term, independent guarantees, fall different 
nomenclatures such as: standby credits, unconditional performance bonds and demand 
guarantees.
50
 In order to clear the confusion and uncertainty in this regard, this 
dissertation uses a generic and neutral label to denote such instruments. Using the 
term independent guarantee to denote such an instrument reflects one of its most 
important characteristics which is being independent from other relationships created 
in order to bring this instrument into existence.  
2.3.2.  Mechanism 
 
The aim of this subsection is to illustrate the mechanism of independent guarantees in 
the same way that has been pursued above in the context of documentary credits. For 
instance, B is a buyer located in the UK who is eager to buy a consignment of laptops 
from S, a seller in Jordan. B does not know S very well and is not certain about S’s 
creditworthiness; therefore, B is reluctant to deal with S without an assurance that S 
will duly perform the assigned obligations that will ensue from the laptops’ contract. 
Occasionally, reliant on his superior bargaining powers, B would ask S to afford some 
credit in order to secure the transaction and to guarantee that the latter will perform 
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his contractual obligations to the fullest. Involving a third creditworthy person is one 
of the most successful solutions which might come to the minds of these parties.
51
  
In view of that, S will instruct his bank I, the issuing bank, to open an independent 
guarantee in favour of B. I, in its turn, will notify B that an independent guarantee was 
opened in his favour by S and that I is pleased to pay the independent guarantee to B 
on behalf of S once B presents signs that S has defaulted in performing the obligations 
assigned to him by the laptops’ contract. Contrary to the situation with documentary 
credits, where payment depends on commercial documents, the signs in an 
independent guarantee usually take the form of a plain demand.
52
 
Accordingly, with the existence of such an independent guarantee, B will be assured, 
to a great extent, that S will perform the obligations assigned to him. If S does not 
perform his obligations in the required manner, B will find it useful to demand the 
independent guarantee. In such a case, B will not need to commence litigation against 
S for the loss that he might suffer. Through utilising an independent guarantee, all that 
B has to do, in the case that he has suffered loss from S’s tardy performance, is to 
demand the guarantee amount. In such a situation, it is the seller, who did not fulfil his 
obligations, who would initiate litigation and bear its expenses.  
I, the bank which provided the independent guarantee and made the transaction easier 
and securer for B and S, will get an appropriate commission in return for its 
services.
53
 B gets a bank’s guarantee to compensate him for any loss that could be 
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caused by S. On the other hand, S would benefit from the bank’s facility in order to 
obtain the buyer’s contract where the latter would not risk dealing with the former 
unless assured that such an independent guarantee is provided. Moreover, S would 
become motivated to fulfil his obligations in order not to pay the independent 
guarantee amount. Like documentary credits, utilizing such an instrument brings 
benefit to all the parties involved. 
2.3.3.  Various relationships and types 
 
Three relationships exist in a simple independent guarantee: firstly, the contract 
between the seller, S (referred to as the applicant or the principal), and the buyer, B 
(the beneficiary); secondly, the contract between S and his bank I (the issuing bank); 
thirdly, the independent guarantee between the issuing bank, I, and the buyer, B.
54
 
Commonly, a distant buyer prefers to get the independent guarantee from a bank 
situated in his country rather than a bank located in the seller’s country. Thus, the 
former will require the seller to provide him with an independent guarantee available 
through the desks of his local bank.
55
 The involvement of a second bank in the 
buyer’s country gives rise to the need for a new contract between the issuing bank and 
the corresponding bank. In an independent guarantee context, the correspondent bank 
is called the issuing bank and the bank in the seller’s country, which instructs the 
correspondent bank to open the independent guarantee, is called the instructing bank. 
Such different terms should be kept in mind as they will be used hereinafter 
frequently to denote the different banks and different parties involved. 
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It has been said that “[independent guarantees] may readily be adapted to provide 
financial support for any transaction”.56 Unlike documentary credits, which are 
usually used to facilitate international sales contracts, independent guarantees are used 
to facilitate various contracts. For example, an independent guarantee has been used 
to guarantee a marriage promise in Canada.
57
 Such an instrument could be found used 
in the construction industry to protect employers from the contractors’ tardy 
performance of different construction contracts. Also, it could be found in 
international sales contracts to protect buyers and sellers against the defaults which 
they both may perpetrate.
58
 In the three examples provided above the independent 
guarantee is usually referred to as a performance guarantee. Such a term denotes the 
kind of act which the independent guarantee protects which is, namely, the 
performance of the underlying contracts.  
Another type, for example, is the tender guarantee which is used to guarantee the 
seriousness of a bidder to obtain a particular tender contract. Such a guarantee is 
meant to protect the beneficiaries’ interests in case the party who tendered it 
withdraws prior to entering into a binding contract. Overall, each different type of 
business may necessitate the issuance of a specific type of independent guarantee.
59
 
As Bertrams has observed: “One might safely assume that major transactions today do 
not take place without some kind of guarantee support.”60  
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2.3.4.  Comparison with ordinary guarantees 
 
In order to get a better understanding and appreciation of the remarkable role which 
independent guarantees serve, it would be useful to compare them with what has been 
known as ordinary guarantees. In comparing independent guarantees with ordinary 
guarantees, the other element instigating confusion and lack of consistency in this area 
of law will be identified.
61
 In fact, using the word ‘guarantee’ in both documentary 
guarantee and ordinary guarantee terms is a reason for confusion and lack of 
consistency. While both instruments share similar goals, both instruments embrace 
different rights and obligations for the parties utilising them.
62
 Accordingly, different 
outcomes could ensue from utilising each of these instruments of which the different 
parties should be aware before such utilization.
63
 
In England, the term guarantee has been conventionally used to indicate an ordinary, 
secondary, or conditional sort of commitment.
64
 The core of this relevantly deep-
rooted instrument is a promise to fix the default of others once they have defaulted.
65
 
What the promisee gets is a third party’s promise to answer the default of the person 
with whom the promisee deals once he/she defaults. Contrary to independent 
guarantees, the promisor guarantor would not pay as the result of a mere demand, but 
only in situations where an actual default could be proven by the promisee. Besides, 
the promisor in such event could raise any defence or counter-claim available to the 
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party that he is promising in favour in order to negate payment. For instance, if it later 
becomes apparent to the promisor that the parties’ contract was void and null, the 
promisor could grasp such a defence against the promisee to avoid paying the 
guarantee amount.
66
 The promisor in an ordinary guarantee could raise other defences 
which are not available for the party which he guarantees in case of the latter’s 
default.
67
 Such defences include set off and changes and alterations in the contract 
which have been made without the knowledge of the promisor and which would 
increase the latter risks.
68
  
In an independent guarantee the payment process is different. While in an ordinary 
guarantee the payment is conditional on actual default, in an independent guarantee 
the beneficiary does not need to prove the applicant’s default but a mere written 
demand will qualify him to obtain its amount. Banks are not concerned with the 
underlying contract terms and so cannot raise defences available to applicants against 
beneficiaries in order to refuse payment.
69
 Therefore, as observed by Mugasha: “[an 
independent guarantee] is usually cheaper than its counterpart the surety bond”.70 In 
such a context, as it is not required to investigate whether actual defaults have 
occurred, banks do charge relatively cheap prices. Banks do not like the idea of 
investigating facts in order to pay and accordingly it is other entities such as sureties 
and insurance companies which usually provide ordinary guarantees and usually for a 
better-paid commission taking into consideration the factual risky type of work 
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connected with it.
71
 As a result of the different approach taken in order to effect 
payment, the independent guarantees payment process is easier and quicker than that 
of its counterpart.
72
  
An ordinary guarantee has been described as an instrument which “provides little 
security for the beneficiary”.73 Ordinary guarantees are applicant oriented as they 
serve the applicants’ interests more than that of beneficiaries. However, independent 
guarantees are beneficiary oriented as they serve the beneficiaries’ interests more than 
that of the applicants.
74
 Therefore, independent guarantees and ordinary guarantees, 
while sharing similar goals, embrace different rights and obligations for the parties 
utilising them.
75
 
In fact, it should be noted that there is much terminological confusion and lack of 
certainty in deciding whether a certain guarantee is an independent or an ordinary 
guarantee.
76
 Such a fact is well-embodied in different recent cases as well as in older 
cases.
77
 No precise approach has yet been adopted by English courts in determining 
how to distinguish between them.
78
 Indeed, labels do not constitute the conclusive 
evidence in deciding whether an instrument is an ordinary or independent guarantee.
79
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As suggested by Enonchong: “It is generally accepted that the correct characterization 
depends on the construction of the instrument”.80  
Ordinary guarantees are legally different from independent guarantees and therefore 
will not be discussed further. This study is concerned with independent guarantees 
which through their distinctive legal characteristics the fraud exception has found its 
way to develop.
81
 In the next chapters, the term guarantee denotes an independent 
guarantee as opposed to an ordinary guarantee. 
2.4. Issues pertaining to both documentary credits and 
independent guarantees: a background  
Documentary credits and independent guarantees, while different in terms and goals, 
do share the same legal principles and characteristics.
82
 Both share an irrevocable 
binding nature which is acquired once they are issued by the concerned bank. Besides, 
they both share two important inherited principles which are, namely: autonomy and 
strict compliance principles. Also, given the great attention that they receive in the 
area of international trade and the lack of national law codification to this area, a 
number of different international initiatives have emerged to guarantee their smooth 
running. 
The aim of this section is to provide a background for the common legal basic 
principles and characteristics which both instruments share. By providing such a 
background the main aim of this chapter, which is providing a general background to 
these instruments in order to help understand the following discussion in subsequent 
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chapters, will be accomplished. Taking this into account, subsection 2.4.1 is intended 
to discuss the binding nature characteristic. The following subsection provides a 
discussion in regard to two important inherited principles, the autonomy and strict 
compliance. Finally, subsection 2.4.3 will offer enlightenment in relation to the 
different initiatives that have been constructed in this area. 
2.4.1.  The binding nature 
 
A bank that has once issued a documentary credit or an independent guarantee cannot 
revoke such a commitment. While the matter seems to be simple, legal scholars have 
had a prolonged debate with regard to this.
83
 They have noted that such a binding 
nature cannot be justified from a contractual perspective. In Goode’s words: 
“…the problem is to reconcile the binding nature of the bank’s 
undertaking with traditional concepts of general law, which deny legal 
effect to a simple promise unless consideration is furnished…”.84 
 
In fact, English law has some theoretical problems with justifying such a binding 
nature. In English law, what is called the doctrine of consideration necessitates that a 
contract cannot be recognised as binding unless each party gives something to the 
other.
85
 In other words, in order to find a contractual relationship between the bank 
and the beneficiary, some finding of a valid consideration moving from the latter to 
the bank is required. According to Sarna: “This consideration, to be valid, must not be 
past consideration, that is, arising from a previous bargain”.86 For example, the 
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promise to deliver the goods, which has been made in the sale contract prior to the 
issuance of a documentary credit, does not provide a valid consideration as it is a past 
one. Moreover, a consideration used to affect a particular contract cannot be used “a 
second time to constitute the basis of the bank-beneficiary transaction”.87 
This specific point has been raised by the English courts in three different cases. In 
Urquhart Lindsay & Co., Ltd. v. Eastern Bank Ltd,
88
 Rowlatt J. was of the opinion 
that a documentary credit or an independent guarantee is an offer made by banks to 
sellers and that it becomes binding when the seller acts upon it. In his opinion, the 
binding nature of the credit commences merely when the seller acts on it. Similarly, 
such an opinion has been pursued in Elder Dempster Lines Ltd. v. Ionic Shipping 
Agency Inc
89
 by Donaldson J. who found that the best explanation of the legal 
phenomenon constituted by these instruments is that it is an offer which is accepted 
by being acted upon.
90
 However, it is submitted that such an opinion does not provide 
an answer to the following question: why before the seller acts upon these instruments 
the bank cannot revoke such an offer which has not yet been accepted by the 
beneficiary?  
A different view was expressed in Dexters, Ltd. v. Schenker & Co.
91
 where Greer J. 
suggested that such instruments become binding when they reach the seller’s hands. It 
is unclear whether his Lordship intended to lay down a general rule regarding this 
point or only to explain the point at which such a credit becomes binding. 
Interestingly, a defence of lack of consideration has been pleaded in this case but it 
                                                 
87
 Ibid at p. 30 
88
 [1922] 1 K.B. 318. See also Devlin J. in Midland Bank, Ltd. v. Seymour [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 147 at 
166 
89
 [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 529 at 535 
90
 Ellinger, E. “Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” (University of Singapore Press, 
Singapore, 1970) at p. xvii 
91
 (1923) 14 LI.L.R. 586 at 588 
37 
 
has been found that it does not affect the binding nature of such instruments. As seen 
above, the English courts have not given a final decision on this point yet. The dicta 
provided did not affect either the binding nature or the operation of such instruments 
and “if the point were taken the courts would uphold the binding nature of the bank’s 
undertaking”.92  
Since the beginnings of the last century, a string of “peculiarly unsatisfactory”93 
theories have been advanced by different scholars to explain the binding effect of 
these instruments.
94
 Rowe,
95
 Malek,
96
 Roy,
97
 Goode,
98
 Finkelstein,
99
 Ellinger,
100
 and 
many others
101
 refused such theories.
102
 In Rowe’s words: 
“None of these [theories] quite fits the commercial realities. The courts 
recognise the binding effect of bankers’ irrevocable credits nonetheless, 
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which is what the parties want. English law may not be too certain what 
letters of credit are, but English judges enforce them.”103  
 
It has been frequently reiterated by these learned authors that independent guarantees 
and documentary credits are of “a special nature”104 and that they are “sui generis” 
instruments.
105
 It has been also suggested that it is impossible to apply “general 
contractual concepts such as consideration and offer and acceptance” to these 
instruments.
106
 This position has been accepted by courts for the past 200 years
107
 and 
it suffices to say that it is now accepted all over the world.
108
 It is suggested that the 
reason for the binding nature of these instruments is the way it has been intended that 
they operate through merchants.
109
 The lack of a cogent theory to justify the 
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instruments’ legal operation did not weaken their practical value as can be seen by 
their increasing use.
110
  
It is submitted that such a debatable point is an academic one. Authors in England, 
USA, France and other countries have agreed that wading into the midst of this 
debate, in order to justify the mechanism of such instruments, is of a little practical 
help.
111
 Irrespective of the existent lack of consideration, it is difficult to imagine that 
a bank would attempt to escape paying these instruments as the bank’s commercial 
reputation would be acutely damaged.
112
 In Harfield’s words: 
“the banker’s letter of credit is a legally enforceable instrument, rooted in 
the law merchant and contractual in its nature. There is neither need nor 
utility to employ Procrustean techniques to establish its validity”.113  
 
2.4.2.  Two distinct principles 
 
2.4.2.1. The autonomy principle 
 
Also well-known as the abstraction or the separation principle, this subsection is 
concerned with the autonomy principle which plays an important role in this context. 
According to Sarna, “The notion of autonomy has long been accepted as the very 
basis of the letter of credit system, permitting both assurance and immediacy of 
payment”.114 The principle of autonomy is based on the fact that documentary credits 
and independent guarantees do create several legal relationships with other parties 
who are not involved in the underlying contract which brings up these instruments.
115
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As been explained above,
116
 a minimum of three legal relationships are involved in 
order to bring a documentary credit or an independent guarantee to existence. The 
principle of autonomy dictates that each of these legal relationships should be kept 
separated from other relationships. This is to say, the contract of the buyer with the 
seller should be kept separated from the bank’s legal relationship with both the seller 
and the buyer. Similarly, the buyer’s legal relationship with the bank should be kept 
separated from the bank’s relationship with the beneficiary and from that of the 
latter’s relationship with the former. In addition, the beneficiary’s legal relationship 
with the bank should be kept separate from the bank’s relationship with the buyer and 
from that of the latter’s relationship with the former. If a correspondent bank is 
involved, each of its relationships, with the issuing (instructing) bank, seller or the 
buyer, should stand alone and none of the different legal relationships should affect 
any other relationship. 
The main basis of the bank’s obligation to pay emanates from the independent 
guarantee or the documentary credit itself.
117
 An independent guarantee is not an 
ordinary guarantee and thus the bank’s payment obligation is primary, not secondary, 
as it is the first port which the beneficiary will approach to obtain money against the 
damages it has sustained. On the other hand, a documentary credit is not a sale of 
goods which the parties complete in person, but a payment instrument which the bank 
affects as a principal and not as an agent of the buyer.
118
 Parties cannot benefit 
themselves from the different legal relationships which exist in such contexts. 
Accordingly, a beneficiary could not escape submitting a required document in a 
documentary credit context relying on a variation in the sale contract terms between 
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him and the buyer. Likewise, a buyer could not force the bank to stop its payment 
process relying on some problems that have arisen between him and the beneficiary. 
Moreover, the bank cannot negate payment relying on disputes that might ignite 
between beneficiaries and applicants. 
While the autonomy principle has been contained in a code in some civil law 
jurisdictions such as France, it has been recognised as a part of the common law in 
England.
119
 One of the early and oft-quoted statements to this effect is Lord Jenkins’ 
statement, in Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd., where he 
provided: 
“We were referred to several authorities, and it seems to be plain that the 
opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the 
banker and the vendor of the goods, which imposes on the banker an 
absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute which there may be 
between the parties on the question of whether the goods are up to 
contract or not.”120 
 
2.4.2.1.1.  Why autonomy? 
 
As noted above,
121
 it is difficult to reconcile the interests of different sellers and 
buyers unless a third party, usually a bank, interposes. Such interposition resolves 
many of the concerns that sellers and buyers had been experiencing before 
documentary credits and independent guarantees came into practice.
122
 Banks do not 
have knowledge of the sale contract terms, nor of any subsequent variations or 
repudiation of such a contract by the trading parties.
123
 Whilst banks do have expertise 
in handling documentary work, a contract of sale dispute could relate to the goods 
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themselves about which the bank will have no knowledge.
124
 As noted by Carr: “In 
practice, it would be extremely rare to find a bank willing to get involved beyond the 
level of payment against documents”.125 If banks were required to intervene in such 
contracts, “it is evident that the modern system of commercial credits would not 
exist”.126 
From the bank’s point of view, the autonomy principle does make good commercial 
sense, since in practice they will find it difficult to verify different contracts which 
they may finance or guarantee. It is also difficult to verify different disputes as a result 
of which the parties may come and make claims at the bank’s offices.127 Irrevocable 
binding documentary credits and guarantees would become revocable if banks or 
applicants could raise different defences available to them on the underlying contract 
in order to avoid payment. As Sarna noted:  
“It would be of little consolation to the beneficiary to know that his 
recourse against a solvent debtor was theoretically good but that payment 
could only be had after expensive lengthy litigation in a foreign 
jurisdiction.” 128 
From the beneficiary’s point of view, many risks, e.g. the applicant’s or the bank’s 
refusal to pay, are weakened by the existence of the autonomy principle.
129
 Banks 
could not rely on their relation with applicants to stop paying beneficiaries. If the 
applicant changes his mind, the bank cannot change its mind and will remain 
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responsible towards the beneficiary.
130
 However, it should be noted that the addition 
of such instruments does not alter the original contract’s different rights and duties. 
Parties could have an accounting session or a court lawsuit if needed later in order to 
settle their disputes.
131
 
Utilizing documents assures that bankers will not become involved in different 
underlying contracts and disputes that might follow.
132
 The essence of these 
instruments is that they are conditioned only by the terms of the documents which 
they contain. The autonomy principle is the principle which makes documentary 
credit and guarantees distinguishable from the above mentioned non-autonomous 
instruments.
133
 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that using third parties to 
finance such transactions is not without its own problems. It should be noted that the 
presence of the autonomy principle gave way to indirect inducements of fraud on the 
part of the beneficiaries. Taking into consideration that: “The effect of the rule of 
autonomy is multi-edged,”134 the autonomy principle has been deemed as “not 
absolute” opening the doors for some exceptions to exist in order to narrow the 
boundaries of such a principle.
135
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2.4.2.1.2.  Autonomy principle: for the benefit of whom? 
 
It has been suggested that the very basis of the autonomy principle is to provide the 
seller with “assurance and immediacy of payment”.136 In support of this Lord Diplock 
has provided: 
“The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed 
irrevocable documentary credits has been developed in international trade 
is to give to the seller an assured right to be paid before he parts with 
control of the goods…”137 
 
While it has been frequently reiterated that the purpose of such instruments is to 
“assure the seller’s payment,”138 it is suggested that the autonomy principle does serve 
applicants’, beneficiaries’ and banks’ interests. It is submitted that one of the main 
objects of documentary credits is to safeguard buyers against situations where they 
may pay but not obtain the goods. Such a view has been echoed by different 
commentators.
139
 Indeed, a bank wishes “not to get involved in disputes, complexities 
arising from the underlying contract”,140 and the autonomy principle has been inserted 
in order to make such a wish comes true. The nature of these instruments and the 
banks’ lack of abilities to scrutinize each of the transactions which involves such 
instruments are reasons for the autonomy principle manifestation in this context. 
Protecting the beneficiaries’ right of payment is another reason for the autonomy 
principle addition. Neither banks nor applicants could negate the beneficiaries’ right 
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to payment relying on a dispute that has arisen from the underlying transaction. 
Besides, guarding the applicants’ expectations regarding the goods is a third reason 
for the autonomy principle existence. The bank would not pay the beneficiary unless 
the documentary conditions, instructed by the applicant, are fulfilled. In sum, it is 
submitted that the autonomy principle aims to serve all the involved parties’ 
expectations and needs in order to facilitate the running of such instruments.  
2.4.2.2.  The strict compliance principle 
 
The strict compliance principle works hand in hand with the autonomy principle to 
preserve the effectiveness of these instruments.
141
 As has been suggested: “Strict 
compliance may be the best legal rule which can be devised to govern how closely 
tendered documents ought to comply with the terms of the credit”.142 In English, 
Scottish and Australian Bank v Bank of South Africa, Bailhache J. has illustrated the 
strict compliance notion. In his words: 
“It is elementary to say that a person who ships in reliance on a letter of 
credit must do in exact compliance with its terms. It is also elementary to 
say that a bank is not bound or indeed entitled to honour drafts presented 
to it under a letter of credit unless those drafts with the accompanying 
documents are in strict accord with the credit as opened”.143 
 
The strict compliance principle reflects the terms of the contractual obligation 
allocated to the bank. A bank can only claim reimbursement from the account party 
“if the conditions on which it authorised to accept are, in the matter of the 
accompanying documents, strictly observed”.144 According to Mackinnon L.J. in JH 
Rayner & Co Ltd v Hambro’s Bank Ltd:  
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“…it is quite impossible to suggest that a banker is to be affected with 
knowledge of the customs and customary terms of every one of the 
thousands of trades for whose dealings he may issue a letter of credit”.145 
 
Such a principle does protect bankers’ and applicants’ expectations. The applicant 
instructs the bank not to pay the beneficiary unless he strictly fulfils the former’s 
instructions.
146
 Under such a principle, an apparently trivial discrepancy would justify 
rejecting the documents submitted by the beneficiary if the credit is precise as to that 
requirement.
147
 If such rejection is limited to documents with material discrepancies, 
banks would have to judge materiality which they do not have the relevant expertise 
to judge.
148
 
The necessity of the strict compliance principle in an independent guarantee has been 
debated as
 
it is rare that an applicant asks for documents in such a context.
149
 
Documents required in this context are prepared by the beneficiary himself who 
would have no problem attaining any strictly complying document as long as it is 
produced by him. As Guest has noted: “…neither the drafting of the default certificate 
nor the execution of the bill of exchange requires any specific skills.”150 It should be 
noted that, however, there are cases where the beneficiary fails to present one of the 
required documents such as the bill of exchange or where he tenders the entire set 
after the expiry date of the independent guarantee itself. 
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The matter has been disputed in the English courts. In Ermis Skai Radio and 
Television v Banque Indosuez Europa SRL,
151
 Thomas J. held that the strict 
compliance principle is applicable in independent guarantees. However, in Siporex 
Trade SA v Banque Indosuez,
152
 the High Court held that the strict compliance rule 
should not to be applied in such a context. It is suggested that the best approach in this 
regard can be borrowed from Staughton LJ in IE Contractors Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Plc 
where he provided: 
“The degree of compliance required by a performance bond may be strict 
or not so strict. It is a question of construction of the bond. If that view of 
the law is unattractive to banks, their remedy lies in their own hands”.153 
  
2.4.3.  International initiatives 
 
The law which governs independent guarantees and documentary credits has 
developed “largely through customs”154 which have been established through the 
bankers dealing with different parties in this context.
155
 Such customs are now largely 
embodied in different set of rules issued by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(hereinafter ICC).
156
 These sets of rules include: the Uniform Customs and Practice 
for Documentary Credits (hereinafter UCP), the Uniform Rules for Contract 
Guarantees (hereinafter URCG), the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees 
(hereinafter URDG) and the International Standby Practices (hereinafter ISP98). As 
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well as these sets of rules which have been shaped by the ICC, a Convention known 
as the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of 
Credit (hereinafter UN Convention) has been promulgated by the UNCITRAL as an 
attempt to set an international legal framework to regulate the operations of 
independent guarantees. 
The fact that national laws are few in this regard made most traders depend on the 
above mentioned international initiatives.
157
 Taking this into consideration, this 
subsection seeks to examine the role which each of these different international 
initiatives has played in this regard. Whether the role which they played has helped in 
mitigating the fraud problem in such a context will be analysed. Substantive issues 
regarding the fraud exception, with which this dissertation is concerned and which can 
be found in these initiatives, are to be examined where relevant in the next following 
chapters.  
2.4.3.1.  UCP 
 
Today, most documentary credits are governed by the UCP which has been 
established by the ICC. The UCP has been described as the “most successful 
harmonising measure in the history of international commerce”.158 It has been stated 
that: “the UCP unification is a consequence of necessity and use of banks as agents in 
international trade”.159 Indeed, “The UCP was by no means an overnight success”.160 
It is important to note that documentary credits have undergone many changes in the 
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current and last century.
161
 Such changes have been mainly due to the “increased 
sophistication in banking practice, shipping and communication.”162 While the first 
version of the UCP was established in Vienna in 1933, taking the changes that 
documentary credits have undergone into consideration, many other versions have 
been produced by the ICC since that time. The last version, which is called UCP600, 
was issued on the 1
st
 of July, 2007. 
The UCP draftsmen had a “realistic and modest goal,” namely, “not to codify all the 
relevant rules of law, customary or otherwise, but rather to compile international 
banking customs and other rules that facilitate banking functions.”163 It is submitted 
that it is not surprising that uniformity has been achieved in this respect. Whilst the 
goal of documentary credits is to provide different parties’ involved in international 
trade with a secure method of payment, it is normal that such parties, who do not 
reside in the same country, agree on a unified interpretation of a documentary credit 
involved in their transactions. Indeed “a set of rules providing regulations of world-
wide application has always been necessary for the proper function of the system.”164 
Parties are not bound by the UCP unless they expressly incorporate it in their contract. 
Interestingly, some writers have gone further and have described the UCP as a code 
which is operative of its own force without even the necessity of incorporation in the 
contract.
165
 In this effect, Goode, for example, has regarded the UCP as: 
                                                 
161
 For a detailed discussion of each of these changes and the reasons for them, see: Gao, X. “The 
Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2002) at pp. 16-18 
162
 Sarna, L. “Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice” (Carswell Legal Publishers, 2nd ed., 
Toronto, 1986) at p. 9 
163
 Kozolchyk B, “Letters of Credit”, in. Ziegel, J. (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 9. Ch 5 (Hamburg, 1980) p. 146 
164
 Ellinger, E. “Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” (University of Singapore Press, 
Singapore, 1970) at p. 3 
165
 Goode, R. “Commercial Law” (Penguin Books, 3rd ed., London, 2004) at pp. 968-969. See as well. 
Gao, X. “The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2002) at p. 18 
50 
 
“…directly incorporated by implication into the contract on the basis that 
their adoption is so much a matter of course that the parties must be taken 
to have intended to contract with reference to them even if the contract 
does not state this in terms and even if one of the parties was not aware of 
the UCP.” 166  
 
Whilst Goode’s suggestion is commendable, it is submitted that, so far as the English 
law is concerned, the position of the UCP does not constitute a law in the technical 
sense.
167
 However, it should be said that even if the parties do not incorporate the 
UCP in their contract, this does not mean that a court cannot look into the UCP to find 
an answer for a specific point not tackled by the contract. In fact, English courts have 
relied on UCP in some cases even where there was no reference to it in the contract.
168
  
The UCP does not mention anything regarding the fraud problem which constitutes 
the main focus of this dissertation. It has been suggested that the reason for such a 
vacuum is the “difference and uncertainty of the position in municipal laws and that 
every court should give its decision according to the related municipal law.”169 Taking 
this into account, later discussion about the fraud exception will not include 
provisions derived from the UCP. However, such a discussion will benefit from 
different related provisions such as those which address the autonomy principle.  
2.4.3.2.  URDG 
 
Whilst the UCP has been intended to cover both documentary credits and independent 
guarantees,
170
 it has been noted that “The majority of the provisions are simply 
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inappropriate”171 to apply to independent guarantees.172 Accordingly, the ICC has 
issued a set of rules which are directed to address the operation of independent 
guarantees. The new rules called the URDG 458 were first issued in 1992. URDG 758 
is the second and most recent edition of the URDG.
173
 URDG 758 became operative 
on the 1
st
 of July, 2010. The URDG, “which is strongly influenced by the UCP”,174 is 
applied if incorporated by the parties into their contract. URDG seeks to balance the 
interests of the different parties who utilise an independent guarantee by setting clear 
unified definitions and rules to control its operation. As UCP600, URDG 758 has 
been issued in order to cope with the changes that have occurred in the field of 
independent guarantees lately.  
However, what distinguishes URDG from UCP is that the former have inserted some 
provisions to mitigate fraudulent practices.
175
 Indeed, URDG “impose some constraint 
on unfair calling of the guarantee without undermining its efficacy as a swift remedy 
in the event of perceived default”.176 Article 15 of URDG 758 requires the beneficiary 
to present a written default statement in order to obtain the independent guarantee 
amount. It also requires the beneficiary to indicate the respect in which the applicant 
has breached his obligations. It has been suggested that:  
“Requiring such written statements may discourage improper demands on 
a guarantee or counter-guarantee, as even a beneficiary who might not 
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hesitate to make an improper demand might think twice before presenting 
a false written statement”.177 
 
While it offers some preventive measures, the URDG does not offer practical solution 
for the fraud problem where it happens. Moreover, it is noteworthy that a recent 
STIPRO study has found that only a minority of independent guarantees which were 
issued in the UK are made subject to URDG.
178
 As been noticed by one commentator: 
“in the UK, URDG 458 is very rarely seen in practice”.179 It remains to be seen 
whether URDG 758 will follow the footsteps of its precedent or not. For now it is 
sufficient to say that URDG pertinent articles to the fraud discussion following in the 
next chapters will be discussed where relevant. 
2.4.3.3.  URCG  
 
The URCG was issued in 1978 by the ICC.
180
 In fact, it has been suggested that the 
URCG does not deal with independent guarantees but rather it has been set out in 
order to deal with uncertainties and ambiguities related to ordinary guarantees.
 181
 
However, URCG has been rarely accepted or used since its publication as it has 
“proved too far removed from market practice to be acceptable”. 182 
URGG did not made clear whether it is a set of rules which aim to unify independent 
guarantees or ordinary guarantees practices. Article 9 requires the beneficiary to 
present a judgement, an arbitral award or the principal’s written acceptance in order to 
obtain the guarantee amount. While such numerous requirements could be seen as 
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treatment for the fraud problem which frequently occurs in such a context, URCG has 
been heavily criticized as it has “virtually turned independent guarantees to accessory 
ones.”183 Taking this into consideration, URCG will not constitute a part of the 
following discussion. 
2.4.3.4.  ISP98  
 
Taking into consideration that the UCP is a set of rules more pertinent to documentary 
credits and the long American battle with guarantees,
184
 the United States centred 
Institute for International Banking Law and Practice with ICC support has 
promulgated a set of rules specifically designed for standby letters of credit.
185
 The 
ISP98 came into effect in 1999. These rules have been drafted similarly to UCP and 
URDG. It shares the same different characteristics which have been explained above 
in regard UCP and URDG. Yet, ISP98 states expressly that it does not provide for 
“defences to honor based on fraud, abuse or similar matters.”186 
2.4.3.5.  UNCITRAL Convention 
 
The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of 
Credit has been prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL).
187
 This Convention which deals with independent guarantees was 
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adopted by the General Assembly by its resolution 50/48 of 11 December 1995.
188
 
This Convention entered into force on 1, January, 2000. To this date, only eight 
countries have utilised this Convention.
189
 The Convention has been mainly designed 
to assist the practice of independent guarantees. It seeks to solidify the recognition of 
its basic principles and characteristics. It also emphasizes the common umbrella of 
rules provided for independent guarantees to overcome divergences that may exist in 
terminology.
190
 While it could be applied to documentary credits,
191
 it mainly applies 
to independent guarantees.
192
  
What is special about the Convention is that, contrary to the above mentioned rules, it 
has dealt explicitly with the fraud problem in a comprehensive manner.
193
 It has been 
suggested that the UN convention took “a middle way”194 as it has neither left a 
vacuum in respect to the fraud issue (like UCP, URDG, and ISP98) nor burdened the 
parties with difficult requirements (like URCG). It has been suggested that such a 
treatment “constitute[s] a good barometer of international consensus on the topic of 
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fraud”.195 Yet it should be recalled that the UN Convention “has very limited 
application”.196 This could be attributed to the fact that it is only a few countries that 
have made use of the Convention. 
2.5.  Conclusion 
The popularity of documentary credits and independent guarantees in international 
commerce has led judges to describe them as “the life blood of international 
commerce”.197 Taking into consideration the problems that their predecessors have 
been confronting, these instruments have been devised by merchants to facilitate their 
different transactions. Different names and various types have been developed in this 
context to satisfy the numerous requirements of the different parties. Moreover, the 
autonomy and the strict compliance principles have been inserted to ensure the 
smooth running of these instruments and to protect the parties’ different expectations. 
Principles borrowed from contracts or other instruments are not always applicable to 
documentary credits and independent guarantees as they are neither contracts nor 
usual payment methods or ordinary guarantees. It should be always kept in mind that 
these unique instruments have evolved in an exceptional way to ensure a smooth 
operation of international trade finance.  
The manifestation of different initiatives to unify the customs and practices of 
documentary credits and independent guarantees is a normal consequence which 
reflects the importance of these instruments in the international commerce realm. 
However, the fact that these rules have overlooked the fraud problem is regrettable. 
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Having allocated some rules, the UNCITRAL Convention approach is commendable 
in this regard. Nevertheless, under such a lax attitude, it is suggested that the true 
remedy against the fraud problem lies in the courts’ hands. Unless a certain court is 
willing to interfere in order to stop fraud, a documentary credit or an independent 
guarantee governed by the UCP, URDG, ISP98 or URCG would remain susceptible 
to fraud practises. The same applies in regard to the UN Convention especially if its 
limited application is taken into consideration. 
After providing a general background dealing with the important basic legal principles 
and the characteristics of documentary credits and independent guarantees, the next 
chapters aim to deal with the fraud exception to the autonomy principle in both 
documentary credits and independent guarantees.  
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Chapter Three: Non-genuine Documents: A Bank Defence to 
Payment 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which banks can successfully rely 
on the fraud exception to refuse tendered documents in a letter of credit context. This 
chapter seeks to answer the following questions: is the approach adopted by English 
courts acceptable in this respect? Does this exception meet the banks’ and applicants’ 
expectations? If not, what other solutions can be submitted in order to relieve banks 
and applicants from fraud perpetrated by unscrupulous beneficiaries?  
Accordingly, after the introduction, the second section examines the American 
seminal case in this regard: the Sztejn case.
1
 Examining this case, which is 
acknowledged as the first case to recognise the fraud exception and upon which later 
English authorities have erected their decisions, is an indispensable necessity in this 
regard in order to understand the precise nature of the fraud exception. The third 
section is meant to examine the English seminal case in this regard: the American 
Accord case.
2
 Examining this case is also important in order to understand how 
English authorities have applied this exception and in order to appreciate the different 
implications of such an application. The following section explores the nullity 
exception, the tenor of which advocates that a bank should be able to reject a null 
document notwithstanding whether it is fraudulent or not, and discusses whether such 
an exception should be recognised or not. The fifth section is the conclusion.  
For the purposes of this work, fraud perpetrated in a letter of credit context is divided 
into two potential categories: firstly, fraud which can be found by merely examining 
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the documents accompanying the seller’s demand for payment (e.g., where there has 
been falsification of a signature or a date on a certain document): secondly, fraud 
which cannot be found by examining the documents alone and which needs an 
investigation of external facts in order to determine whether a call on a letter of credit 
is fraudulent or not (e.g., examining the underlying transaction which the documents 
represent or the underlying contract which has been issued through a letter of credit). 
Whilst it is submitted that fraud in either of the categories would certainly result in 
fraud in both, this should not obscure the fact that a fundamental differentiation does 
exist between them. On the one hand, documents are presented by sellers to banks and 
hence it is the latter that would discover a “documentary” fraud such as a falsified 
signature on a bill of lading. On the other hand, it is an inherited particularity of the 
letters of credit law that bankers are merely concerned with documents.
3
 Hence, if the 
fraud is one which does not relate to the documents but to the goods (e.g., the 
shipment of water rather than petrol) or the underlying contract between the seller and 
the buyer (e.g., the seller misrepresents some facts in order to make the buyer enter 
into the contract), the only relief for buyers would be to seek the intervention of courts 
by means of injunctions to stop the letter of credit payment. 
Legal and practical issues arising from such differentiation is the core of the next 
chapter (chapter four). The second category, which relates to fraud which needs 
external investigation, is to be discussed in chapters five and six respectively. 
However, it is the object of this chapter to examine the first “documentary” fraud 
category and its relation to the fraud exception. It should be noted that the focus of 
this chapter is centred on documentary letters of credit. The reason behind such a 
focus on documentary credits is that the use of documents is of such a limited 
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application in independent guarantees.
4
 Nonetheless, it would be appropriate to apply 
the concluded outcomes equally to both documentary credits and independent 
guarantees as some of the latter require some documents to be presented in order to 
affect their payment. 
3.2. The Sztejn case 
 
Fraud in documentary credits is not new; indeed it came into existence simultaneously 
with the early stages of the life of documentary credit.
5
 However, fraud had not been 
fully developed as an exception to the banks’ obligation to pay under documentary 
credits, until the evidence of the well-known American case Sztejn v. J. Henry 
Schroder Banking Corp.
6
 Admittedly with approval, the Sztejn case, which has been 
described as the ‘seminal’,7 ‘landmark’8 and ‘the most illuminating’,9 sets the general 
framework of the fraud exception which has been adopted by later authorities who 
confronted a fraud allegation in a letter of credit context.
10
 As has been recently stated 
by one commentator: “It is customary, in any discussion on fraud and letters of credit, 
to begin with an analysis of the decision in Sztejn… Indeed, it is almost 
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unavoidable”.11 The decision of the Sztejn case is of central importance to the fraud 
exception discussion and hence it will be discussed below.  
3.2.1. The facts 
 
A brief summary of the Sztejn case facts are important in order to understand the 
discussion which will follow. In this case the buyer, Sztejn, contracted with the seller 
Transea to purchase a quantity of bristles. The parties agreed to finance the 
transaction by means of a documentary letter of credit. Therefore, Sztejn instructed 
his bank, Schroder, to open an irrevocable documentary credit in Transea’s favour. 
Accordingly, Schroder undertook the obligation to pay the seller once it had presented 
a bill of lading and an invoice evidencing the shipment of the required bristles and 
which conformed to the documentary credit terms. In his turn, to obtain the 
documentary credit amount, the seller presented the required conforming documents 
to a collecting bank called Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China which duly 
presented the documents to Schroder in expectation of the payment.  
Unexpectedly, and before the payment, Sztejn applied to the Supreme Court of New 
York for an injunction to stop the documentary credit payment.
12
 The basis of the 
injunction sought was that the seller had shipped worthless material instead of the 
agreed bristles. Sztejn alleged that Transea had in fact shipped: “fifty crates with 
cowhair, other worthless material and rubbish with intent to simulate genuine 
merchandise and defraud the plaintiff”.13 In its role, Chartered Bank resisted Sztejn’s 
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allegations and argued that they were solely “concerned with the documents on their 
face and on their face these conformed to the requirements of the letter of credit”.14 
Chartered Bank argued that it had not breached any of its obligations under the 
documentary credit and, consequently, it could not see a reasonable cause of action to 
restrain the payment. 
 
3.2.2. The decision 
 
3.2.2.1  Genuine documents: a pre-requisite to the autonomy principle 
 
At the beginning of his judgment, Justice Shientag stressed the significance of the 
autonomy principle in a way which made Chartered Bank believes that it would 
succeed in the case.
15
 Justice Shientag observed that without the autonomy principle 
the efficiency needed in letters of credit would be undermined. To that effect, he 
noted that banks should not be obliged to look behind the required documents and that 
such an approach if allowed would embroil banks in controversies which they are ill 
equipped to deal with.
16
 Nevertheless, he found that there is a pre-requisite which a 
documentary letter of credit beneficiary has to discharge in order to be appropriately 
covered under the autonomy principle umbrella. In this regard he provided that: 
“…Of course, the application of this doctrine [the autonomy principle] 
presupposes that the documents accompanying the draft are genuine and 
conform in terms to the requirements of the letter of credit”.17  
 
He underpinned the latter dictum by citing a statement from Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Lawyers Title and Trust Co
18
 which reads as follows: 
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“…obviously, when the issuer of a letter of credit knows that a document, 
although correct in form, is, in point of fact, false or illegal, he cannot be 
called upon to recognise such a document as complying with the terms of 
credit…”.19 
 
The last two quotations, where Justice Shientag evaluated the documents’ significance 
in a documentary credit transaction, are interesting. He found that a bank which 
knows that a certain document presented by a beneficiary is not genuine, in the sense 
that it includes a point of fact which is false, although correct in form and facially 
conforming to the documentary credit terms, has to refuse such a document on the 
basis of non-conformity with the credit terms. The question of who has perpetrated 
the falsity, whether the seller or a third party, or how it has been done, whether 
intentionally or innocently, or how material it is, whether it is trivial or significant, are 
issues that are of no relevance to the bank. In other words, whether the reason is a 
forgery, fraudulent misrepresentation or an unauthorised mistake resulting in the 
document being null, the bank would be justified in its refusal to pay. The bank’s 
obligation is to pay under genuine conforming documents and nothing other than 
that.
20
 Accordingly, it was submitted that a document being false in any respect will 
be refused by the bank without any further investigations.
21
 It is noteworthy that 
establishing any kind of fraud on the seller’s side at this stage is not required to justify 
the documents’ rejection.22 
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Justice Shientag illustrated that genuinity of the documents precedes the application of 
the autonomy principle and that the question of whether the documents are genuine or 
not has nothing to do with the autonomy principle which separates the documents 
from the underlying transaction which they represent. Whilst the autonomy principle 
dictates that a bank should not look into the underlying transaction to determine if a 
document is truthful or not, the same principle does not deprive a bank of the right to 
refuse to pay when it knows that a certain document is not a genuine one.
23
 As can be 
inferred from the above quotations, genuinity is a pre-requisite for banks to accept the 
documents. Once the documents presented are seen as genuine and conforming to the 
documentary letter of credit terms, one can say that the autonomy principle has been 
activated to protect the beneficiaries.
24
 Goode has noted the conformity and genuinity 
pre-requisite and described it as a ‘threshold test’ to activate the autonomy principle. 
In his words:  
“When the seller passed the threshold test by presenting documents which 
do in fact conform to the undertaking, he is in a strong position, for it is 
well established that the contract is independent of the underlying 
transaction.”25 
 
Having illustrated the genuinity point underlined in the Sztejn case, other aspects of 
the decision which comprise the fraud exception application are the substance of the 
discussion of the next subsection. 
3.2.2.2. Fraud as an exception to the autonomy principle 
 
A dispute regarding the genuinity of the documents in the Sztejn case cannot be found. 
The documents were genuine and conforming to the documentary credit terms and 
both the issuing and the collecting bank were unable to find any evidence of falsity or 
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non-conformity in the documents. Documents presented to the bank although genuine 
and conforming in form were fraudulent in their substance as the fraud was existent in 
the goods. As one commentator noted:  
“…it is not a difficult task to fabricate or forge these documents. 
Particularly with developing technology, every single person can fabricate 
an identical copy of a shipping document that is commonly used in trade, 
or they can buy one from related associations and fill it up according to 
their own wishes”.26  
 
It is also possible that a beneficiary could obtain a document through a conspiracy 
with its own maker. It is submitted that fraud in the goods renders the documents 
fraudulent and vice-versa (i.e. a documentary credit stipulates for a bill of lading 
evidencing the shipment of petrol and the seller, although he has shipped water 
instead of petrol, submits the stipulated facially confirming bill of lading). Such fraud, 
related to the goods and consequently rendering the documents fraudulent, is difficult 
to examine by banks and accordingly they refuse to interfere and stop the payment 
process unless they are provided with soundly established evidence of the perpetrated 
fraud in order to justify its refusal when sued by a beneficiary.
27
 Even if the former 
were provided with that kind of proof, in practice banks fear getting embroiled with 
such controversies and consequently advise their customers to obtain a court’s 
injunction to stop the payment process.
28
 This can be seen from the facts of the Sztejn 
case which is an appropriate example of a fraud case. 
Justice Shientag noted that, in situations such as the aforementioned, the sacrosanct 
autonomy principle which the beneficiary obtains even by submitting genuine 
documents should no longer be preserved to protect such fraudulent deeds. He noted 
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that there are few exceptions to this rigid principle and that fraud is one of them.
29
 
Whilst he observed the courts’ reluctance to interfere with the machinery of letters of 
credit and to act upon them in light of the underlying contract which led to their 
issuance, that did not prevent him from finding that: 
“…there is overwhelming approval of the notion that the fraud of the 
beneficiary in relation to the documentary evidence and the actual 
performance of his personal obligation should not go unpunished, or at 
least, unnoticed insofar as payment upon the credit is concerned.”30 
 
In considering the facts of the present case, he found for the plaintiffs on the basis of 
the fraud exception and as a result an injunction was granted.
31
 As a procedural 
requirement the allegations were considered as referring to established fraud.
32
 He, 
justifying the decision, noted that the case: 
“is not…concerning a mere breach of warranty regarding the quality of 
the merchandise; on the present motion, it must be assumed that the seller 
has intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer…the 
principle of the independence of the bank’s obligation under the letter of 
credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller…No 
hardship will be caused by permitting the bank to refuse payment where 
fraud is claimed, where the merchandise is not merely inferior in quality 
but consists of worthless rubbish”.33 
 
This statement sets out two key principles in regard to documentary credits law. 
Firstly, a distinction was made between mere breaches of warranty (such as one 
regarding the quality of the merchandise) and situations where fraud has been 
perpetrated deliberately in order to deceive a documentary credit applicant. Indeed, it 
is true that if courts were allowed to interfere in situations concerning a breach of 
warranty, the effectiveness of documentary credit would be damaged. However, as 
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Justice Shientag observed “The distinction between a breach of warranty and active 
fraud on the part of the seller is supported by authority and reason”.34 The court had 
found, from the case’s particular facts, that the seller had ‘intentionally’ perpetrated 
the fraud.
35
 It is noteworthy that such a finding might not usually be available to 
courts and banks due to the short period between the demand and the payment of the 
documentary credit. Furthermore, proving a defendant’s intention or state of mind is 
an extremely difficult task. Consequently, it is submitted that the dictum delivered by 
Shientag J. regarding fraud is not confined to situations where fraud can be proved to 
be perpetrated ‘intentionally’; rather, the existence of this piece of evidence in this 
particular case was a coincidence which made the allegation more compelling. The 
second key principle is that, as a consequence of fraud, the autonomy principle should 
not in any way be extended to protect an unscrupulous seller. As has been stated 
“…while the autonomy principle is paramount, the abstraction of the credit may be 
diminished by an application of the fraud defence”.36 
After illustrating the Sztejn case facts, one can notice the difference between genuinity 
as a pre-requisite before the autonomy principle is activated and fraud as an exception 
to obstruct the autonomy principle after it has been activated. Genuinity of the 
documents is a pre-requisite for payment to occur; however, fraud is an exception to 
the payment occurrence. In sum, as has been set out by the Sztejn case, fraud and non-
genuinity are two different defences to payment in a letter of credit context. Having 
revealed the difference between genuinity (the pre-requisite) and fraud (the exception) 
in Sztejn, one might ask: have English courts adopted a similar approach? The 
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following sections will examine the related English authorities in this regard in order 
to answer this question.  
3.3. The American Accord case 
 
The Sztejn case echoes have crossed the geographical boundaries of the American 
continent and became an international reference wherever fraud is alleged in a letter 
of credit context.
37
 Consequently, to date, English courts have been keen to cite Sztejn 
whenever a case of fraud comes before them.
38 In fact, it has been described as “the 
foundation stone of English Law in this area”.39 The doors to discussions of letters of 
credit fraud had been widely opened in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord).
40
 Interestingly, this case which has 
“…a profound effect on the letter of credit jurisprudence”41 took five years to settle. 
Whilst one might think that the English courts have adopted the American approach in 
this regard, yet the following discussion of the United City Merchants case is 
important and will demonstrate that a contrary approach to the Sztejn has been 
pursued. 
3.3.1. The facts 
 
In the United City Merchants, Vitro a Peruvian company entered into an F.O.B. 
contract to buy manufacturing equipment from an English company called Glass 
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Fibres.
42
 The parties agreed that the payment was to be carried out by means of 
documentary letters of credit. Thus, Vitro instructed its bank, Banco Continental S.A., 
to open an irrevocable documentary credit in Glass Fibres’ favour. The documentary 
credit was confirmed by the London branch of the Royal Bank of Canada. The credit 
terms included the following: that payment was to be triggered through a sight draft 
drawn on the confirming bank accompanying a full set of clean ‘on board’ bills of 
lading. The credit required the shipment from London to Callao on or before the 15
th
 
of December 1976.  
Pursuant to the contract, the seller early in December 1976 had the goods ready to be 
shipped. Unfortunately, “owing to some breakdown”,43 the ship that was supposed to 
transport the goods was cancelled. Therefore, and to rectify the situation, the carrier’s 
agent (the loading brokers) chose another vessel, the American Accord, to undertake 
the voyage intended. In fact, the American Accord left Felixstowe on 16 December 
1976, a day later than the agreed time. The loading broker’s employee, called Mr. 
Baker, “knowing that the correct date was a matter of importance in relation to a letter 
of credit”44 fraudulently produced bills of lading stating the 15th of December as the 
shipment day. Honestly believing in their accuracy, the beneficiary’s assignees, 
United City Merchants, tendered the documents to the Royal Bank of Canada 
requesting the documentary credit sum. Surprisingly, the latter refused to pay alleging 
that “information in [their] possession suggests that shipment was not in fact affected 
as it appears by the bill of lading”.45 Accordingly, the seller’s assignees brought an 
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action against Royal Bank of Canada alleging that its refusal to pay constituted a 
wrongful dishonour. 
3.3.2. The Court of first instance: fraud is the only defence 
 
Justice Mocatta noted that the proceedings are “of some complexity and difficulty 
both on fact and law”.46 The defendant bank argued that producing a bill of lading 
which lies about its place and time of shipment made it a non-genuine document 
which allows the bank to refuse it. The bank supported its allegation regarding the 
genuinity pre-requisite notion, well-illustrated in the Sztejn case, by citing a number 
of English and American cases.
47
 Justice Mocatta acknowledged that the act 
committed by the loading carriers resulted in the document being a non-genuine 
document.
48
 Moreover, he found that predating the bill of lading which was “so very 
indifferently altered that one can discern the figure 16 below the superimposed 15”49 
constituted fraud. Nevertheless, after citing some cases assuring the significance of 
the autonomy principle, he refused the bank’s arguments and admitted just one 
exception to the bank duty to pay, namely, fraud.
50
 Justice Mocatta found that the case 
is vitally different from the Sztejn as “…there was no fraud on the part of the 
plaintiffs, nor…that they knew the date on the bills of lading to be false when they 
presented the documents”.51  
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Justice Mocatta found that to be liable for fraud, the seller or his agents had to be the 
one who perpetrated the fraud, or at least that fraud had been committed under their 
knowledge.
52
 Accordingly, the fact that neither the seller nor his agents (the carrier) 
were responsible for the fraud exempted the former from bearing the liability occurred 
by such a fraud. Justice Mocatta noted that allowing banks to refuse payment on the 
ground of non-genuinity or even third parties fraud unknown to the beneficiary 
“might greatly hold up the smooth running of international trade and might place on 
banks exceptionally onerous investigations, which they are ill fitted to perform”.53 
Nevertheless, surprisingly, he added: 
“It was suggested by Mr. Brodie [for the bank] that the plaintiffs could 
readily have verified the date the containers were loaded on board by 
getting in touch with United States Lines [the carrier] at Felixstowe. This 
is no doubt true but the same can be said of the defendant”.54 
 
But this is contradictory. For example, one might ask, how could a bank facing a non-
genuine document know who has perpetrated such falsity? How could the bank know 
if it is the beneficiary, his agents or others without exceptionally onerous 
investigations? In addition, how could a bank ill fitted to perform onerous 
investigations, as described by Justice Mocatta, know if the falsity had been 
perpetrated intentionally to deceive other parties or if it happened innocently? While 
he claimed that banks should not investigate the underlying facts, he ironically 
justified the plaintiff’s failure to verify the goods’ loading date by alleging that the 
bank could know if they contacted the carriers. Indeed, how could the latter’s task be 
achieved while Justice Mocatta calls for not investigating? 
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Banks, according to Justice Mocatta’s approach, which recognise only fraud as a valid 
defence to payment, are required to pursue onerous investigations to find such 
information and not the other way around. Under such an approach, a bank might be 
held liable for a wrongful payment if it paid a beneficiary who presented a non-
genuine document which later is found to be fraudulent where fraud is perpetrated by 
the beneficiary or his agents. In contrast, a bank might be held liable for a wrongful 
dishonour if it refuses to pay a non-genuine document which later is found to be 
fraudulently perpetrated by third parties other than the beneficiary and his agents.
55
 
Moreover, banks might be held liable for damages if it is later found that the falsity 
has been done innocently. As one commentator puts it: 
“It would be surprising if the legal position were that if on the day of 
tender of documents the issuing bank knew, but the beneficiary did not, 
that the bill of lading was falsely dated, and the issuing bank were obliged 
to pay, whereas if the beneficiary did know, the issuing bank were not 
obliged to pay”.56 
 
Here is an example which would better show the results of Justice Mocatta’s 
questionable approach: a documentary credit requires the beneficiary to submit an 
invoice signed by one of the bank clients (which the bank is familiar with). However, 
the beneficiary submits an invoice with a false signature. Under such circumstances, 
what is the bank’s duty where it is without a doubt sure about the falsity of the 
signature? Unfortunately, as can be seen, applying Justice Mocatta’s approach, which 
calls for exempting the banks from exceptionally onerous investigations, ultimately 
will lead banks to investigate in order to protect their interests. As has been stated 
recently by one commentator: 
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“It is submitted that such a restrictive approach although simplistic in 
theory is difficult to apply in practice. It leads to the already demonstrated 
dilemmas that this puts the banks in... Consequently, a bank confronted 
with fraudulent documents will have to work out who committed fraud 
before it can decide whether to pay or not. Yet banks are supposed to 
assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, genuineness 
or legal effects of any documents. Furthermore, they are also not supposed 
to ask any questions and to deal in documents only not goods”.57 
 
It is submitted that the better approach is that which limits the bank duty to documents 
and nothing other than documents. External facts and parties’ intents should be of no 
relevance to banks. A bank’s decision to accept documents should be confined to a 
practical criteria and the question of who perpetrated falsity or why it is perpetrated 
should be irrelevant to the bank.  
Justice Mocatta justified the approach he has taken by contending that: “there is no 
plea either by way of an implied term or by way of a warranty imposed by the law 
that the presenter of documents under a letter of credit warrants their accuracy”.58 
With respect, if the presenter (the beneficiary) of the documents does not guarantee 
their accuracy who will do this?
59
 If this approach is applied, the essence of the 
beneficiaries’ transactions which is the shipment of the goods will be relegated into 
becoming a secondary matter and the main concern will be the documents whatever 
their source is.
60
 Such a statement allows delinquent beneficiaries to demand payment 
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where they possess facially conforming documents irrespective of their tenor.
61
 In 
other words, the beneficiaries’ worry will be concentrated on documents rather than 
the goods which are the essence of the transaction between them and buyers.
62
 Such 
an approach if followed would have harmful implications for vigilant sellers, who 
would know that there is fraud perpetrated in the transaction, and accordingly they 
will be deprived of payment.
63
 In contrast, delinquent reckless sellers will benefit 
from this approach by merely alleging that they did not know about such a fraud.
64
 
Furthermore, such an approach if allowed will give the opportunity to involve 
unscrupulous agencies who would issue fraudulent documents and flee after. In fact, 
litigation will not be an adequate remedy in the face of deceived banks or applicants 
in such situations because finding these fraudsters will be an almost impossible task.
65
 
Moreover, such a statement overlooks the documents’ importance and the role which 
it plays in international trade transactions. In fact, every document required by the 
buyer has its own function.
66
 A bill of lading is a carrier receipt, a document of title 
and an evidence of the carriage contract. An insurance policy is the buyer’s only way 
to compensate any loss which might happen to the goods whilst they are in transit. 
Furthermore, a certificate of origin will be an entrance requisite for the goods by the 
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authorities in different countries. Any of these documents if not stating the truth will 
jeopardise the bank’s and the applicant’s interests.67 
It seems that Justice Mocatta overlooked the fact established in the Sztejn case that the 
documents’ genuinity pre-requisite precedes that of the fraud exception application. 
Justice Mocatta has leaped over the genuinity question, which banks raise usually as a 
pre-requisite for payment, to discuss the fraud exception which comes later where 
genuine conforming documents are presented. In the present author’s view, the 
inability to distinguish between these two defences is the first reason which led Justice 
Mocatta to his conclusion. Blindly applying common law doctrines which have been 
developed out of the letter of credit context, such as the intentional fraud standard 
which Mocatta applied, is the second reason.
68
 It has been noted by Lord Griffiths 
that: “It would be most unfortunate if we had to look to the technicalities of our 
criminal law to determine the validity of international commercial transactions”.69 
Finally, exaggerated emphasis on the autonomy principle, which has been created by 
merchants to protect their interests, in a way which eliminates such interests, is 
another reason for reaching such a decision. As professor Goode noted: 
“Unfortunately, English courts have become so beguiled by the autonomy 
principle that they decline to allow refusal of payment in favour of a 
beneficiary acting in good faith even where the documents are forged or 
otherwise fraudulent, on the supposed principle that the beneficiary’s duty 
is to tender documents which appear to conform to the credit, even if they 
are in fact fraudulent and worthless. Such an approach, far from enhancing 
the documentary credit system, does a disservice to its integrity, and it 
will be argued a little later that it is high time it was abandoned.”70 
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Unsurprisingly, the matter went to the Court of Appeal.
71
 The Court of Appeal 
decision is the core of the next following subsection. 
3.3.3. The Court of Appeal: genuinity is a pre-requisite 
  
As a repercussion of the decision reached by Justice Mocatta, the case was brought 
before the Court of Appeal. Stephenson, Ackner and Griffiths L.J.J.
72
 respectively 
were the Bench who ruled the court’s verdict. To this Lord Stephenson held: 
“…if a document false in the sense that it was forged by a person other 
than a beneficiary could entitle the bank to refuse payment there was no 
reason why a document in any way false to the knowledge of a person 
other than the beneficiary should not have the same effect…here the bill 
of lading was a dishonest document, it was not a genuine document and 
the defendants were entitled to reject it”.73 
 
In choosing who should bear the loss that would ensue from a defective presentment 
of the documents, between the honest parties involved in a letter of credit (bank, seller 
and buyer), Lord Stephenson did not hesitate to choose the beneficiary.
74
 In his view, 
it is the beneficiary’s duty to obtain such documents and if he dealt with fraudulent 
parties, it is he, neither the bank nor the applicant, who should bear the consequences 
of his selection.
75
 He further noted that a document should not merely facially accord 
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with the credit requirements but rather it should accord with the facts shown on its 
face.
76
 He supported this view by citing one of Goode’s statements which states of the 
beneficiary that
77
: 
“He himself has a duty to tender documents which are in order, and the 
fact that he acted in good faith in tendering forged documents is thus 
irrelevant. This fundamental point appears to have been overlooked by 
Mr. Justice Mocatta…A fraudulently completed bill of lading does not 
become a conforming document merely because the fraud is that of a third 
party”.78 
 
In his turn, Lord Ackner suggested that the documents in documentary credit 
transactions might be the only available security for the banks.
79
 It is true that a bank 
does not open documentary credits unless it is assured about its customer’s (the 
documentary credit applicant’s) solvency.80 Nevertheless, where banks are uncertain 
about the customer’s creditworthiness, and to enhance its precautions, it usually 
requires the documents to be issued for its own order.
81
 Such stipulation protects 
banks in situations where they pay the documentary credit amount and applicants 
refuse or are unable to reimburse them later due to some difficult financial 
circumstances.
82
 A bank which stipulates that documents should be in its order might 
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sell or at least preserve the goods till the money is paid.
83
 Accordingly, his Lordship 
refused the appellants’ allegations and held that a bank which knows that the 
documents are “waste paper” is under no obligation to accept these documents or to 
pay against them. He further noted that “To hold otherwise would be to deprive the 
banker of that security for his advances, which is a cardinal feature of the process of 
financing carried out by means of the credit”.84 
Ackner L.J. further noted that applying the fraud exception in such circumstances is 
inadequate. He found that the fraud test had been wrongly applied before the 
genuinity test and therefore Mocatta J. was mistaken in applying the ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio doctrine.
85
 His Lordship observed that to apply the proper test in the 
proper manner one must go back to the first principles which govern letters of credit 
operations. In view of that he found for the defendants on the point that a buyer 
mandates his bank to pay the seller only if the latter presents genuine documents.
86
 
Conversely, if a non-genuine document is presented it should be refused irrespective 
of the reason or the identity of the person which makes the document non-genuine 
because “It is the character of the document, not its origin, that must decide whether 
                                                 
83
 Todd, P. “Cases and Materials on International Trade Law” (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) at p. 
396; Westpac Banking Corp v 'Stone Gemini' [1999] FCA 917  
84
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [1981] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 604 at 628 
85
 Ibid. As noted by Enonchong: “The phrase ‘fraud unravels all’ is a more accurate translation of the 
maxim fraus omnia corrumpit, which is probably a more precise basis for the exception than the 
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur action. The latter maxim is more commonly associated with the 
illegality defence. In some civil law jurisdictions the fraud exception is based on the maxim fraus 
Omnia corrumpit”. See: Enonchong, N. “The Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand 
Guarantees” (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at p. 97 
86
 Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) 
at p. 271; Megrah, M. ‘Risk Aspects of the Irrevocable Documentary Credit’ (1982) 24 Arizona Law 
Review 225, at p. 257 
78 
 
or not it is a “conforming” document, that is a document which complies with the 
terms of the credit”.87  
Griffiths L.J. agreed with Ackner L.J. that the identity of the forger is immaterial and 
that what does count is the document’s genuinity.88 He further found for the bank in 
the strict compliance point which dictates that banks are obliged to refuse documents 
which do not strictly comply with a letter of credit terms.
89
 His Lordship found it a 
strange rule to oblige banks to accept false but facially conforming documents which 
they are obliged to refuse by the virtue of the strict compliance principle if the 
documents correctly showed up such a falsity.
90
  
In short, the Court of Appeal revived the decision of the Sztejn case by applying the 
genuinity pre-requisite in such a case. Yet when the matter went to the House of 
Lords another view was reached. The following section is dedicated to investigating 
the various views raised in this venerable court. 
 
3.3.4. The House of Lords: fraud is the only exception 
 
In the House of Lords, Lord Diplock, with whom other Lords concurred, found the 
present case a unique case which “falls to be decided by reference to first principles”91 
and reversed the Court of Appeal judgment. It is submitted that his Lordship’s 
rationalization for the decision is not without its own problems. Indeed, Lord Diplock 
raised up two debatable key points, namely, the banks’ and sellers’ duty related to 
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documents and whether the seller acquires the status of a bill of exchange “holder in 
due course”. Each of these two points is examined below. 
3.3.4.1. Banks’ and sellers’ duty: conforming or any documents? 
 
Lord Diplock observing that “the stipulated documents…constitute a security 
available to the issuing bank”92 had cited one of the most related UCP Articles and 
concluded that the seller and the confirming bank “deal in documents and not in 
goods”.93 His Lordship found that, if, on their face, the documents presented to the 
bank conform to the credit requirements as stipulated by the bank that “bank is under 
a contractual obligation to the seller to honour the credit”.94 
Yet, one might ask, even if sellers and bankers only deal in documents, why are the 
latter obliged to accept documents which they know are not stating the truth. A careful 
examination of Article 8 of the UCP400, which Lord Diplock relied on in 
underpinning his aforementioned conclusion, reveals that his Lordship’s approach 
was mistaken. It is submitted that the main aim of this Article is to protect a good 
faith banker which accepts documents and pays without knowledge of fraud or falsity, 
and not to protect delinquent and unscrupulous sellers.
95
 Indeed, on this assumption, 
that they are not responsible for what is behind the face of the documents, banks issue 
letters of credit.
96
 However, to say that banks are obliged to pay documents which are 
facially conforming while they know that they are not overstates such a duty and 
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makes it a superfluous one.
97
 If this Article is applied the way Lord Diplock construed 
it, it will be with harmful implications for banks and applicants.  
It is true that it is an inherited particularity of letters of credit law that banks are not 
responsible for the goods’ condition and that the nature of their obligations is a 
documentary one.
98
 It is true also that banks and applicants do turn a blind eye to the 
goods, on the assumption that the documents required in the credit evidence the 
shipment of the agreed goods in the agreed condition, in order to facilitate the trade 
transaction process.
99
 But it goes too far to say that whilst banks and applicants cannot 
raise disputes regarding the goods’ they are obliged to accept any facially conforming 
documents irrespective of the known contrary facts.
100
 Moreover, the suggestion that 
banks are under an absolute obligation to pay is flawed because banks initially do 
examine documents and if they conform to the credit requirements they pay.
101
 
Ironically, it is submitted that applying Lord Diplock’s findings would confine banks’ 
responsibility in relation to a letter of credit to only scrutinizing commas and full 
stops. 
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His Lordship further called for the equation of the different parties’ duties involved in 
a documentary letter of credit transaction.
102
 In his opinion, if banks are protected 
from any unknown contrary facts regarding documents which might be discovered 
later, there is nothing preventing sellers from enjoying the same protection. To this 
effect, his Lordship stated:  
“It would be strange from the commercial point of view, although not 
theoretically impossible in law, if the contractual duty owed by 
confirming and issuing banks to the buyer to honour the credit on 
presentation of apparently conforming documents despite the fact that 
they contain inaccuracies or even are forged, were not matched by a 
corresponding contractual liability of the conforming bank to the 
seller/beneficiary (in the absence, of course, of any fraud on his part) to 
pay the sum stipulated in the credit upon presentation of apparently 
confirming bank”.103 
 
With respect, Lord Diplock was unable to distinguish between two dissimilar 
contractual obligations under a letter of credit transaction.
104
 That is to say, 
contractual obligations between the conforming bank, the issuing bank and the buyer 
on the one hand, and contractual obligations between the beneficiary and the banks on 
the other hand. Lord Diplock reached this conclusion after citing one of the UCP 
Articles which provides that:
105
 
“…confirming banks and issuing banks assume no liability or 
responsibility to one another or to the buyer ‘for the form, sufficiency, 
accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents’”.106 
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Whilst the Article quoted clearly limited its application to the first contractual 
obligations set out above, it goes too far in saying that this would govern the second 
contractual obligations set.
107
 Whereas it is the seller/beneficiary duty to present 
genuine conforming documents, the banks’ duty is confined to scrutinizing the 
documents’ face unless fraud or falsity is established before them. As has been stated 
by Jack QC in Montrod Limited v. Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH, Standard 
Chartered Bank: 
“There may be found in the different wording of these articles [UCP] 
support for a distinction between the rights of beneficiaries to payment, 
and the rights of banks to reimbursement, namely that beneficiaries must 
present the correct documents to have a right to payment, not merely 
documents which appear correct, while banks need only be concerned 
with the appearance to have a right of reimbursement”.108 
 
It is submitted that Lord Diplock’s equation of the two different contractual 
obligations is based on a questionable reasoning.
109
 It is in no way correct that the 
applicant mandates a bank to pay in lieu of non-conforming documents but, in 
contrast, common sense and commercial motivations advocate the necessity for 
conforming documents.
110
 Moreover, his Lordship’s attempts to justify the approach 
he pursued by highlighting the need to provide “…the seller an assured right to be 
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paid before he parts with control of the goods”111 is taken from a one sided 
perspective and therefore is untenable.
112
 While his Lordship assured on the seller 
aspect of the bargain, yet one might ask, what about the bank and the applicant 
aspects?
113
 Indeed, any contract contains more than one party and each of these 
parties has its own aspirations and expectations under such contract. Overemphasising 
the right of one of these parties more than the others will inevitably lead the latter to 
avoid utilising this kind of contract.
114
  
 
3.3.4.2. Is a documentary credit’s seller a bill of exchange “holder in due 
course”? 
 
Lord Diplock further found for the plaintiffs in relation to what can be described “the 
holder in due course” point. Matching the rights of the documentary credits’ 
beneficiaries with that of bills of exchange holders in due course under the American 
Uniform Commercial Code
115
 directed his Lordship to suggest: 
“…I see no reason why, and there is nothing in the Uniform Commercial 
Code to suggest that, a seller/beneficiary who is ignorant of the forgery 
should be in any worse position because he has not negotiated the draft 
before presentation”.116 
 
Indeed, it is undeniable that the law of negotiable instruments is connected to that of 
letters of credit as many of the latter stipulate for the former to be presented with the 
seller’s documents in order to obtain payment. Furthermore, for example, Professor 
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Kozolchyk claims that a documentary letter of credit belongs to “the realm of 
negotiable instrument law”.117 Interestingly, one court took a further step and stated 
that: “[a] letter of credit is like a bill of exchange…it ranks as cash and must be 
honoured”.118  
However, while the historical roots of bills of exchange and letters of credit are close, 
one cannot ignore that both instruments serve different functions and are utilised by 
different parties to serve different expectations.
119
 Unfortunately, the use overlap 
between the two instruments made Lord Diplock construe it as their being identical. 
In contrast, as one commentator suggests: 
“The analogy of letters of credit to bills of exchange, while of value in 
many ways, has its limitations. This might be expected in view of the 
rather specialized function which the modern documentary credit has 
come to perform”.120 
 
Hence, applying legal doctrines which have been tailored to serve negotiable 
instruments’ particular characteristics to documentary letters of credit without fully 
considering its implications is inadequate.
121 
It is suggested that
 
the application of the 
“holder in due course” doctrine, which is an inherited feature of bills of exchange law, 
to the letters of credit law in the manner which Lord Diplock has pursued in respect of 
beneficiaries is not without its own pitfalls.
122
 As Stephenson L.J. in the Court of 
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Appeal noted, a letter of credit “… is not a negotiable instrument, though it resembles 
a bill of exchange or a cheque in some respects”.123  
The “holder in due course” doctrine has been attached by merchants to bills of 
exchange to serve a special need.
124
 The lack of currency and the fear of theft or 
losing the money while traders are on their long commercial trips are the reasons 
behind bringing up bills of exchange to practice.
125
 Consequently, to help bills of 
exchange perform these functions it has inevitably been necessary to insert the 
“holder in due course” rule in order to ensure the effectiveness of such an 
instrument.
126
 Such a doctrine gives the party holding a bill of exchange the merit of 
the right to return to any of those who previously accepted or negotiated the bill and 
to ask for payment notwithstanding any dispute between those latter parties.
127
 This 
doctrine was inserted to encourage parties to become engaged in transactions that 
contain bills of exchange on the assurance that they will get paid irrespective of any 
defence which might arise from previous dealings.
128
 Indeed, those new holders might 
not know anything about other distant parties involved in the bill of exchange or the 
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reason why it was issued. Common sense and commercial marketability in allocating 
the risk of these defences necessitated putting the risk on previous parties.
129
 The 
main reason for such allocation is that those previous parties were in a better position 
than the latter holders to find out any defence which might be discovered later.
130
 
Hence, the urgent need for such a doctrine for such commercial instruments is 
appreciated.  
However, to say that this doctrine applies to a documentary letter of credit beneficiary 
is erroneous and inconsistent because the commercial purpose and the parties’ 
expectations are totally different in each instrument.
131
 Unlike a bill of exchange, the 
beneficiary under a documentary letter of credit is a seller who is required to carry out 
some duties which can be proven by documents in order to get paid.
132
 The seller’s 
position cannot be equated with that of a holder in due course in a bill of exchange 
transaction.
133
 Such a seller is not a stranger person to the underlying transaction 
which led to the issuance of the documentary credit, but rather the seller himself is the 
person who is supposed (in most cases) to manufacture, insure and send the goods 
with the properly contracted for documents.
134
  
While the beneficiary can, after presenting the documents if accompanied with a bill 
of exchange, negotiate the bank’s accepted draft with a third party resulting in the 
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latter being a holder in due course that cannot make the former a holder in due course. 
According to Ackner L.J: 
“We do not have to consider the complications which may arise when a 
claim is made under a letter of credit by a bona fide holder for value of, 
for example, a draft, because what was forged and false here was not a 
draft but a bill of lading and the point that the plaintiffs were bona fide 
holders for value was not raised at the trial”.135 
  
Courts should take into consideration that the motives which led to the creation of 
documentary credits is not the same as that of bills of exchange. A court, accordingly, 
before establishing hasty dictums, has to ask itself: what are the different parties’ 
expectations under these commercial instruments? Are the dictums it is applying 
consistent with these expectations? If not, it is suggested that it would probably be 
better if it tries to find an approach which is acceptable to all. 
3.3.4.3. The conclusion: fraud is the only exception 
 
Lord Diplock restored the judgement of Justice Mocatta which the latter provided in 
the Court of first instance. His Lordship, in relation to the autonomy principle, found 
one established exception, namely: 
“…where the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently 
presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by 
implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are 
untrue”.136 
 
This exception requires the existence of intent by the beneficiary to defraud other 
parties or at least the knowledge of such fraud.
137
 Yet, the difference between Lord 
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Diplock and Mocatta J.’s exceptions is the added on materiality requirement.138 It is 
submitted that this further requirement (materiality), at this stage, places on the banks 
a greater burden of investigation which supposedly they are exempted from by the 
virtue of the autonomy principle.
139
 Unfortunately, in accordance with what his 
Lordship found, if they select not to pay, banks presented with non-genuine 
documents have to prove that there is intent or knowledge of fraud on the 
beneficiary’s side and that such fraud is material. In spite of all these conditions which 
require banks’ external investigations, English courts still claim that they are 
maintaining the autonomy principle.  
Remarkably, his Lordship further stated that “The courts will not allow their process 
to be used by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud”.140 However, applying the 
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio doctrine which his Lordship employed leads to 
the conclusion that “The instant case, however, does not fall within the fraud 
exception”.141 Therefore, it is correct to say that English courts will eliminate fraud 
but, unfortunately, that elimination is limited to the fraud of beneficiaries and not all 
fraud. Fraud of other parties will be allowed to go unpunished. 
After all the motives which he alleged as the foundation of his, described as 
“unnecessary and erroneous”,142 judgement, Diplock L.J argued that to accept the 
non-genuinity pre-requisite “would embrace the fraud exception and render it 
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superfluous” and that it would “undermine the whole system of financing 
international trade by means of documentary credit”.143 Indeed, his approach has been 
strongly criticised.
144
 With respect, a moment’s reflection would show that the 
contrary is the sound approach. In Goode’s words: 
“The root of the difficulty underlying Lord Diplock’s reasoning lies in the 
conflation of two distinct principles of documentary credit law. The first is 
that the documents must conform to the credit; the second, that fraud on 
the part of the beneficiary or his agent absolves the bank of its duty to pay. 
Where a document is forged, the fraud involved is potentially relevant not 
only qua fraud but as rendering the document non-conforming. Forgery as 
fraud is not a defence within the second principle unless perpetrated by 
the beneficiary or his agent. What was overlooked by the House of Lords 
in the American Accord is that the selfsame forgery also means that the 
document is not genuine and cannot, therefore, be a confirming 
document”.145 
 
The raison d'être for what the House of Lords in the American accord reached was 
the conflation between two distinct defences, namely non-genuinity (non-conformity) 
and fraud. Applying the question of fraud before that of non-genuinity is what led 
Lord Diplock to reach his conflated decision. The current author agrees with Goode’s 
view that: “what should have been the threshold question, namely conformity with the 
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credit, was submerged beneath what should have been the second-stage question, the 
defence of fraud.”146 
Yet this was not the end of the story. Lord Diplock’s last words in this case kept the 
hope for non-genuinity to apply as an exception in some limited situations. To that 
effect, his Lordship stated: 
“I would prefer to leave open the question of the rights of an innocent 
seller/beneficiary against the confirming bank when a document presented 
by him is a nullity because unknown to him it was forged by some third 
party; for that question does not arise in the instant case”.147 
 
The last statement regarding what is described as a null document, and whether the 
case should be different if a document presented to a bank is null, comprises the focus 
of the discussion in the remaining parts of this chapter. 
3.4.  The nullity exception 
 
3.4.1. Introduction 
 
As seen above, Lord Diplock seemed to be accepting that what he held in the 
American Accord might not be applied when a document is a null one. Consequently a 
demand arose for recognising nullity as a separate exception that exempts banks and 
applicants from their obligation to pay. Bridge,
148
 Hooley
149
, Neo
150
 and many others 
were amongst those who demanded the recognition of such an exception.
151
 They 
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suggest that if banks have a significant interest in the documents as one of the main 
securities available, there is nothing that prevents them from refusing to pay when 
presented with such worthless documents. Indeed, at the first glance and without 
taking into consideration the implications of it, one might be taken by the 
attractiveness of this proposition. Yet, before getting into argument with the 
commentators who favour recognising a nullity exception some questions arise: what 
is the meaning of nullity? When can it be said that a certain document is a null one? Is 
the fact of being null confined to certain documents rather than other documents? Is 
there any correlation between the fraud exception and the demanded nullity 
exception? The subsequent sections of this chapter carry the answer. 
3.4.2. When a document can be considered as null?  
 
Part of the answers to the questions raised above can be found in the American accord 
case which is indisputably the seminal English case in regard to the discussion of 
fraud and nullity. Lord Diplock in respect of the nullity point noted that: 
“The bill of lading with the wrong date of loading placed on it by the 
carrier’s agent was far from being a nullity. It was a valid transferable 
receipt for the goods giving the holder a right to claim them at their 
destination, Callao, and was evidence of the terms of the contract under 
which they were being carried”.152 
 
In Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers
153
 a bank paid the seller after the 
presentation of a backdated bill of lading. The buyer brought an action for damages 
against the seller alleging that a fraudulently backdated bill of lading is a null 
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document. The House of Lords refused the buyer’s allegations and held that not every 
forgery would render a document null and void. Lord Devlin held that the bill of 
lading in this case was “valueless but not a complete nullity”.154 The court found that 
to constitute a nullity it is necessary that the forgery “goes to the essence of the 
instrument” and “corrupts the whole of the instrument or its heart”.155 The dictum 
held in the cases above finds more support in Lombard Finance v. Brookplain 
Trading 
156
 where the court held that what constitutes a nullity is limited to a forgery 
which goes to the essence of a certain document. Similarly, in the American Accord 
Court of Appeal, Lord Ackner rejected the bank submission that backdating a bill of 
lading would render it a nullity.
157
 He found that “…a bill of lading on which the date 
of shipment has been forged is not a nullity, since such a forgery would not go to the 
essence of the document.”158 Stephenson L.J., basing his suggestions on the Forgery 
Act 1913,
159
 provided some hints as to what can constitute a nullity and what cannot. 
In his words: 
“A document may tell a lie about itself, e.g., about the person who made 
it, or the time or place of making. If it tells a lie about the maker, it is a 
forgery; if it tells a lie about the time or place of making “where either is 
material “, it is a forgery... In the former case it may be a nullity; in the 
latter not”.160 
 
However, in Ruben and Another v. Great Fingall Consolidated and Others,
161
 where 
the maker of a share certificate himself forged the document, Lord Loreburn held that 
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the forged certificate is a “pure nullity”.162 Similarly, in Kreditbank Cassel G.m.b.H. 
v. Schenkers, Ltd,
163
 Bankes L.J. held that a document forged in any respect is a null 
and void. Moreover, in Egyptian International Foreign Trade v. Soplex Wholesale 
Supplies (The Raffaella)
164
 Leggatt J. found that a misdated bill of lading was a “sham 
piece of paper”.165  
Moreover, legal scholars have their own view in this regard. For example, one 
commentator found that nullity as an exception is confined to situations where an 
element of fraud is existent. In his opinion “…fraud by third parties should be 
recognised by English law as an independent and separate nullity exception”.166 
Hedley was of the view that “All forgeries are nullities”.167 Another commentator 
suggests that an element of fraud is unnecessary and that an innocent mistake may 
result in the document being null.
168
 
3.4.3. The nullity exception quarrel 
 
As it can be seen above, a clear and sustainable test does not exist at least in 
determining when a document is null or not.
169
 In Lord Diplock’s view, the one day 
difference, between the time stipulated in the documentary letter of credit and the 
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actual shipment day, was insignificant. In his opinion, the non-genuine bill of lading 
in that case was far from demonstrating nullity and therefore this “would not justify 
the confirming bank’s refusal to honour the credit in the instant case” as “the 
realisable value on arrival at Callao could not be in any way affected by its having 
been loaded on board a ship at Felixstowe on December 16, instead of December 15, 
1976”.170 But, how and why did the House of Lords in American Accord reach the 
conclusion that the bill of lading in that case was not a nullity? If the “realisable 
value” test Lord Diplock applied is the appropriate one, how did he ensure that the 
goods’ price would not be affected on its arrival at Callao?171 
Letters of credit are utilised purely by parties with tough commercial minds who 
should be committed to their own words. Thus, if the terms manifested on the face of 
a documentary credit are construed by courts in a way which does not take into 
consideration what it means, then the whole purpose of such instruments will be 
undermined resulting in their being abandoned.
172
 Following the approach of Lord 
Diplock’s thinking, one might sympathetically argue that a one day difference 
between what was stipulated in both the documentary credit and the underlying 
contract and the actual day of shipment is trivial and therefore entitles the seller to get 
paid.
173
 Ironically, by the same token, another seller might argue that a two or three 
days’ difference is also insignificant entitling him to obtain payment. Accordingly, 
difficult questions which are not easy to answer arise: where should courts place the 
boundary between what could be a nullity and what could not? How many days 
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should a seller be allowed to delay till the document which he presents could be 
considered as a nullity? 
It can be suggested that even a one day difference could result in the document being 
a nullity.
174
 For example, concurrently, a buyer of a meat consignment himself could 
be a seller for the same consignment to a third party. The contract between him and 
his own buyer stipulates for the 20
th
 of March as the last day to deliver the meat. The 
buyer in this chain of contracts knows that the shipment needs 15 days till it arrives at 
his local port and accordingly asks his seller to send the meat on the 5
th
 of March in 
order to reship it on the 20
th
 to his own buyer. Notwithstanding this fact if the meat is 
sent on the 6
th
 of March then it will certainly reach the buyer’s port on the 21st of 
March. As a result, the second buyer would lawfully reject the documents submitted 
by the first buyer where it states the 21
st
 of March as the shipment date. 
One might argue that even if the second buyer in such a chain of contracts refused the 
goods, the first buyer could sell it to any other person. In fact, such a suggestion is 
true as the buyer could sell the goods and he might make more profit. However, there 
is a possibility that he will sustain a large loss also. The buyer imported the meat on 
the assumption that there is another buyer who is ready to get the consignment 
directly and for a profit. The former did not import without being sure that there was a 
buyer standing by. Yet to say that he is still in a good position to sell the goods for the 
same price or even more is erroneous as the goods might perish before the buyer 
could find someone to buy the meat. Moreover, he might face a falling unstable 
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market resulting in a large loss.
175
 There is also the possibility that a day’s difference 
might cause many other days of stoppage in various ports due to different holidays, 
strikes or any other unforeseen events. Furthermore, as the bank’s counsel argued in 
the American Accord:  
“There is also the matter of insurance. If a buyer purchases on an f.o.b. 
contract, the buyer will himself insure and the buyer will have to declare 
the date of shipment and the nature of the goods. The date may be critical 
if the market is very volatile. The fact that the false date is very close to 
the true date may nevertheless in the circumstances have considerable 
financial implications.”176  
 
A day’s difference would result in the goods’ being out of the insured period of time. 
Accordingly, a buyer who insures for the envisaged 15 days of shipment might be 
unable to obtain any compensation from his insurance company should the ship 
carrying his goods have an accident or sink on the 16
th
 day which is out of the insured 
period. This begs the question: who would compensate the buyer in such 
circumstances?  
As has been noted in the American Accord case: “The nullity test put forward by the 
appellants is not sustainable.”177 That is to say, in deciding whether a certain 
document is null or not, many factors should be considered such as the underlying 
contracts, the parties’ intentions and the nature of the goods. As seen above, the 
nullity concept is not yet fully developed by English courts. What is meant by nullity 
will differ from one judge to another judge and from one court to another. Since many 
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of these judges are not letters of credit specialists, one can expect flawed doubtful 
decisions where certainty is of vital importance.
178
 
Where courts are confused in determining when a certain document is a nullity, the 
following pertinent questions may arise: what are the banks’ obligations in this 
respect? How could a bank that is poorly equipped to investigate external facts 
establish whether a certain document is a nullity or not?
179
 How could it assess an 
applicant’s allegation that a bill of lading is null and void in the light of the 
aforementioned “goes to its essence” or the “realisable value” tests which English 
courts failed to settle on? As one commentator puts it: 
“…the banker is not concerned as to whether the documents stipulated by 
the buyer serve any useful commercial purpose or as to why the customer 
called for tender of a document or a particular description or as to the 
legal effect of the document or vis a vis the applicant. It forms no part of 
the bank’s function, when considering whether to pay against the 
documents presented to it, to speculate about the underlying facts. Neither 
should the bank question the usefulness or sufficiency of the 
documents.”180 
  
It is suggested that, if recognised, such an exception would result in more 
inconsistencies to banks further to those associated with the fraud exception such as 
that which necessitates establishing who perpetrated fraud in order to apply it.
181
 
Indeed, to insert consistency and efficiency in a letter of credit context, applying the 
non-genuinity test is recommended whether a document is null, fraudulent or not.
182
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Otherwise, the English approach will provide a theoretical illusion rather than 
practical solutions. 
3.4.4. Nullity with fraud: the Montrod case 
 
One might think that the English courts puzzling approach to banks stopped at this 
point. Yet, in addition to the above-mentioned violations to the autonomy principle, 
English courts have also confined the application of the nullity exception to certain 
situations. The repercussions of the latter point have been raised in a relatively recent 
case, Montrod Ltd v. Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH.
183
  
The case concerned a documentary credit sale of 400 tons of frozen pork meat by 
Grundkotter (a German seller) to Ballaris (a Russian buyer).
184
 Ballaris who was 
described as “an uncertain entity”185 was unable to obtain a bank credit and hence it 
used the service of Montrod (a finance company located in London which provides 
documentary credits facilities to companies involved in international trade). 
Accordingly, Montrod ordered its bank Fibi to instruct Standard Chartered Bank to 
issue the credit in Grundkotter’s favour.186 The credit terms called for the presentation 
of a number of documents including an inspection certificate which has to be signed 
by Montrod itself. The reason behind the requirement of this “locking clause” 
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document was to guarantee Montrod that the credit would not be operable until it is 
put in funds by Ballaris.
187
 
Yet, unpredictably, Ballaris fraudulently persuaded Grundkotter that it was eligible to 
sign the inspection certificate on behalf of Montrod. Presented by facially conforming 
documents, Standard Chartered paid Grundkotter. Accordingly, Montrod commenced 
proceedings against the seller Grundkotter. Jack QC who was sitting as a judge of the 
Queen’s Bench Division in the Commercial Court held that: 
“…Grundkotter was not fraudulent but acted innocently in thinking that 
Montrod had given its authority to Mr Wieler [for Grundkotter] to sign the 
inspection certificates on its behalf”.188 
 
Allegations that Grundkotter was fraudulent could not be found in this case, rather it 
has been argued that the innocently mistaken signed inspection certificate was nullity 
and so payment should have been refused.
189
 However, Jack QC refused such 
allegation and held that: 
“In my judgment the ‘nullity exception’ should and does form no part of 
English Law. It is unsupported by authority. It provides a further 
complication where simplicity and clarity are needed. There are problems 
in defining when a document is a nullity. The exception could have 
unfortunate consequences in relation to the rights of third parties”.190  
 
This judgment was confirmed when heard again by the Court of Appeal.
191
 Potter L.J. 
held “…that to create a general nullity exception, which could not be precisely 
formulated, would make undesirable inroads on principles of autonomy”192 While, in 
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the present author’s view, both courts’ conclusions were reasonable,193 yet the 
justifications for reaching this conclusion were “flawed”.194 
One of Lord Potter’s arguments is “…that there was no authority which supported the 
existence of such a nullity exception, apart from certain dicta of lord Diplock [in the 
American Accord].”195 With respect, such argument for not recognising a nullity 
exception is untenable. The only reason why the nullity exception is not supported 
negatively or positively by authority is that the latter issue has not been before a court 
prior to this case. The only dicta regarding this issue can be found by Lord Diplock in 
the American Accord and has been described as a very slender support.
196
 Indeed, 
nothing prevents the development of new legal doctrines if needed to guarantee the 
smooth running of international trade by means of documentary credits, especially 
since such financial instruments are fairly new. 
The second of Lord Potter’s arguments asserts that: “the nullity exception was not 
supported by UCP”.197 In fact, fraud is a well-known exception which English courts 
are applying and the best evidence is Lord Diplock and his suggestions in the 
American accord. Yet, one might ask: is the fraud exception supported by the UCP? 
The answer is undoubtedly no. Hence, Potter’s suggestion in this respect is unsound. 
Furthermore, Lord Potter raised another argument, which resembles that one 
contended by Lord Diplock in the American Accord, calling for the inconsistent 
equation between a documentary credit beneficiary and a holder in due course of a 
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negotiable instrument.
198
 As has been explained before, the equation between a letter 
of credit beneficiary and a bill of exchange holder in due course cannot stand either 
legal or commercial sound analysis.
199
 The expectations of the different parties under 
these two different financial instruments are not the same due to the special 
characteristics which both enjoy. Yet his Lordship adopted one of Lord Diplock’s 
arguments without considering its implications. 
After affirming that, “If a general nullity exception were to be introduced as part of 
English law it would place banks in a further dilemma as to the necessity to 
investigate facts…”,200 Lord Potter confined the possibility to accept a nullity 
exception to situations where there is an element of fraud. While he admitted that 
Lord Diplock had left the question open to be answered by later authorities, he found:  
“…there is nothing to suggest that he [Lord Diplock] would have 
recognised any nullity exception as extending to a document which was 
not forged (i.e., fraudulently produced) but was signed by the creator in 
honest error as to his authority; nor do I consider that such an exception 
should be recognised”.201 
  
In his opinion, Lord Diplock himself confined the application of the nullity exception 
to situations where a document is forged and fraudulent. His Lordship concluded this 
by recalling one of Lord Diplock’s often-cited statements which provides: 
“I would prefer to leave open the question of the rights of an innocent 
seller/beneficiary against the confirming bank when a document presented 
by him is a nullity because unknown to him it was forged by some third 
party; for that question does not arise in the instant case”.202 
 
Interpreting the last statement literally has led Lord Potter to limit the boundaries of a 
nullity exception, if it should be recognised, to situations where an element of forgery 
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and fraud is existent in the presented documents. However, the current author argues 
that Lord Diplock in the American Accord intended something else different to this 
conclusion submitted by Lord Potter. Revisiting another statement of Lord Diplock in 
the American Accord would illustrate the matter. In Lord Diplock’s words: 
“The Court of Appeal reached their half-way house solution in the instant 
case by starting from the premise that a confirming bank could refuse to 
pay against documents that it knew to be forged, even though the 
seller/beneficiary had no knowledge of that fact. From this premise they 
reasoned that if forgery by a third party relieves the confirming bank of 
liability to pay the seller/beneficiary, fraud by a third party ought to have 
the same consequence. I would not wish to be taken as accepting that the 
premise as to forged documents is correct, even where the fact that the 
document is forged deprives it of all legal effect and makes it a nullity and 
so worthless to the confirming bank as security for its advances to the 
buyer.”203 
 
Lord Diplock distinguished two situations in the last statement; the first is forgery by 
a third party and the second is fraud by a third party. A moment’s reflection would 
reveal that Lord Diplock’s used expression to distinguish between the two different 
situations is misleading. Indeed, a person forges a document in order to deceive other 
parties as was the case in the American Accord. The forgery of the bill of lading 
therein constituted fraud. To this point Lord Griffiths in the American Accord
204
 
provided: 
“I am unable to draw any distinction between a false document which is a 
forgery according to English criminal law and a document which 
fraudulently conveys false information but is not technically a forgery.” 
 
Forging a document would make it a fraudulent document and accordingly there is no 
point to distinguish between fraudulent documents due to forgery and fraudulent 
documents due to other reasons. Indeed, what Lord Diplock meant by a forged 
document was a non-genuine document irrespective of the reason which makes it non-
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genuine. Indeed, if the word “forged” is replaced by “non-genuine” then the 
distinction would make sense. Accordingly, Lord Potter’s statement relying on 
forgery as fraud does not find support in Lord Diplock’s findings in the American 
Accord. What Lord Diplock meant by forgery by third parties was any act which 
makes a certain document non-genuine whether due to fraud or not. 
While Lord Potter seemed militant for the views which he expressed above, he found 
that in some situations, even where forged documents, whether null or not, are 
presented by a bona fide seller, the conduct of the latter would not deserve the 
protection which the autonomy principle presents to sellers. His Lordship to this point 
stated: 
“…I would not seek to exclude the possibility that, in an individual case, 
the conduct of a beneficiary in connection with the creation and/or 
presentation of a document forged by a third party might though itself not 
amounting to fraud, be of such character as not to deserve the protection 
available to a holder in due course.”205  
 
Whilst his Lordship repeatedly articulated the sensitive nature of the banks’ role in a 
letter of credit transaction, he undermined it by this later suggestion. Indeed, it is an 
inherited characteristic of letters of credit that banks would not go behind documents 
to search for facts.
206
 Yet to confine situations in which banks can refuse the 
documents’ tender to the abovementioned situation “which could not precisely 
formulated” is cumbersome.207 As Hooley argues: 
“When will the conduct of the beneficiary in connection with the creation 
of the presentation of a nullity document, although not amounting to 
fraud, be of such character as to prevent him claiming under the letter of 
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credit?… How is the bank meant to know about the conduct of the 
beneficiary?”208 
 
Lord Potter confined the possibility to recognising a nullity exception in situations 
where an element of fraud is existent. As a result, a document innocently signed by 
mistake which is deprived of all its legal effects cannot be refused by a bank unless it 
includes a fraud element. With respect, the course his Lordship applied is bewildering. 
Is it the fact that a certain document is worthless and without any legal effect or that it 
is fraudulent that matters to banks and applicants?
209
 Lord Potter’s approach can be 
excused to some extent due to the unusual facts of the case; firstly, the credit’s 
applicant (Montrod) was not the buyer and hence was not privy to the contract with 
the beneficiary (Grundkotter) which prevents the former from suing the latter. 
Secondly, there is the fact that the issuing bank (Standard Chartered Bank) had 
already paid. It may be argued that if the bank had chosen not to pay and that the 
credit’s applicant was the buyer, the court’s conclusion would have been different. 
Far from the complexity raised above, and the question whether a document is null or 
not, the non-genuinity test expounded in Sztejn can be used to overcome such 
difficulties.
210
 As the bank’s counsel in the American Accord argued: 
“If the buyer in the seller-purchaser contract is promising to pay by the 
bank, it is to pay against genuine documents. The difference between a 
document which is a forgery and not a nullity and the document which is a 
                                                 
208
 Hooley, R. “Fraud and Letters of Credit: Part 1” (2003) 4 J.I.B.F.L., 91 at p. 95. For a similar 
treatment, see: Bridge, M. ‘Documents and Contractual Congruence in International Trade’ (eds.) in 
Worthington, S. “Commercial Law and Commercial Practice” (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 213 at 
p. 237; Blair, W. ‘Commentary on ‘Documents Contractual Congruence in International Trade’’ (Eds.) 
in Worthington, S. “Commercial Law and Commercial Practice” (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 241 
at p. 247 
209
 Goode, R & McKendrick E. “Goode on Commercial Law” (Penguin Books, 4th ed., London, 2010) 
at p. 1106 
210
 Davidson, A. ‘Fraud; the Prime Exception to the Autonomy Principle in Letters of Credit’ [2003] 8 
Int’l Trade & Bus. L. Ann., 23 at p. 29 
105 
 
forgery and, therefore, a nullity is a distinction which is not relevant in the 
present case”.211 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
Letters of credit were developed to reconcile the traders’ different expectations. On 
the one hand, a seller without the bank’s assurance of payment, which the former 
acquires by the issuance of a documentary credit, is exposed to non-payment risks. On 
the other hand, buyers use banks’ services to ensure that payment to the sellers is to be 
discharged by a creditworthy and solvent party on the assumption that sellers, in order 
to get paid, submit genuine documents which evidence the shipment of the agreed 
goods.  
Whilst the English approach protects sellers from the risks which they used to suffer 
before the advent of documentary credits, it does not offer other parties the protection 
they envisage. A seller, who was exposed to the risk of non-payment where no 
documentary credit was issued, will now get paid by utilising the latter. However, a 
buyer, who used to have the merit of not parting with the goods’ price unless the 
goods were received, is now obliged to pay even when the documents presented by 
the seller are non-genuine. 
On the one hand, it is suggested that this can be attributed to the English courts’ 
misapplication of the “holder in due course” and the “ex turpi cause” doctrines in this 
regard. Applying such doctrines which have been developed outside the letters of 
credit context without considering its various implications might cause harmful results 
as seen.
212
 On the other hand, it is submitted that the inability to distinguish between 
non-genuinity and fraud as two distinct defences is the other reason why English 
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courts have failed to provide applicants and banks with the protection which they 
need. The Sztejn and the American Accord Court of Appeal decisions are 
recommended in this regard.  
While many commentators call for recognising a nullity exception, it is suggested that 
such an exception will add complexity to this area of law.
213
 As stated by Lord Justice 
Ackner in the American Accord Court of Appeal: 
“…whether or not a forged document is a nullity, it is not a genuine or 
valid document entitling the presenter of it to be paid and if the banker to 
which it is presented under a letter of credit knows it to be forged he must 
not pay.”214 
 
It can be concluded that the fraud exception should not be applied when the matter is 
between a bank and its beneficiary at the documents level. It is enough for banks to 
show that a certain document is a non-genuine one. It is submitted that the latter test is 
the one which should be applied at this level. The position of the UN Convention is 
noteworthy in this regard. Article 19 provides that it is an exception to the payment 
obligation: “(1) if it is manifest and clear that: (a) any document is not genuine or has 
been falsified”. Indeed, “The genuineness of the documents is the foundation of the 
success of letters of credit”.215 
It is suggested that determining whether a particular document is a genuine one or not 
is not a difficult task anymore. The Commercial Crime Services (CCS), a division of 
the ICC, offers such a service which is fee-free for members.
216
 Pursuant to this, a 
bank can send the documents to the CCS which will check their authenticity. In fact, 
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the Commercial Crime Bureau has a database which is provided by various and 
different information from all parts of the world. In addition, this Bureau’s expert 
members are very helpful in determining whether a particular document is a genuine 
one or not. It is noteworthy that any request to this Bureau will be answered within a 
few hours or, at the maximum, two days.
217
 Interestingly, as one commentator has 
noted: 
 “The author’s favourite neighbourhood drug store routinely uses a 
technical device to check every twenty dollar bill for its genuineness while 
supposedly sophisticated banks pay millions of dollars daily without 
checking the genuineness of documents such as bills of lading. Letters of 
credit developed in an age when it was impossible to confirm speedily that 
the presented documents were legitimate – this is no longer true”.218
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Chapter Four: The Fraud Scope 
  
4.1.  Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter it has been illustrated that fraud in documentary credits and 
independent guarantees can be divided, in terms of the circumstances in which it takes 
place, into two main categories, namely, fraud in the documents and fraud in the 
underlying transaction. This chapter aims to examine whether a successful fraud 
allegation should be confined to the first fraud category, fraud in the documents, and 
whether it can be alleged in the second fraud category and thus include fraud 
perpetrated in the underlying transaction as a valid ground to stop the process of 
letters of credit payment.  
The first section of this chapter is concerned with the meaning, differences and 
boundaries in the concepts of both ‘fraud in the documents’ and ‘fraud in the 
underlying transaction’. The following section seeks to examine the fraud scope 
debate. This section is divided into four subsections. The first subsection highlights 
the genesis of this debate. The second subsection examines the English courts’ 
approach to this particular area. A succinct investigation of the way other common 
law jurisdictions have dealt with the fraud scope is provided in the third subsection. 
The final subsection focuses on the arguments for and against expansion of the fraud 
scope. 
 
4.2.  Terminology 
 
As one commentator puts it: 
“While the courts recognise that several sets of circumstances will 
interfere with the parallel flow of goods and documents and they do apply 
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several exceptions to the autonomy principle, circumstances 
involving…the application of the fraud exception remain the most 
notorious”.1 
 
It is submitted that one of the notorious aspects of the fraud exception is its scope of 
application; that is the need to clarify whether it applies where fraud has been 
perpetrated in the underlying transaction as distinct from that carried out in the 
documents.
2
 Indeed, it is suggested that one main reason behind the notoriety of this 
particular area of the letters of credit law is that the boundaries of the “fraud in the 
documents” and “fraud in the underlying transaction” concepts are unclear.3 Taking 
this into account, the following subsections are meant to clarify such ambiguity. 
 
4.2.1. Fraud in the documents 
 
Fraud in the documents is a broad concept. In the United City Merchants, Lord 
Diplock in his frequently cited statement has described fraudulent documents as those 
where a documentary letter of credit seller: 
“…for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the 
[bank] documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material 
representation of fact that to his knowledge are untrue.”4 
 
Documents could be fraudulent for a number of different reasons. This includes, but is 
not limited to, the following instances; first, a document issued by the fraudulent 
beneficiary himself in order to deceive other parties. An example of this is where a 
beneficiary presents to the bank an invoice which is alleged to be covering a 
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consignment of grapes, for instance, when it actually does not.
5
 Secondly, documents 
are fraudulent also when obtained from a fraudulent third party. Such documents can 
be obtained through a conspiracy between the beneficiary and a third party in order to 
deceive the bank or the applicant for the credit.
6
 The bill of lading issued fraudulently 
by the loading brokers in the United City Merchants case is a clear example of such a 
kind of fraudulent document.
7
 Thirdly, a document forged by the beneficiary is 
another reason for a document being fraudulent. For instance, a letter of credit 
requires a bill of lading which evidences the shipment of 10000 tons of grapes. The 
beneficiary ships 4000 tons, acquires a bill of lading which evidences the shipment of 
the 4000 tons and alters it in order to show that 10000 tons have been shipped.
8
 
Finally, a document can be described as fraudulent when it contains false information 
and the beneficiary knows about such falsity. 
 
 
4.2.2. Fraud in the underlying transaction  
 
In a letter of credit context, it can be said that the “the underlying transaction” concept 
itself is misleading.
9
 It has been sometimes used to denote the seller and the buyer 
underlying contract which stipulates for a letter of credit to finance or secure some 
parts or the whole of the parties’ transaction.10 On the other hand, the same 
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“underlying transaction” concept has been used to denote the letter of credit 
arrangement itself which arises between the issuing bank and the beneficiary of such a 
credit.
11
  
One example which explains this misleading approach in particular and which 
explains the debate pertaining to the scope of fraud in general can be found in three 
different publications by the same author.
12
 In one of these, Goode found that the 
English authorities implicitly assume that “fraud is a defence where it arises in relation 
to the tender of documents or the underlying sale transaction”.13 In another 
publication, Goode retreated from the position he had previously adopted and 
questioned the matter again: 
“…does fraud by the beneficiary which does not affect the documents but 
relates only to the underlying transaction- for example a fraudulent 
misrepresentation which induced the account party’s entry into the 
contract affect his right to payment under the credit? Probably not, but the 
position is unclear”.14 
 
However, in a relatively recent publication, Goode further stated that the bank is both 
entitled and obliged to refuse to honour a credit if “…the issue of the letter of credit 
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was induced by fraud or misrepresentation [or] there is other established fraud, 
whether in relation to the credit or the underlying transaction”.15 
As one commentator proposed “Different perceptions of the locus of fraud or readings 
by courts of the term ‘fraud in the transaction’ may produce sharply contrasting 
results”.16 Indeed, what is meant by “fraud in underlying transaction” is unclear.17 
Goode in the first quotation has divided letters of credit fraud (in terms of place) to 
documents fraud and the underlying sale transaction fraud. In the second quotation he 
distinguishes such fraud into two categories: fraud in the documents and fraud in the 
underlying transaction. In the third quotation mentioned above, Goode found that 
fraud could be a good basis to restrain a letter of credit payment if it is related to the 
credit or the underlying transaction.  
  
4.2.3. Distinguishing between both categories  
 
A letter of credit is a “multi-transaction arrangement”.18 In fact, a letter of credit 
transaction involves at least three transactions: (a) the underlying contract between the 
applicant and the beneficiary through which these parties agree to issue a letter of 
credit, (b) the applicant’s application to his bank in order to open a letter of credit, (c) 
the letter of credit transaction between the bank and the beneficiary which usually 
stipulates for some documents to be submitted by the latter in order to obtain the 
amount named in the letter of credit.
19
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The beneficiary’s fraud on the applicant can be envisaged only in transactions (a) and 
(c).
20
 Transaction (c) is the letter of credit transaction which usually stipulates for the 
documents presentation. In this sense, if the documents are fraudulent this would 
mean that there is fraud in the letter of credit transaction.
21
 By the same token, if there 
is fraud in the letter of credit transaction this would be directly reflected in the 
documents stipulated for in such a credit. Examples provided above to illustrate fraud 
in the documents can be said to constitute equally fraud in the letter of credit 
transaction.
22
 Hence, it could be understood that fraud in the documents is the same as 
that described as fraud in the letter of credit transaction (or even that called ‘fraud in 
the credit’). Both cover the different fraudulent actions happening in the same 
transaction. The Sztejn case is an example of such fraud.
23
 Worthless cow hair was 
sent instead of the contracted for bristles and, accordingly, although apparently 
conforming, the documents were fraudulent. As one commentator suggests “This 
fraud will usually relate to the documents themselves. They may be forged or untrue 
in relation to the goods to which they refer.”24  
In order to determine whether the presented documents are fraudulent or not, 
scrutinizing the documents merely would not be sufficient. Examining the letter of 
credit transaction which the documents cover would be necessary to reveal such a 
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fraud. It would be very difficult for the bank itself to verify fraud allegations which 
stem from such cases except in situations which the current author describes as 
technical documentary fraud (e.g. where the letter of credit beneficiary submits a 
fraudulently signed certificate of inspection which should be signed from one of the 
bank’s clients with whose signature the bank is familiar).25 It should be noted that, 
unlike independent guarantees, this kind of fraud (fraud in the documents/fraud in the 
letter of credit transaction) is more pertinent to documentary letters of credit contexts. 
In an independent guarantee context no documents are usually required but a mere 
demand by the guarantee’s beneficiary, without even stating that the applicant has 
defaulted, would be sufficient for obtaining its amount.
26
 
Transaction (a) is the underlying contract through which the applicant for credit and 
the beneficiary agree to utilise a letter of credit in order to facilitate their intended 
business. Fraud in the underlying contract can be committed at the stage of formation 
of the contract. There is no case better than that of Themehelp Ltd v. West
27
 to provide 
an example of this kind of fraud. In the case of Themehelp, the plaintiff contracted 
with the defendant, West, to buy some shares by instalments. An independent 
guarantee had been opened by the plaintiff in the seller, West’s, favour to secure the 
third and largest instalment of the contract. Indeed, the parties negotiated their 
contract on the assumption that a major customer of the seller’s business would 
continue to deal and order from the new buyer. However, the seller, who knew that 
the major customer had ceased his dealings with the company engaged in 
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 Such kind of fraud is of a technical nature including instances of fraudulent signatures, fraudulent 
dates or even where documents are obtained from a non-existent company. United City Merchants 
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misrepresentation in relation to this fact in order to facilitate the sale process.
28
 The 
plaintiff, alleging fraud in the underlying contract, acquired a court’s injunction to 
stop his bank from paying the seller, West. Indeed, this kind of fraud in the underlying 
contract is what Goode provided as an example of fraud in the underlying transaction 
in his second and third quotations cited above.
29
 
In addition to fraud committed in its formation, fraud in the underlying contract can 
be carried out in the performance of such a contract. Shipping cowhair instead of the 
contracted for bristles is an example of fraud in performing the underlying contract.
30
 
While one might think that this kind of fraud would constitute fraud in the documents, 
this is not the case always. An example of this fraud is where the underlying contract 
stipulates for the shipment of a number of cars produced in the year 2003 and the 
letter of credit only requires documents attesting the shipment of the cars without 
mentioning the production year. The seller fraudulently ships a 1999 set of cars, 
acquires the required documents which do not show the year when the cars were 
manufactured and obtains the letter of credit amount. Whilst fraud in such an example 
does not exist in the documents and the bank-beneficiary letter of credit transaction, 
fraud is pertinent to the underlying contract between the applicant and the 
beneficiary.
31
 
In order to determine whether fraud in the underlying contract does exist or not it 
would be necessary to return and consider the beneficiary-applicant contract itself.
32
 
Examining the documents and the letter of credit transaction only, which the 
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 Themehelp Ltd v. West [1996] Q.B. 84 
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 See section 3.2.2. 
30
 Sztejn v. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct 1941) 
31
 Horowitz, D. “Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment” (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at p. 26 
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documents represent, would not reveal such a kind of fraud.
33
 It would be very 
difficult for banks to verify allegations of this kind of fraud where there is no fraud in 
the documents which limits its relation with both the credit’s applicant and 
beneficiary.
34
 It should be noted that, unlike documentary letters of credit, this kind of 
fraud is more pertinent to the context of independent guarantees where no documents 
are usually required. Indeed, to discover if a demand is fraudulent or not in an 
independent guarantee context, returning to the underlying contract itself is usually 
inevitable. 
Whilst fraud in the underlying contract, whether in its formation or performance, will 
sometimes constitute fraud in the documents,
35
 in some cases it does not.
36
 In order to 
make common sense and to denote something other than fraud in the documents, and 
though not being redundant, it is submitted that the concept of fraud in the underlying 
transaction connotes that fraud having been committed in the underlying contract. The 
letter of credit transaction and the documents fraud being two sides of the same coin, 
there would be no sense in distinguishing between them. Accordingly, fraud where a 
letter of credit is utilised should be divided (in terms of place) into: fraud in the 
documents (transaction c) and fraud in the underlying transaction (transaction a).
37
  
 
4.3. The fraud scope debate 
 
Having illustrated the difference between fraud in the documents and that in the 
underlying transaction, this section proceeds to clarify the fraud scope debate, as to 
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 Horowitz, D. “Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment” (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at p. 26 
34
 Note, ‘Letters of Credit: Injunctions as a Remedy for Fraud in U.C.C. Section 5-114’ (1979) 63 Minn 
Law Review 487, at p. 510  
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 For example: Sztejn v. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct 1941) 
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37
 Hooley, R & Sealy, L. “Commercial Law-Text, Cases, and Materials” (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed., 2009), at p. 866. To that Hooley stated: “The autonomy principle is not absolute. The most 
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whether the fraud exception should be confined to fraud perpetrated in the documents 
or should include, as well as that perpetrated in the documents, fraud carried out in the 
underlying transaction. The first subsection is meant to trace the genesis of this 
debate. The reason behind such a trace is of great benefit in assessing the soundness 
of the debate. 
 
4.3.1. The debate genesis  
 
The genesis of the fraud scope debate can be traced back to the 1950s in the USA. 
More precisely, such a debate has emanated from the prior UCC Article 5.
38
 Section 
5-114(2) of the prior UCC Article 5 provides that banks and courts can enjoin a letter 
of credit from being honoured if the “documents appear on their face to comply with 
the terms of a credit but a required document… is forged or fraudulent or there is 
fraud in the transaction”.39 Whilst prior UCC Article 5 explicitly recognised that both 
fraud in the documents and fraud in the transaction could restrain a letter of credit 
payment, this explicit recognition was not without its own problem.
40
 The concept 
‘fraud in the transaction’ was the core of the problem and the reason behind the 
emergence of two opposing trends. Supporters of the first trend advocated a narrow 
approach reading of the ‘fraud in the transaction’ concept.41 Indeed, the supporters of 
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 According to Gao: “When article 5 of the UCC was first drafted in the 1950s, it was not a complete 
‘code’ like some other articles. Instead, it was intended to set up an ‘independent theoretical framework 
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this trend argued that such a concept is intended to cover merely the letter of credit 
transaction. On the other hand, most of the courts and commentators, who constituted 
the second trend, were of the view that such a concept should be read broadly to cover 
fraud perpetrated beyond the letter of credit transaction and which is carried out in the 
underlying contract.
42
 Supporters of the latter broad trend were of the view that both 
banks and courts should be allowed not only to look to the letter of credit transaction 
but also to the underlying contract, which stipulates for a letter of credit to finance it, 
in order to find any potential evidence of fraud. Gao, for example, found that this 
narrow view did not withstand analysis or stand up in practice because: 
“a narrow reading of the phrase encounters logical difficulties from the 
language of the section since it uses both ‘a required document…is forged 
or fraudulent’ and ‘fraud in the transaction’ simultaneously. If the latter 
phrase is interpreted as ‘fraud in the documents’, the former becomes 
logically irrelevant”.43 
  
The emergence of such conflicting trends is understandable where neither the original 
text of s 5-114(2) of prior UCC Article 5 nor its Official Comment have made clear 
the meaning of the ‘fraud in the transaction’ concept. However, it was not too late for 
                                                                                                                                            
[submission] and confine fraud in the transaction’ to fraud in the presentation of the required 
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501 et seq 
43
 Gao, X. “The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: a Comparative Study” (London, 2002) at p. 
103. Other commentators who support this argument: Clark, B. “The Law of Bank Deposits Collections 
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such discussion to arise until the new revised UCC Article 5 became law in 1995 and 
ended the fraud scope debate in the United States of America.
44
 New Article 5, s 5-
109 provides that a fraud allegation can succeed: 
“If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with 
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is 
forged or materially fraudulent, or honour of the presentation would 
facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant” 
 
Obviously, new Article 5 put an end, at least in the USA, to the controversy regarding 
the ‘fraud in the transaction’ concept where it replaced such a concept with a loose 
sentence which explicitly did not confine a successful fraud allegation to that fraud 
perpetrated in the documents as distinct from that of the underlying contract. This new 
replaced part of Article 5 has unequivocally given permission to American courts to 
interfere and interrupt the letter of credit honour where, in addition to fraud in the 
documents, the ‘honour of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the 
beneficiary on the issuer or applicant’.45 It is submitted that the effect of such an 
explanatory sentence was to reassure that what was meant previously by the concept 
of ‘fraud in the transaction’ is fraud in the underlying contract as being different from 
that of fraud in the documents. 
 
4.3.2. The English legal position and the fraud scope debate 
 
One commentator suggests that the problem of the fraud scope in the letters of credit 
context is one which merely concerns the USA, because of the abovementioned 
diversity in interpreting the ‘fraud in the transaction’ concept which existed in the 
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May 2002. Indeed, one of the main reasons for this new edition, which was drafted by a special task 
force, was to fill the gaps and to solve the problems which the old edition was suffering from such as 
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prior UCC article 5, and that such a debate does not arise in other jurisdictions such as 
England.
46
 Yet, Mugasha, among others, argues that the same problem regarding the 
fraud scope does arise in England.
47
 Mugasha argues that “English law does not 
recognise such an exception (fraud in the underlying transaction)”.48 Indeed, as 
another commentator opines “this aspect seems to be far from settled”.49 Accordingly, 
this section seeks to examine the English position towards the fraud scope debate.  
In Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd
50
 the plaintiffs discovered that only a 
small fraction of the goods which they contracted for with a French seller had been 
shipped. The other bulky part of the goods was mostly damaged and not as described. 
The Chancery Division refused to grant the plaintiff, ‘Discount’, an injunction to 
restrain Barclays Bank from honouring the French seller drafts. Justice Megarry 
refused to grant the injunction because Discount did not meet the proof standard 
required for granting an injunction. He found that the fraud was merely alleged and 
had not been proven clearly.
51
 Fraud in this case was pertinent to the documents and 
accordingly it was unnecessary for the court to consider the fraud scope dilemma. It 
can be said that the Discount case is neutral in this regard. 
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Unlike the Discount case, the case of Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank 
International Ltd
52
 provides more relevant and useful information in relation to the 
fraud scope point. In the Edward case, Lord Denning stated that: 
“there is this exception to the strict rule [the autonomy principle]: the bank 
ought not to pay under the credit if it knows that the documents are forged 
or that the request for payment is made fraudulently in circumstances 
where there is no right to payment”.53 
 
Whilst Lord Denning’s statement is broad enough to comprise fraud in the underlying 
transaction as well as that in the documents, Horowitz argues that the dicta provided 
by his Lordship regarding the underlying transaction should be limited to independent 
guarantees as the current case under consideration was one concerning an independent 
guarantee and accordingly such a statement does not provide support for the broad 
approach. In her words: 
“The central point is that Lord Denning then applied the encapsulation in 
a demand guarantee case, and the second formulation-‘the request for 
payment is made fraudulently’-was the relevant one. This is because on-
demand guarantees involve very few documents, so ‘fraud in the 
documents’ is an inappropriate defence…Edward Owen does not support 
a fraud in the transaction defence. Instead, it offered an alternative 
formulation that was appropriate to demand guarantees cases…”.54 
 
Horowitz’s comments in this regard are problematic. Firstly, Lord Denning in this 
case stated unequivocally that an independent guarantee stands on a similar footing to 
a documentary letter of credit.
55
 Hence, it is right to expect that the dicta offered by 
his Lordship could apply to independent guarantees and documentary letters of credit 
indifferently.
56
 Secondly, if his Lordship’s dicta were confined to independent 
guarantees where very few documents are involved, what made his Lordship mention 
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the first formulation, fraud in the documents, as a base which a bank or a court can 
rely on in its refusal to pay? It is difficult to understand the legal means which 
Horowitz erected on her claim to determine that the dicta was concerning merely an 
independent guarantee and neglected the first formulation ‘the documents are forged’ 
which predominantly cannot be envisaged except in a documentary letter of credit 
context.  
Thirdly, supposing that Lord Denning’s statement is one which concerns independent 
guarantees, what prevents its application in a documentary letter of credit context? 
Isn’t it an inherited characteristic that independent guarantees are more abstract than 
documentary credits?
57
 Therefore, one would think that the opposing position is more 
convincing. Finally, Horowitz’s admittance that Lord Denning had accepted looking 
into the underlying transaction in an independent guarantee context, itself is a strong 
supportive indication for the trend which argues that the English courts do not confine 
the fraud exception to fraud in the documents as distinct from the underlying 
transaction. While there are many differences between an independent guarantee and 
a documentary letter of credit, it is suggested that this should not be the case in 
relation to the fraud scope.
58
 It is submitted that his Lordship’s statement is broad 
enough to include both fraud in the documents and that in the underlying transaction 
in both independent guarantees and documentary letters of credit contexts. In view of 
that, the Edward Owen should be considered as a case supporting the English courts’ 
recognition of fraud in the underlying transaction as well as that in the documents as 
sufficient to stop a letter of credit payment. 
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In the United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,
59
 Lord 
Diplock, in his frequently quoted passage, stated that: 
“There is one established exception: that is, where the seller, for the 
purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming 
bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material 
representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue.” 
 
It could be said that Lord Diplock’s utilization of the word ‘documents’ above 
suggests that his Lordship has limited the fraud scope specifically to fraud perpetrated 
in the documents as distinct from fraud in the underlying transaction. However, it is 
suggested that Lord Diplock did not intend such a limitation. Indeed, Lord Diplock’s 
utilisation of the word document arose from the fact that the United City Merchants 
case itself was a case of fraud in the documents.
60
 No fraud in the underlying 
transaction had been existent and accordingly his Lordship did not address such a type 
of fraud. Another point which supports the author’s suggestion, that Lord Diplock did 
not intend to limit the fraud exception to that fraud perpetrated in the documents only, 
can be found in the following statement propounded by his Lordship:  
“The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail 
himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi non oritur 
actio or, if plain English is to be preferred, ‘fraud unravels all’. The courts 
will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out 
fraud.”61 
 
His Lordship in the last statement has explicitly articulated the main reason for 
recognising the fraud exception which is combating fraudulent conducts by dishonest 
persons. Indeed, if ‘fraud unravels all’, as his Lordship has stated, it would be difficult 
to accept that he intended to limit the fraud exception to fraud in documents while not 
including the underlying transaction fraud.
62
 Hooley, for example, supports such a 
conclusion when he states that “Extending the fraud exception to fraud in the 
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underlying transaction is consistent with Lord Diplock’s view that fraud unravels 
all.”63  
In the Themehelp v West
64
 case, which a case of fraud in the underlying transaction as 
has been illustrated above,
65
 the independent guarantee applicant has been granted an 
injunction to restrain the beneficiary from demanding payment from the bank. In this 
case, Lord Justice Waite stated:  
“The assumption upon which [the beneficiary’s] argument proceeds is that 
the autonomy of a performance guarantee is threatened if the beneficiary 
is placed under a temporary restraint from enforcing it. That is not an 
assumption, however, which appears to me to have any validity. In a case 
where fraud is raised as between the parties to the main transaction at an 
early stage, before any question of the enforcement of the guarantee, as 
between the beneficiary and the guarantor, has yet arisen at all, it does not 
seem to me that the slightest threat is involved to the autonomy of the 
performance guarantee if the beneficiary is injuncted from enforcing it in 
proceedings to which the guarantor is not a party”.66 
  
In the same manner as that which Lord Justice Waite has pursued, Todd
67
 and 
Horowitz
68
 argue that ‘restraining a demand’ is different from ‘restraining a payment’ 
in a letter of credit context. That is to say, applying for an injunction to restrain a 
beneficiary from demanding a letter of credit payment is different from applying for 
an injunction to restrain a bank from paying after a payment demand has been already 
made by the beneficiary.
69
 In their opinion, in the former case no diminution to the 
autonomy principle occurs as the bank has not been involved yet and accordingly 
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there is no need to apply the fraud exception.
70
 Such a fact made Horowitz conclude 
that the Themehelp case does not support the trend which argues that the English law 
recognises fraud in the underlying transaction.
71
 
However, it is suggested that the approach which Todd, Horowitz and Lord Justice 
Waite took is untenable for a number of reasons.
72
 First, it is true that a beneficiary 
who stipulates for a letter of credit to finance a contract between himself and a buyer 
of his goods, services or etc…, enters such contract on the assumption that nothing 
will prevent him from obtaining the credit amount once he has fulfilled the duties 
assigned to him.
73
 The autonomy principle which a letter of credit enjoys is one of the 
main reasons why a beneficiary enters into such a contract. Even where the 
beneficiary did not submit his documents or demand the amount stated in the letter of 
credit, such an injunction would deprive him of his right to do so. Hence, if the 
beneficiary’s demand or the bank payment is restrained doesn’t it lead to the same 
consequences for the beneficiary? In both situations the beneficiary is prevented from 
obtaining the money due to him by virtue of an abstract payment and as a result the 
advantage from using such an instrument would be hampered.
74
 Moreover, it is one of 
the autonomy principle’s most prominent characteristics that the relationship between 
the beneficiary and the bank is independent and that it should be kept away from the 
underlying transaction between the other parties. Hence, what other than interfering 
with the autonomy principle can be seen in the above case? Preventing the beneficiary 
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from obtaining or demanding the letter of credit amount is an intervention affecting 
the beneficiary’s relationship with his bank and accordingly it diminishes the 
autonomy principle.
75
 
Second, if no detriment to the autonomy principle would arise in such a situation, the 
approach of Todd and Horowitz would allow a mere breach of contract to stop the 
letter of credit payment. Indeed, one might ask what other reasons than that of fraud 
would have led to the Themehelp court granting the applicant an injunction? Would 
the court in this case have interfered and granted the injunction if the wrongful action 
perpetrated by the beneficiary was merely an ordinary breach of contract which did 
not amount to fraud? It is submitted that the court would not have granted the 
injunction if the applicant’s allegation had been one concerning a breach of contract. 
It is the fraud exception which has been relied on by the court to restrain the 
beneficiary from demanding the letter of credit. 
Third, it is noteworthy that later English authorities have criticised Lord Justice 
Waite’s rationale pursued in the Themehelp case.76 In Group Josi v. Walbrook 
Insurance Company Ltd,
77
 Lord Justice Staughton found that distinguishing between 
restraining a beneficiary from demanding a letter of credit and restraining a bank from 
paying such a letter of credit is contrary to the established doctrine. To that effect he 
stated: “the effect on the lifeblood of commerce would be precisely the same whether 
the bank is restrained from paying or the beneficiary is restrained from asking for 
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payment”.78 Moreover, the rationale that Lord Justice Waite pursued in illuminating 
the reasons behind granting the injunction did not pass without an internal objection 
from the members of the same court. Evans LJ took the view that an injunction 
whether against a bank or a beneficiary would inevitably interrupt the autonomy 
principle. 
Finally, it is suggested that Lord Justice Waite’s approach is based upon a 
misunderstanding of the precise nature of the autonomy principle and its fraud 
exception. It seems that he was aware of the repercussions that would occur if he 
overlooked gross allegations of fraud, but at the same time he did not want to depart 
from the traditional English position which allegedly adheres to the autonomy 
principle and, thus, he tried to rationalize granting the injunction in a way which 
shows that he did not impinge the autonomy principle. In fact, the Themehelp court 
itself did not have a problem concerning the fraud scope. The court did not confine 
itself to examining the documents only but also went on to assess the fraud allegation 
pleaded in the underlying transaction by the applicant and found for him eventually on 
that evidence. The approach of Todd and Horowitz should be disregarded because the 
autonomy principle was hampered and the reason for the injunction was fraud in the 
underlying transaction. Arguments which support the view that an injunction to 
restrain a beneficiary from demanding payment (as distinct from restraining the bank) 
does not diminish the autonomy principle should be abandoned as they do not stand 
                                                 
78
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legal analysis. Themehelp is a case which supports that potential fraud allegations 
could be accepted irrespective of their scope.
79
  
In Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank Plc
80
, Mr Justice Creswell rejected a 
request to discharge a pre-trial injunction which restrained the bank (Midland Bank) 
from paying the letter of credit beneficiary. The injunction was granted due to the 
beneficiary’s fraudulent demand. Indeed, whilst the beneficiary was required to give 
notice to the applicant before demanding the letter of credit, he did not give such 
notice. The court did not find it difficult to assess the underlying transaction in order 
to find for the letter of credit applicant and his bank.
81
  
In Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trade Inc v Standard Bank London Limited and others,
82
 
Standard Bank issued three letters of credit at the request of Czarnikow in favour of 
Vivalet.
83
 The negotiable letters of credit were payable at the counters of two Swiss 
banks after 390 days.
84
 Due to the fact that the letters of credit were negotiable, the 
beneficiaries before the maturity date discounted them at the Swiss banks and as a 
result the latter obtained the status of a holder in due course where no questions of 
fraud had arisen at that point. Few days before the maturity date of the letters of 
credit, Czarnikow alleging fraud had successfully obtained an ex-parte order to 
restrain Standard Bank from paying the Swiss banks.
85
 However, when the matter 
reached the trial court, it discharged the restraining order because of the special facts 
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of the case in that the confirming banks in Switzerland had duly discounted the letters 
of credit and paid the beneficiary under the mandate assigned to them by the issuing 
bank. Discharging an injunction or declining to grant it does not necessarily mean that 
the court’s reason for doing this is one relating to the fraud scope. The Czarnikow 
court did not discuss the scope problem as it found for the Swiss banks on other 
primary grounds.
86
 If these other grounds had not been present, the author believes 
that the court would have had no problems in granting an injunction regardless of the 
fraud scope.
87
 
Moreover, in Solo Industries Ltd v Canara Bank,
88
 Lord Justice Mance stated that: 
“…the first task of any judge faced with an application for interim 
injunctive relief was to ‘ask whether there was any challenge to the 
validity of the instrument’ and ‘if there is not or if the challenge is not 
substantial, prima facie no injunction should be granted’… in principle a 
misrepresentation inducing the opening of a credit may give rise to a 
defence or other compelling reason for trail.”89 
 
In considering whether to grant or refuse to grant an injunction, his Lordship’s 
concern related to what he called the validity of the letter of credit. The fraud scope 
did not seem to constitute a problem in front of his Lordship as he suggested that a 
misrepresentation inducing the opening of the credit could challenge the validity of 
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the letter of credit and accordingly an injunction could be granted in such a case.
90
 In 
Solo, Lord Justice Mance has repeatedly cited the SAFA v Banque Du Caire
91
 case. In 
SAFA, the bank refused to pay the beneficiary the letter of credit amount and as a 
result the latter resorted to the court seeking a summary judgement. Waller LJ, who 
was sitting as a member of the Court of Appeal in this case, stated: 
“Gathering the threads from [previous] authorities and adapting them to 
the circumstances of this case, my view is as follows: The principle that 
letters of credit must be treated as cash is an important one, and must be 
maintained…[but]…If a bank can establish a claim with a real prospect of 
success, either that the demand was fraudulent even if it had no clear 
evidence of the fraud at the time of demand, or that there was a 
misrepresentation by the beneficiary directed at persuading the bank to 
enter into the letter of credit, it may also be unjust to enter summary 
against the bank”.92 
 
His Lordship made it clear that while the autonomy principle adds a touch of 
temptation to those who utilize letters of credit that should not mean that this principle 
should protect fraudulent conducts.
93
 To that effect, he found that a bank or a court 
can interfere to stop payment in situations where there is either a fraudulent demand 
on the letter of credit or a misrepresentation inducement to open it. Accordingly, it is 
suggested that the Solo and the SAFA cases do not provide support for the view that 
confines successful fraud allegations to that which appears merely on documents, but 
they constitute a strong corroboration for the view that permits looking to the 
underlying transaction in order to verify fraudulent allegations. 
Sirius International Insurance Company (PUBL) v FAI General Insurance Ltd
94
 is an 
interesting case in this regard. The Sirius Court of Appeal found that a beneficiary 
could not draw on a letter of credit where the underlying contract does expressly 
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contain some conditions which restrict drawing on the letter of credit unless the 
beneficiary fulfils such conditions. In Lord Justice May’s words:  
“Although those restrictions were not terms of the letter of credit, and 
although the bank would have been obliged and entitled to honour a 
request to pay which fulfilled its terms, that does not mean that, as 
between themselves and FAI, Sirius were entitled to draw on the letter of 
credit if the express conditions of this underlying agreement were not 
fulfilled. They were not so entitled. I reject [the plaintiff’s] submission 
that in the present case the parties must be taken, as between themselves, 
to have afforded Sirius the right to draw on the letter of credit in defiance 
of the conditions of this underlying contract.”95 
 
In fact, in Sirius there was no fraud but a disagreement on whether the conditions 
which the underlying contract provided in relation to the letter of credit had been 
satisfied. The Court of Appeal did not find any problem in investigating the 
underlying contract to determine whether the conditions which allow a demand on the 
letter of credit had been materialised or not.
96
 Indeed, the court expressed its 
willingness to grant injunctions to restrain the bank from honouring the letter of credit 
in such situations. If in cases like that of Sirius, where no fraud has been perpetrated, 
the English courts have showed readiness to examine the underling transaction and 
thus interfered with the operation of letters of credit, isn’t it fortiori that cases of fraud 
should be treated, at least, in the same way by the virtue of the well enshrined ‘fraud 
unravels all’ principle? It is suggested that the Sirius case, even though no fraud had 
been existent in its proceedings, is another case of the chain discussed above which 
supports looking to the underlying transaction in order to protect bona fide banks and 
applicants. The same has been pursued in the more recent case of Simon Carves Ltd v 
Ensus UK Ltd.
97
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As seen above, the majority of the cases discussed have shown that the English courts 
do not mind investigating the underlying transaction in order to punish fraudulent 
conducts. The other few cases have been neutral to this point because the 
circumstances surrounding it were not such as these which could give support to such 
an expansion. Furthermore, in England, as yet, there is no explicit text in any of the 
various heard fraud cases, which suggests that applying the fraud exception is or 
should be limited to fraud in the documents. Consequently, it is submitted the English 
fraud exception is not confined to fraud perpetrated merely in documents but rather it 
does involve that fraud that has been perpetrated in the underlying transaction. 
Arguments which favour the view that English courts do not permit looking to the 
underlying transaction to examine fraud allegations should be disregarded. As one 
commentator puts it: 
“…the [English] courts appear willing to look to the underlying 
transaction for such [fraud] evidence. The cases dealing with performance 
bonds or standby credits indicate that fraud sufficient to invoke the 
exception may not have to revert directly to documents but may simply 
taint the demand made under the instrument”.98  
 
 
 
 
4.3.3. The conventional view 
 
Mugasha argues that the courts should not be allowed to assess fraud allegations 
pertinent to the underlying transaction, because “the conventional view is that the 
inquiry should be limited to documents”.99 Whilst it is not so clear what he meant by 
the conventional view, the context in which he discussed such a concept suggests that 
the situation in England and other analogical common law countries is what he meant 
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by the conventional view.
100
 Indeed, this subsection seeks to investigate Mugasha’s 
view regarding what he described as the ‘conventional view’. As seen above, the 
American position does not support limiting the fraud exception to documents as 
distinct from the underlying transaction.
101
 Moreover, the English position also does 
not support such a line of thought.
102
 Accordingly, this subsection is concerned with 
other common law countries which have a remarkable authority in this regard. 
In the Canadian seminal case regarding the fraud exception, Bank of Nova Scotia v 
Angelica-Whitewear,
103
 the Supreme Court of Canada laid down a number of general 
rules to be applied in future fraud cases, and submitted that fraud should not be 
confined to that of documents only.
104
 In Justice Le Dain’s words: 
“…the fraud exception to the autonomy of documentary letters of credit 
should not be confined to cases of fraud in the tendered documents but 
should include fraud in the underlying transaction of such a character as to 
make the demand for payment under the credit a fraudulent 
one…Moreover, the words of Lord Denning MR in Edward Owen 
Engineering-‘the request for payment is made fraudulently in 
circumstances when there is no right to payment’-suggest that it was not 
intended to limit the fraud exception to documentary fraud, strictly 
speaking. In my view the fraud exception to the autonomy of a 
documentary credit should extend to any act of the beneficiary of a credit 
the effect of which would be to permit the beneficiary to obtain the benefit 
of the credit as a result of fraud.”105 
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Justice Le Dain made it clear that fraud should be taken in its broad sense and should 
not be limited to cover the narrow approach only which calls for limiting the fraud 
exception to that of documents.
106
 Interestingly, his Justice’s last sentence in the 
above quoted statement, where he found that the fraud exception “should extend to 
any act of the beneficiary which would be to permit the beneficiary to obtain the 
benefit of the credit as a result of fraud” resembles the English ‘fraud unravels all’ 
principle. It is noteworthy that his Justice has relied on the Edward Owen case in 
justifying the approach he pursued. Indeed, this fact tips the balance in favour of 
recognising the Edward Owen as a case supporting the approach which asserts that 
English courts do not limit the fraud exception to documents. 
Mugasha himself has noted that whilst a few cases in Australia have suggested that 
looking into the underlying transaction should not be allowed to restrain a letter of 
credit, the largest number of cases have suggested the contrary.
107
 In Olex Focas Pty 
Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd,
108
 the Australian court has “delved into the underlying 
transaction and engaged in a quantification exercise in relation to the amount paid and 
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the amount repaid”109 in order to determine whether or not to restrain a letter of credit 
payment. While the court in this case found for the applicant on other grounds rather 
than fraud, this does not eliminate the fact that the Olex court has initially examined 
the underlying transaction in order to judge in the plaintiff’s favour.110 Had it found 
fraud in the underlying transaction, it is suggested that the Olex case result would be 
the same. Earlier and in the same manner as that pursued in the English Sirius case, 
the Australian High Court in Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority
111
 expressed it 
readiness to interfere with the letter of credit payment if the underlying contract does 
stipulate for some conditions in order to release the credit, which have not been 
satisfied.
112
  
Moreover, Singaporean cases have not deviated from the pattern which has been 
pursued by the abovementioned countries in this regard. In its decisions which 
resemble that of the Olex court, the Singaporean Court of Appeal in Samwoh Asphalt 
Premix Pte Ltd v Sum Cheong Piling Pte Ltd
113
 and Dauphin Offshore Engineering & 
Trading Ltd v The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan
114
 did not find it a problem to examine the underlying transaction in order to 
restrain the letters of credit involved in such transactions.
115
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Whilst Mugasha himself concedes that “Overall, the weight of opinion favours the 
liberal construction which permits the court to enjoin payment if there is fraud in the 
documents or in the underlying transaction”,116 it is hard to reconcile this with what he 
described as the conventional view. If there should be a conventional view in this 
regard, it is submitted that such a view is that the inquiry should not be limited to 
documents. 
 
4.3.4.  Arguments for and against the fraud scope expansion 
 
The fraud scope question has vexed courts and commentators.
117
 For example, as seen 
above,
118
 Goode seemed hesitant as to whether the fraud exception should embrace 
fraud allegations which emanate from the underlying transaction as distinct from that 
pertinent to the documents.
119
 His view of the matter had been changing over the 
preceding years and the last view he showed was in favour of such an expansion.
120
 
To this effect he stated that “There is no reason in principle why the fraud exception 
should be confined to fraud in relation to the issue of the letter of credit”.121 While his 
last statement is appreciated, especially by those who advocate a broad view of the 
fraud scope, including fraud in the underlying transaction, yet unfortunately it seems 
that Goode did not provide reasons for pursuing such an expansive approach. Unlike 
Goode’s approach, this subsection seeks to examine the reasons most frequently cited 
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by the advocates of both the narrow approach, which advocates limiting the fraud 
scope to fraud perpetrated in documents, and the broad approach, in order to justify 
their view of this particular area of letters of credit law.  
Maintaining the autonomy principle has been the main reason relied on by those who 
advocate the narrow approach in justifying the narrowness of their approach.
122
 In 
their view, the expansion of the fraud scope would undermine the autonomy principle 
and accordingly letters of credit would lose their prominent statues as financial 
payment and security instruments leading the parties to search for alternative 
instruments that cannot be restrained by banks or courts.
123
 From this perspective, for 
example, Horowitz asserted the autonomy principle’s importance and the desire “to 
treat abstract payment undertakings as the equivalent of cash” and, thus, found that 
the broad approach involves “too great diminution of the autonomy principle”.124 
It is submitted that such an argument is untenable. The autonomy principle works on 
the assumption that the parties utilising letters of credit are bona fide parties whose 
good faith is not in doubt. However, where fraudulent parties are involved “the 
principle of independence of the bank’s obligation under the letter of credit should not 
be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller”.125 If fraudulent beneficiaries are left 
to complete their fraud freely, letters of credit will lose the applicants’ trust and will 
be abandoned by them without a return. On this assumption the fraud exception has 
been tailored by courts to guard defrauded applicants from the harm which they might 
sustain by dealing with unscrupulous beneficiaries. It is true that letters of credit 
would lose their temptation if the autonomy principle is undermined by repetitive 
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unjustified intervention by courts and banks with its operation.
126
 However, it should 
not be forgotten that letters of credit would also lose their temptation if they are 
viewed as instruments which are widely open to abuse and fraudulent conducts. 
Maintaining the autonomy principle and accordingly the utility of letters of credit as 
financial payments and security instruments is desirable but at the same time that 
should not be exaggerated. By the same token, protecting the reputation of these 
instruments by not punishing fraudulent beneficiaries should not be tolerated. As one 
American judge puts it: “There is much public interest in discouraging fraud as in 
encouraging the use of letters of credit”.127 
Moreover, the narrow approach advocates argue that in applying the fraud in the 
documents exception the buyer needs only to prove that the documents are fraudulent. 
However, in expanding the fraud exception to comprise that fraud perpetrated in the 
underlying transaction “a careful assessment of the merits of the fraudulent 
inducement must be conducted, because there is nothing patently wrong with the 
documents themselves.”128 In their view, in the latter situation the undermining of the 
autonomy principle is insufferable and accordingly should not be allowed. 
Again this argument does not stand precise legal analysis. As one commentator stated 
“A court really cannot determine whether or not the documents are fraudulent without 
inquiring into whether the underlying transaction is fraudulent as well”.129 Indeed, 
how could the court determine that the documents are fraudulent (e.g., no goods are 
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shipped) without an extraneous assessment? Even if the fraud is one pertinent to the 
documents, a court cannot determine if such a fraud is existent or not without 
examining the letter of credit transaction. One might ask if courts are willing to 
examine the goods which the documents cover to determine the fraud availability, 
why they should be prevented from examining the underlying contract in the same 
way. The arguments of the narrow approach advocates which assert that in examining 
the letter of credit transaction the burden upon the court would be less or that the 
investigations pursued would be easier does not make any sense (e.g., examining a 
contract might be easier for a court than getting involved in the goods’ 
complications). As one commentator suggests:  
“…the difficult question always faced by those favouring a narrow 
interpretation of the term ‘fraud in the transaction’ or locus of fraud: how 
can fraud in the documents or in the credit transaction be ascertained 
without looking to the underlying transaction?”130 
 
Another argument used by those who advocate the narrow approach is that such an 
expansion conflicts with the role which the banks’ play in the letters of credit 
operation. In Mugasha’s view, such an expansion:  
“…strays from the task of the document examiner under a letter of credit 
or bank guarantee, which is only to match the terms of the demand with 
those of the document under which the demand is made. It is not the task 
of the banks as document examiners or that of the courts when they decide 
whether or not to issue an injunction to investigate disputes as to the 
amounts owing or the extent of performance under the underlying 
contracts”.131  
 
This argument is unacceptable. Indeed, the banks’ role in a letter of credit context is 
documentary. If no adequate fraud proof is presented to the bank, whether acquired by 
its own elective investigation or by the applicant, the bank would not be prevented 
from being reimbursed by its applicant if it did pay. Banks in no case are required to 
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go beyond documents and to decide whether in such a situation to pay or not. As 
Fellinger states, the situation: 
“…is that in no case could the bank inquire beyond facially complying 
documents. As such, the extent of the bank’s authority is with the 
genuineness of the documents themselves in so far as they are not forged. 
Parol evidence indicating false or fraudulent statements within genuine 
documents is a matter outside the bank’s sphere of concern and 
liability”.132 
 
However, to say that courts should not interfere in such a situation is untenable. 
Courts are the most competent entities which could weigh facts and proofs which 
exist outside the document’s face in order to achieve justice. If courts do interfere and 
stop the letter of credit payment to prevent a fraudulent beneficiary from swindling 
either the bank or the applicant, it is hard to understand how the banks’ role would be 
badly affected.  
Furthermore, one of the narrow approach advocates’ arguments is that in the vast 
majority of letters of credit cases the fraud will constitute fraud in the documents and 
it is only if the applicant has failed to stipulate enough documentary conditions to 
catch the fraud that the defence of fraud in the documents may be inoperable.
133
 
Accordingly, in such situations the loss should fall on the applicant as he should be 
the one who bears the result of his mistake and negligence. Yet, such an argument is 
questionable. Initially, one might ask why a beneficiary fraudulently induces an 
applicant or a bank to open a letter of credit in his favour; why such a fraudulent seller 
would perpetrate fraud in the underlying transaction and what the consequences of 
such a fraud are. Is it expected that a fraudulent beneficiary who deceives other parties 
in the underlying transaction would discharge the duties entrusted to him under a 
                                                 
132
 Fellinger, G. ‘Letters of Credit: the Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception’ (1990) 1 J. 
Banking and Finance L. & Practice. 4. at p. 11 
133
 Horowitz, D. “Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment” (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at p. 30 
141 
 
letter of credit? Indeed, fraud inducing an applicant or a bank to enter a sale of 
contract and to open a letter of credit would ultimately lead to a fraudulent demand on 
the letter of credit amount. What other end can be anticipated? Fraud in the underlying 
transaction in order to provide letters of credit cannot be detached from the latter as 
both are related and connected robustly to each other and any attempt to separate them 
would be obviously a trail of illusion.
134
 
Even if such an argument is correct, such an approach would encourage rather than 
discourage fraud. In fact, in both the underlying transaction and the letter of credit 
transaction the same goods or services are required from the same seller but what 
differs is the documents’ existence or contents. However, the same fraudulent seller of 
the same goods would be restrained from obtaining payment if fraud is related to the 
documents and at the same time he would be allowed to fade away in respect of the 
letter of credit money if the fraud is one related to the underlying transaction. Such an 
approach presents fraudsters with an invaluable technique in order to deceive their 
victims safely. It is like saying: dear fraudster if you want to defraud the applicant and 
his bank securely, please try to avoid using documents and even if you have been 
forced to use documents try not to stipulate too much information in them so you will 
not be caught by the fraud exception. As Jack noted: 
“It is suggested that the exception is an appropriate one which accords 
with the rationale that the court will not permit a beneficiary to obtain 
payment in reliance on his own wrongdoing. On this basis, it would be 
odd if the bank were obliged to pay an obviously fraudulent beneficiary 
only because the fraud did not manifest itself in false documents”.135 
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In addition, adopting the narrow approach view would lead to the conclusion that an 
independent guarantee, in the absence of documents, is an unstoppable payment 
method which a bank or a court can not interrupt absolutely.
136
 While the narrow 
approach concerns which emanate from a fear about the letter of credit’s future and 
marketability in international trade are respected, it seems that their approach does 
neglect the fact that the majority of independent guarantees do not stipulate for 
documents in order to release the guarantee amount. If the narrow approach view is 
correct in that an inquiry should be limited to documents only, then the fraud 
exception would not be a workable solution to protect abused applicants in an 
independent guarantee context. 
Indeed, whilst the autonomy principle dictates keeping the different transactions 
involved in bringing a letter of credit to life separate, fraud is an exception to this 
principle. If the word exception is taken literally, why should it be limited to the letter 
of credit transaction? If such a conclusion is right, in order to make sense, the fraud 
exception should be renamed to become the fraud exception to the letter of credit 
transaction. 
 
Whilst it is submitted that the fraud scope should not prevent the operation of the 
fraud exception, this should not be taken too broadly since the application of the fraud 
exception is not without its own conditions. In other words, the existence of fraud in 
the underlying contract or the documents does not necessarily mean that the fraud 
exception could be applicable always. Indeed, a sufficient fraud case should be made 
by the party seeking to make use of the fraud exception.
137
 Moreover, certain 
requisites, which differ according to the stage at which the fraud exception are sought, 
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should be provided.
138
 The reason behind such requisites is to maintain the letter of 
credits’ viability in the field of international commerce. As Dolan has noted: 
“Prevention of fraud is legitimate commercial policy, and courts are 
justifiably concerned that they not fashion law contributing to fraudulent 
practices. At the same time, courts must understand that letters of credit 
and independent bank guarantees cannot function, and are lost to 
commerce, if parties can succeed in characterizing underlying transaction 
disputes as fraud in the independent obligation payment transaction. As a 
general rule, commercial law commands courts to look to the underlying 
transaction as part of the fraud inquiry, but the command is not an open 
invitation to use the underlying transaction inquiry to corrode the 
independence of efficient commercial devices. The law must cabin that 
inquiry, for expansion of the inquiry has untoward commercial effect”.139 
  
Dolan’s view does not confine the fraud exception to that where fraud is perpetrated 
in the documents. However, it should be noted that, whilst it is clear that Dolan is in 
favour of looking to the underlying transaction to find fraud, his view has been 
misunderstood. For example, Horowitz argues that Dolan intended to limit the fraud 
exception scope to fraud that had been perpetrated in the documents.
140
 Yet a close 
reading of Dolan’s passage suggests a different conclusion.  
Firstly, Dolan stepped away from using mere contractual disputes which do not 
constitute fraud to obstruct the operation of letters of credit. It is true that if a letter of 
credit is to be interrupted repeatedly for trivial reasons which do not constitute fraud, 
such an instrument will lose its attraction in the international trade realm. Hence, 
interfering with the smooth running of such abstract payment methods should be 
cautiously limited to situations which are worth interfering with. Interestingly, 
Horowitz agrees with Dolan’s view in this regard as she noted that “Only in severely 
egregious circumstances should that line [regarding the fraud scope] be moved [to 
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include fraud in the underlying transaction] for policy reasons”.141 However, one 
might wonder how a court could determine initially that an alleged fraud in the 
underlying transaction is egregious and that it is not merely a contractual dispute, and 
accordingly interfere with the letter of credit payment process, without firstly 
examining such a transaction. Can a court conclude that fraud in a certain underlying 
transaction is of an egregious condition by examining the documents solely? It is 
difficult to understand Horowitz’s approach which rejects looking to the underlying 
transaction to apply the fraud exception and which at the same time calls for applying 
such an exception where fraud in the underlying transaction is of an egregious type.  
Secondly, it is suggested that Dolan’s comments in the last paragraph is pertinent to 
independent guarantees. Indeed, it is usually a sale of goods transaction which is 
covered by a documentary letter of credit and disputes in such a context would be 
pertinent to the goods and their condition in most of the cases. Yet, in an independent 
guarantee context where usually no documents are utilised and where the underlying 
transaction is very complicated, the reason behind the issuance of it would be difficult 
to understand. The use of independent guarantees is not confined to a certain kind of 
transactions but its use could cover a large number of different transactions. 
Moreover, the contracts for which an independent guarantee is used are usually 
manifold and contain more than one transaction (e.g., construction contracts). 
Accordingly, delving into the underlying transaction to apply the fraud exception in 
an independent guarantee context where the reason behind its issuance is unclear 
would bring harmless repercussions to the beneficiary. Mugasha’s view does match 
that of Dolan in this regard. In Mugasha’s words: 
“It is suggested, however, that this seemingly broad interpretation should 
not be taken to permit a court to delve into the determination of the merits 
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of the underlying transaction. Rather a court should still be mindful of 
facilitating the letter of credit as a successful instrument of international 
trade”.142 
 
Interestingly, whilst Mugasha’s last statement seems to contradict his solid opinion 
discussed above toward the fraud scope, it does agree with Dolan’s view in that 
extending the fraud exception to include fraud in the underlying transaction is an 
indispensable need but yet courts should be mindful in applying such an exception. 
 
4.4. Conclusion  
 
In Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear,
143
 Justice Le Dain suggested that the 
reason explaining various judicial and academic opinions in this regard is the collision 
between two main policies which are: firstly, the autonomy principle and its 
importance in maintaining the role which letters of credit play in international 
commerce and, secondly, “the importance of discouraging or suppressing fraud in 
letter of credit transactions.”144  
Indeed, the autonomy principle dictates that banks deal in documents, not goods, and 
that non-fraudulent beneficiaries should be assured of receiving payment if the 
documents comply with the letter of credit terms.
145
 It is true that banks do not have 
sufficient capacity to examine the underlying transaction residing beyond documents. 
Even if a buyer requests a bank to do that, the latter should refuse such a request 
rather than putting itself in an unenviable situation.
146
 However, unlike banks, courts 
are the very institutions which can assess fraud allegations. If one of the courts’ main 
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functions is to discourage fraud, why should it be confined to fraud in the documents 
rather than that in the underlying transaction? One might argue that the courts should 
not interfere because the buyer, by virtue of the autonomy principle, accepts bearing 
the risk of fraud in the transaction as he stipulated for conforming documents only in 
the letter of credit. This may be erroneous. A buyer does accept payment when 
presented with conforming documents to facilitate the operation of an honest sale 
transaction, but to say that the buyer only contracts for documents regardless of their 
contents does not reflect reality. 
In fact, the reason for not invoking the fraud exception in most of the cases heard by 
the English courts (other than the Themehelp and Kvaerner cases) cannot be attributed 
to the fraud scope dilemma and whether fraud is existent in the documents or in the 
underlying transaction, but rather it can be attributed to other reasons such as the fraud 
standard poof, the meaning of the word fraud itself, the presence of a holder in due 
course and failing to satisfy an injunction’s requisites. 
Loosely speaking, like their common law counterparts, English courts have been 
successful in this regard as their focus has been on the fraud evidence rather than 
making unnecessary distinctions pertinent to the fraud exception scope. Nevertheless, 
it is suggested that it would be a better approach if English courts take this issue into 
consideration in future fraud cases and accordingly illustrate their view in this regard. 
Moreover, it is submitted that the concept of ‘the underlying transaction’ itself is 
misleading especially where the operation of letters of credit does necessitate the 
involvement of more than one transaction. Therefore, people involved in this regard 
should be cautious of using such a concept as what is meant by it would be 
misunderstood. Clarification of what transaction they do mean by the ‘underlying 
transaction’ should follow its use. 
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Chapter Five: Fraud in the Underlying Transaction 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
As discussed previously,
1
 the autonomy principle is an indispensable necessity in the 
context of letters of credit. However, it should be noted that the autonomy principle is 
not essentially absolute as fraud has been recognised as an exception to this principle 
which dictates separating the documentary credit or guarantee from the underlying 
contract from which such instruments have ensued. In fact, the fraud exception works 
to protect applicants and banks where the beneficiary’s demand is fraudulent. In this 
context, English courts have reiterated that fraud acts should not go unpunished and 
that “fraud unravels all” even the well-defined autonomy principle.2  
Although fraud is a “globally well-established”3 exception, yet, “one must first 
establish that fraud exists” in order to apply the fraud exception.4 This chapter seeks 
to find out the answer to the following question: what constitutes fraud for the 
purpose of these instruments?
5
 Whilst some commentators have suggested that the 
required fraud which could activate the fraud exception should be of a blatant nature, 
other cases and commentators have advocated intentional fraud as the proper 
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standard.
6
 Nonetheless, it is suggested that “There is no concise definition of what is 
meant by fraud in letter of credit deals”.7 
Taking this into consideration, this chapter is divided into four sections. After the 
introduction, the following section is intended to provide a discussion on the fraud 
standard related to documentary credits. This section is divided into two subsections: 
the first subsection addresses the existing fraud standard test which the English courts 
usually apply when a documentary credit fraud case appears before them; in the 
second subsection, taking into consideration the ineffectiveness of the former 
standard, a new fraud standard is proposed. The third section is dedicated to 
addressing the fraud standard applicable in independent guarantees cases. In its turn 
this section is divided into four main subsections. Similarly to the second section, the 
first subsection of this section addresses the existent fraud standard test which English 
courts usually apply when an independent guarantee case appears before them. The 
second subsection aims to reveal the extent of effectiveness of a similar proposed 
fraud test as that proposed in the last section and which addresses the fraud standard 
in a documentary credit context. The third subsection examines the unconscionability 
exception, which has originated in other commonwealth countries, and its chances of 
being adhered to in the English jurisdiction. The fourth and the last subsection of this 
section is concerned with the underlying contract exception which has lately appeared 
in the English courts as a means by which an applicant can restrain the payment of a 
fraudulent demand in an independent guarantee context. The conclusion is provided in 
the fourth and last section. 
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5.2. The fraud standard in documentary credits  
 
A documentary credit process depends wholly on commercial documents.
8
 The 
beneficiary submits documents which provide evidence that he complied with the 
applicant’s requirements under the documentary credit. The bank in its turn pays the 
beneficiary once it obtains these documents without the need to look further to see 
whether these documents represent the truth or not. The autonomy principle, which 
has been injected into this context to facilitate the ease of use of both documentary 
credits and guarantees, exempts banks from examining different and on some 
occasions, complex transactions.
9
 However, injecting the autonomy principle into 
these financial instruments is not without its own shortcomings.
10
 Indeed, sometimes, 
the autonomy principle can put the applicants in a very “absurdly vulnerable 
position”.11 One commentator has noted that: 
“It is not a difficult task to fabricate or forge these documents. Particularly 
with developing technology, every single person can fabricate an identical 
copy of a shipping document that is commonly used in trade, or they can 
buy one from related associations and fill it up according to their own 
wishes.”12 
 
English courts, as is the case with the courts in most countries, have taken the above 
and many similar statements into account and so have recognised the fraud exception 
to the autonomy principle in such cases in order to protect banks and applicants from 
beneficiaries’ fraudulent acts. Taking this into consideration, this section is divided 
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into two parts. The first part discusses the existent fraud standard test which English 
courts require applicants to satisfy in order to benefit from the fraud exception and 
consequently to stop the beneficiary from fraudulently obtaining the documentary 
credit amount. The second part, taking the problematic nature of the existing applied 
test into consideration, is meant to provide a proposed fraud standard test which 
would suit better the special nature of these instruments and the desires of the parties 
who are potentially exposed to being defrauded. At this stage, it should be noted that 
the English law did not develop the fraud exception to any great extent in 
documentary credits. This is because of the fact that most of the cases which have 
been heard by the English courts in relation to the fraud exception were cases which 
concerned independent guarantees.
13
 
5.2.1. The common law fraud standard: a subjective test 
 
In Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industry Ltd,
14
 Jenkins L.J. in laying stress 
on the importance of the autonomy principle in a documentary credit case has 
provided: 
“We were referred to several authorities, and it seems to be plain that the 
opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the 
banker and the vendor of the goods, which imposes on the banker an 
absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute which there may be 
between the parties on the question of whether the goods are up to 
contract or not”15 
 
Yet, in the United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The 
American Accord)
16
 case which has been described as “the leading case which sets out 
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the standard of fraud”,17 Lord Diplock found that there is an exception to the 
autonomy principle where:  
“…the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently 
presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by 
implication, material representations of facts that to his knowledge are 
untrue”.18  
 
In fact, Lord Diplock’s formulation “is very close to a statement of the elements of 
fraudulent misrepresentation which constitute the tort of deceit”.19 Following Lord 
Diplock’s last statement, it has been suggested that after the United City Merchants 
case “the application of the fraud exception is limited to cases where the beneficiary 
had knowledge of the fraud”.20 Indeed, under English law “…the fraud exception has 
developed as part of the common law”21 and thus there has been emphasis on the 
“beneficiary’s state of mind in the United City Merchants”.22 Originally, the state of 
mind that has been required to establish fraud in the common law had been 
established by Lord Herschell in the Derry v Peek case.
23
 To this effect, his Lordship 
stated:  
“Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been 
made (i) knowingly, (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, 
careless whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and 
third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for 
one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real 
belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false statement from 
being fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an honest belief in its 
truth”.24  
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Accordingly, it has been frequently reiterated that fraud is “common law fraud” and 
that “the claimant must show deceit which involves a heavy standard of proof”25 in 
order to activate the fraud exception in a documentary credit context.
26
 Hence, as 
provided by Waller J. in the Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China case: 
“If the fraud exception is to apply, the bank [or buyer] must have 
irrefutable evidence that the claimant is dishonest so that it can establish 
that dishonesty if it were sued by the beneficiary”.27 
 
While such an intentional standard of fraud has been applauded by some courts and 
scholars,
28
 it has been criticised frequently by the majority.
29
 It has been said that such 
a standard makes the fraud exception a narrow exception
30
 because of the difficulty of 
proving it.
31
 Indeed, “Dishonesty is hard to prove”.32 Such a “rarely [to] be 
successfully established”33 subjective test which requires an inquiry into a person’s 
state of mind
34
 has led to some commentators describing the English Courts’ 
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approach, in this context, as a non-interventionist approach
35
 and the fraud exception 
as “a theoretical concept rather than a practical one”.36 
As late as 1893, Lord Esher in Leivre v Gould
37
 had observed the rigid nature of such 
a standard of fraud. In his words: “A charge of fraud is such a terrible thing to bring 
against a man that it cannot be maintained in Court unless it is shown he had a wicked 
mind”.38 Such a burden is very hard to satisfy by the party alleging fraud. It makes 
“investigators of buyers and banks”.39 It would be difficult to establish that a drawing 
under a letter of credit involved deceit
40
 and so “under English law there is a very 
limited exception to the autonomy principle in the case of fraud on the part of the 
seller or his agents”.41 In fact, there are not many cases where this exception has been 
successfully applied in favour of the applicant. This could be best understood where 
English courts have held that they would not decide that an action of deceit exists 
unless the beneficiary is present in the judgement procedures so that he could have the 
opportunity to defend himself.
42
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The repercussions of the application of such a rigid standard can be clearly observed 
in the Discount Record case.
43
 In this case not only were the goods delivered later 
than the agreed date which had been stated in the invoice, but there was evidence 
which showed that most of the goods delivered were either not as had been ordered or 
else were useless. Interestingly, the inspection of the goods had been made in the 
presence of the applicant and the issuing bank officers, but yet the English court did 
not recognize such an action as fraud.
44
 In fact, the court had confined its focus to the 
beneficiary’s state of mind rather than the situation in relation to the goods 
themselves. 
It is submitted that, because investigating the beneficiary’s mind is not an easy job 
and because proving such a state of mind is not an easy matter especially in 
preliminary hearings where it is usually only the allegations of the applicant that are 
heard, the English existent fraud exception is biased in favour of beneficiaries and that 
it does not fulfil banks’ and applicants’ desires as they are defenceless against 
fraudulent beneficiaries.
45
 As Guest puts it:  
“It is, thus, clear that the fraud rule has a narrow scope of application. It is 
true that there is an indication that a more liberal approach may be 
adopted by the courts in the future.”46 
 
The question which would arise at this point is: “whether it is appropriate to reassess 
the narrow fraud exception in order to preserve trust?”47 The current author’s answer 
to this question is in the affirmative and, therefore, the next subsection is meant to 
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provide a more flexible fraud standard which would make the fraud exception a 
practical rather than a theoretical concept. 
 
5.2.2. A proposed fraud standard: an objective test 
 
As has been seen above, “the existence of a fraud exception…is severely limited in 
English law”.48 Thus, the question that arises at this stage is: ““Does fraud require 
(evidence of) deceitful or malicious conduct on the part of the beneficiary?”49 The 
current author’s answer to this question is no. It is suggested that the question with 
which the courts should be concerned is not whether the beneficiary knows about the 
fraud but rather whether the beneficiary should have known about it. Indeed, rather 
than looking subjectively at the beneficiary’s state of mind to find fraud, an objective 
test, which would direct the inquiry into the case’s relevant circumstances in order to 
find fraud, will suit such a context better and will ease the application of the fraud 
exception. The suggested test, which previously examined this situation, and which 
was advocated approximately one hundred years ago in Société Metallurgique 
d’Aubrives & Villerupt v. British Bank for Foreign Trade,50 states: “Did the person 
presenting misdescribe the goods in such a way as to be guilty of fraud. If that were 
so, then the bank in refusing to pay would be justified”.51  
Documentary credits are usually issued in connection with sales contracts and the 
conditions they contain relate to the sale of goods which they have been issued for.
52
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Accordingly, it is submitted that goods are “the decisive factor in finding fraud.53 
Through examining the situation of the goods’ required by the documentary credit 
documents, the court can infer whether an evil intent is existent or not.
54
 Fraud could 
be inferred in circumstances where the goods’ shipped by the seller are of a 
completely different nature from those which have been contracted for and 
determined by the documentary letter of credit. Fraud could also be inferred where the 
goods are defective or useless.
55
 This would include, for example, situations where 
bags tendered were rags instead of paper.
56
 In other words, “The description of old, 
worthless, newspapers as ‘class I typing paper’ is inconsistent with anything but a 
fraud”.57 Such a fact would be “prima facie evidence of fraud”.58 In such a case, the 
existence of knowledge, dishonesty, or male fide conduct on the part of the 
beneficiary “is simply derived from the established facts…”.59 As it has been 
observed recently by one commentator: 
“There are circumstances where it is obvious that the seller’s breach of 
contract is not one which could have occurred through mere negligence 
and in which a strict adherence to the autonomy principle would benefit 
fraudsters while denying justice to other parties”.60 
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Loosely speaking, the law of sales does recognize that there is a distinction between 
differences in kind and differences in quality and that the former may well constitute a 
case of fraud but the latter will rarely do.
61
 Where it is merely a contractual breach by 
the beneficiary in the underlying sales transaction, it could be said that the autonomy 
principle is supportable on the ground that the applicant has accepted the risk of 
payment notwithstanding such kinds of defects in its performance.
62
 If such a 
principle was not adhered to and the bank refused payment, the expectations of the 
parties, which they have initially bargained for, would be undermined. Furthermore, 
documentary credits would soon lose their commercial reputation in the eyes of 
sellers who would no longer trust them as a prompt and certain way of payment. 
However, this rationale becomes less compelling when ‘the degree and mala fides of 
the beneficiary’s breach increase to the point of fraud…’”.63 As has been noted by 
another commentator:  
“Given the destruction of the underlying contract it is inconceivable that a 
customer without adequate legal remedy would have to pay on a letter of 
credit because the seller shipped empty crates through negligence rather 
than ‘active, intentional fraud’”.64 
 
Whilst it is necessary to prevent the fraud exception from including cases of only 
small quantity shortage or deferred delivery, it would be of irreparable harmful 
consequences to allow fraudulent beneficiaries, who ship rubbish or totally different 
goods, to go unpunished. Allowing the latter situation would, as would tolerating the 
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former situation, lead to the breakdown of the documentary credit mechanism.
65
 In the 
latter cases, as well as the applicant, the bank’s security would be affected badly. 
Nonetheless, banks would not always be affected in cases of intentional fraud. Where 
there is no great discrepancy between the actual state of the goods and their 
description, the bank can obtain almost the same amount which it has paid to the 
beneficiary if the applicant refuses to pay and as a result the bank is forced to sell the 
goods. However, in cases where there is a substantial discrepancy it would be very 
difficult for the bank to get the sum of money which it has already advanced.
66
 
Whether a deceitful intention is available or not, the banks’ attention is directed into 
the goods and nothing else but the goods. Accordingly, it is submitted that the 
objective test would better serve, in addition to applicants, the banks’ expectations.  
However, the difficulty which arises in such a context is to determine specifically 
what circumstances should be considered as merely breach of contract, which would 
not restrain a documentary credit payment, and those which would constitute fraud 
and so result in restraining the payment.
67
 While some specific cases are clear, other 
cases are more difficult to determine. There can be no doubt that the seller is 
fraudulent when he submits an invoice which describes Manilla hemp while what he 
actually ships is cotton rags. However, a dispute could arise where the question is 
whether grapes are of a certain quality and whether some paper is of certain 
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strength.
68
 Such a difficulty has been noted by Lord Diplock in the United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord).
69
 
Other than the required deceitful intent, his Lordship has found that fraud should be 
material. In citing his words again, one could note the materiality point where his 
Lordship provided:  
“…the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently 
presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by 
implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are 
untrue”.70 
 
His Lordship’s requirement that the fraud should be material does echo the view 
suggested by the proposed objective test. However, what could be cited against Lord 
Diplock’s approach is that he connected the test of materiality to that of intent which, 
as seen above, is hard to prove and so ineffective in this context.
71
 Yet the problem is 
to define when it could be said that a certain action does constitute a material fraud.
72
 
To this his Lordship has provided:  
“The answer to the question: ‘to what must the misstatement in the 
documents be material?’ should be: ‘material to the price which the goods 
to which the documents relate would fetch on sale if, failing 
reimbursement by the buyer, the bank should be driven to realise its 
security’.73 
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Such criterion, which has been drawn by Lord Diplock in order to determine the 
circumstances which would constitute a material fraud, is laudable. It depends on the 
actual state of the goods and takes into account the expectations of banks as well as 
applicants. Nonetheless, the materiality formulation which Lord Diplock has 
formulated has been criticized as it does not provide a detailed guidance as to what 
situations could specifically constitute material fraud.
74
 While it is unanimously 
accepted that “the fraud in question must relate to a material aspect of the documents 
and shipment”75 and that a distinction must be made between fraud and a mere breach 
of contract, it has been frequently suggested that it is a very difficult matter “to draw a 
line between breach of warranty and outright fraudulent practices”.76 In fact, the line 
between mere breaches of contract and fraud is not clear
77
 and therefore it has been 
suggested that this “is a matter that only the courts can properly assess”.78 
However, it is submitted that such a point should not be overestimated. As has been 
suggested by Ellinger: “It is true that, on occasions, the facts might speak for 
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themselves”.79 Fraudulent beneficiaries who have the intent to defraud applicants 
would not send the contracted for goods and they would not even send goods of 
equivalent price but rather they will send something valueless or even with no value at 
all in order to benefit from their own fraud.
80
 Accordingly it would be easy to infer 
which cases are cases of fraud and which are merely breaches of contracts. The few 
following cases would illustrate the fact that it would not be a very difficult task to 
determine fraud in this context. 
In Malas (Hamzeh) & Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd,
81
 Malas, a Jordanian buyer, 
contended that the goods, sent to him by an English seller, were defective and 
therefore he applied for an injunction. Jenkins L.J. held that the confirmed 
documentary credit constituted an absolute obligation on the bankers to pay the 
beneficiary “irrespective of any dispute there may be between the parties as to 
whether the goods are up to contract or not”.82 His Lordship found that the system of 
international commerce facilitated by irrevocable documentary credits “would break 
down completely if a dispute between the vendor and the purchaser was to have the 
effect of freezing… the sum in respect of which the letter of credit was opened”.83 In 
fact, Jenkins L.J.’s statement is recommendable in such circumstances. Where the iron 
metal which had been sent by the English sellers to the Jordanian buyers was slightly 
different in quality from that contracted for, it would be difficult to infer fraud from 
such circumstances. By the same token, sending newsprint paper of a different tensile 
strength rather than the contracted for strength, in the American case of Maurice 
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O’Meara Co. v National Park Bank84, did not qualify for the fraud exception 
application.
85
 In this case, there was no allegation of fraud and “the whole tenor of the 
case seemed to represent a mere honest difference of opinion”. 86 
However, in Sztejn v Henry Schroder Banking Corporation,
87
 worthless cowhair had 
been sent rather than the agreed on quantity of bristles by an Indian seller. According 
to Justice Shientag: “In the present motion, it must be assumed that the seller has 
intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer.”88 One should note that 
Justice Shientag has assumed that an intention to defraud was existent from the case 
relevant circumstances, namely: the shipment of rubbish rather than bristles. 
According to Sarna: “One is therefore left with the impression that, in the reasoning of 
Shientag J., material fraud is sufficient justification for dishonour”.89 It seems that 
Lord Diplock, who allegedly followed Sztejn in the United City Merchant case, may 
have misapplied Justice Shientag’s test. Although Justice Shientag has used the term 
‘intentional’, the Sztejn case facts exhibit an objective test of fraud in relation to the 
degree of fraud necessary to warrant the application of the fraud exception.
90
 The 
facts of the Discount Record Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd
91
 case resemble that of the 
Sztejn case. Yet, Megarry J. in the Discount Record case has concluded that:  
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“I do not think that this is a case for an injunction at all…If the first 
defendants have acted in breach of contract, the plaintiffs will have their 
claim against them…I would be slow to interfere with bankers’ 
irrevocable credits, and not least in the sphere of international banking, 
unless a sufficiently grave cause is shown; for interventions by the court 
that are too ready or too frequent might gravely impair the reliance which, 
quite properly, is placed on such credits”92  
 
Justice Megarry has clearly suggested that in a breach of contract case the parties have 
to settle their disputes in normal ways of litigation and that an injunction could not be 
granted to restrain a documentary credit payment in such circumstances. A contrary 
approach would gravely impair the reliance which has been placed on these payment 
methods. Moreover, he has made it clear that if a sufficiently grave cause is shown the 
matter would be different and that courts should interfere to balance the interests of 
the different parties. However, it is submitted that he has applied a “rather defeatist 
approach”.93 In Discount most of the goods shipped as required under the 
documentary credit were either rubbish or of a valueless nature. Nevertheless, Justice 
Megarry did not find that such facts would be considered as a sufficiently grave cause 
which would justify the fraud exception application. It is submitted that what made 
Justice Megarry refuse the injunction is the existence of a confirming bank in France 
which had already accepted to discount the beneficiary’s bills of exchange and so 
acquired the status of a holder in due course.
94
 The inability of the applicant to 
provide an established proof of fraud is another reason for not granting the required 
injunction. In Justice Megarry’s words: “The Sztejn case is plainly distinguishable in 
relation both to established fraud and to the absence there of any possible holder in 
due course”. It would have been a better approach if he illustrated clearly that the 
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facts of Discount qualified the fraud exception but because of other above-mentioned 
reasons he found it necessary to refrain from granting the requested injunction.  
The US courts have adopted a similar approach to that which requires an objective 
test rather than an intentional subjective test. In finding fraud, US courts look “at the 
factual circumstances of the case, in particular the effect and severity of the 
wrongdoing”.95 This has been described as “a US-style wide conception of fraud”.96 
Article 5-109 of the United States UCC provides that for the fraud exception to apply 
the fraud must be material.
97
 The official comment (Para 1) has provided that the 
word material in the above provision “requires that the fraudulent aspect of the 
document be material to the purchaser of the document or that fraudulent act be 
significant to the participants in the underlying transaction”.98 An example of a 
contract to deliver one thousand barrels of salad oil has been given in the official 
comment. The example provides that if the seller delivers 998 barrels and, 
nevertheless, even knowingly, submits an invoice which shows that one thousand 
barrels have been shipped, the shortage of two barrels is an ordinary and immaterial 
breach of the underlying contract and the beneficiary’s act, even though possibly 
fraudulent, is not material and, accordingly, the fraud exception will not be applied.
99
 
Obviously, the official comment has made it clear that what should be counted on is 
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the act itself and not the intent. A frequently cited formulation which illustrates the 
American courts’ approach can be found in Intraworld Industries, Inc. v Girard Trust 
Bank
100
 where it argues: 
 “The circumstances that will justify an injunction against honor must be 
narrowly limited to situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of the 
beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate 
purposes of the independence of the issuer’s obligation would no longer 
be served”.101 
 
In another US case, 3Com Corp. v Banco do Brasil, S.A.,
102
 the objective test has 
again been highlighted to fit comfortably with documentary credits’ fundamental 
mechanisms and principles. In Sotomayor J.’s words:  
“The adoption of an objective test standard is consistent with the 
contractual nature of letters of credit. Under such contracts, a beneficiary 
has the right to draw on the letter of credit only if certain conditions are 
met. If there is a ‘bona fide claim’ that those conditions have been met – 
in other words, if it is clear that the beneficiary has no right to draw on the 
letter of credit – the beneficiary should not be permitted to draw on the 
line of credit merely because the beneficiary has formed a good faith but 
mistaken belief that conditions permitting a draw do exist”.103  
 
Similarly, in a relatively recent documentary letter of credit case, Levin v Meagher,
104
 
Margulies J has remarkably found that:  
“What unifies the various standards formulated in the cases cited in the 
official code comment is their requirement that fraud be determined by an 
objective examination of the circumstances, rather than by reference to 
the subjective beliefs of the beneficiary”.105 
 
Interestingly, Ackner LJ in the United Trading Crop
106
 case has referred to some of 
the cases cited in the official comment of UCC 5-109 and has noted that the US 
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concept of the fraud exception is far wider than that in England. He observed that 
such a wider concept did not result in destroying the utility of letters of credit in the 
international trade context but rather it gave the fraud exception a more realistic role 
to play.
107
 In sum, the common law fraud and fraud under UCC Article 5 are not the 
same.
108
 The difference is that the standard of the fraud which is required under 
Article 5 to stop a letter of credit payment is material fraud rather than intentional 
fraud.
109
 The Task Force agreed that letters of credit fraud is not the same as common 
law fraud and that such a test “should be regarded in light of the critical importance 
played by the independence of the credit transaction from the underlying 
transaction”.110 Having illustrated the fraud standard position in respect of 
documentary credits, the next section is concerned with the position of such a test and 
other applicable tests in an independent guarantee context. 
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5.3. The fraud standard in independent guarantees  
 
In contrast to documentary credits, the independent guarantees’ payment process does 
not depend on commercial documents. More often, an independent guarantee 
beneficiary invokes the guarantee by a simple written demand without a proof of 
default and without the need to submit any valued commercial documents.
111
 The 
bank in its turn pays the beneficiary once the latter demands the independent 
guarantee amount without the need to look at the underlying transaction to see 
whether the demand is a result of a genuine default on the part of the applicant or not. 
As has been mentioned above,
112
 the autonomy principle, which has been injected into 
this context to facilitate the ease of use of both documentary credits and guarantees, 
exempts banks from examining different and, in some circumstances, complex 
transactions.
113
 Nonetheless, inserting the autonomy principle into these financial 
instruments has not been without its own inadequacies.
114
 Whilst it may be said that 
most of the issuers do proceed on the basis that an independent guarantee will never 
be called upon “due to their faith in the good faith, strength and financial capability of 
the applicant,”115 it is true, in certain circumstances, that the autonomy principle 
would put banks and applicants in an “absurdly vulnerable position”.116 
Unlike documentary credits, the autonomy principle’s necessity in the independent 
guarantees field has been disputed. While it has been reiterated frequently that the 
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same principles apply to independent guarantees and documentary credits,
117
 it has 
been said that an analogy between the two instruments is “tenuous”.118 Two 
interesting trends have shown up in this regard. In the first trend, Debattista argues 
that there should be no equation between principles of independent guarantees and 
that of documentary credits.
119
 He argues that “The principle of autonomy is 
commercially justifiable in the [documentary credits], but totally without such 
foundation in [independent guarantees]”.120 Accordingly, taking his view, which 
refuses the application of the autonomy principle in such a context,
121
 into 
consideration, applicants should be free to interrupt the independent guarantee 
payment process whenever a dispute comes up in the underlying contract from which 
the guarantee has ensued. It is submitted that such a view, if followed, will undermine 
the utility of independent guarantees in the international trade realm.
122
 Such a view 
overlooks the fact that one of the primary purposes of using independent guarantees is 
to guarantee the beneficiary a quick and easy payment by a reliable master without 
both needing to engage in protracted arguments.
123
 In utilising such financial 
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instruments, it is a well-known principle that the applicant will have to pay first and 
argue later.
124
 Hence, such a trend should be disallowed.  
In the second trend, Bennett suggests applying the autonomy principle but with no 
exceptions in one way or another.
125
 He suggests that the applicants should, from the 
start, inflate their contract price in order to mitigate the risk of loss caused by 
fraudulently demanding independent guarantees.
126
 In his opinion, courts should not 
be allowed to intervene with underlying contracts to protect independent guarantees 
applicants because these risks, which might occur later, have been obvious to the 
sophisticated applicants before they have accepted to establish an independent 
guarantee.
127
 According to Mugasha: “The parties agree to use these instruments well 
aware that each instance is a ‘pay now, talk later’ situation.”128 With the same effect, 
Lord Denning in the Edward Owen case
129
 has stated:  
“As one takes instance after instance, these performance guarantees are 
virtually promissory notes payable on demand… customers make an 
honest demand, the banks are bound to pay: and the banks will rarely, if 
ever, be in a position to know whether the demand is honest or not. At any 
rate they will not be able to prove it to be dishonest. So they will have to 
pay.”130 
 
It is submitted that this view should also be disallowed for the following reasons. 
Indeed, independent guarantees are virtually imposed on the exporters (applicants) by 
powerful importers (beneficiaries) who have the whip hand in negotiations.
131
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Opening an independent guarantee does not necessarily mean that the applicant is a 
sophisticated trader or that he accepts the risk of later fraudulent calls. In addition, if 
the contract’s price has been inflated to take into account the risks of fraudulent 
demands, high contract prices might lead to a situation where the applicant stays out 
of the tender as a whole. With higher prices and fewer participants, it is more likely 
that fewer contracts will be concluded and therefore international trade will decline as 
a result.
132
 Furthermore, as it has been said by Betrams: “‘paying first’ [and, hence, 
leaving the account party to retrieve the moneys in subsequent proceedings] would 
make no sense if the outcome of ‘later arguments’ is already evident”.133 In some 
situations, the amount of the independent guarantee will equal, or even be more than, 
the applicant’s profit on the project and thus a fraudulent demand can affect the 
applicant adversely.
134
 In addition, if the applicant is a small trader, a fraudulent call 
might result in his bankruptcy and if a number of fraudulent calls have been made on 
one bank, the solvency of the bank might be at the stake.
135
 The applicant who has 
obtained an independent guarantee and then such a guarantee has been acted upon, 
would find it difficult to obtain another independent guarantee subsequently as banks 
will view him as a risky customer who does not discharge his obligations. For the 
same reason, such an applicant will find it difficult either to obtain other contracts 
from parties who would ask for independent guarantees.  
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In the words of Blair J.: “In short, the consequences of a call on an [independent 
guarantee]…can be harsh, draconian and abrupt”.136 Therefore, and for the reasons 
illustrated above, it is submitted that the long term effect of fraudulent calls will insert 
a thick layer of uncertainty into international trade resulting in high contract prices 
and less trade in total.
137 The non-existence of documents in the independent 
guarantees’ field does not mean “that this is an open invitation to beneficiaries to 
defraud banks and applicants”.138  
A conservative view in this regard can be found in Lord Denning’s words in the 
Edward Owen case
139
 where he found that the independent guarantees and 
documentary letters of credit are similar but not identical and that an exception should 
be recognised to the autonomy principle which governs both instruments. In his 
words:  
“All this leads to the conclusion that the performance guarantee stands on 
a similar footing to a letter of credit. A bank which gives a performance 
guarantee must honour that guarantee according to its terms. It is not 
concerned in the least with the relations between the supplier and the 
customer: nor with the question whether the supplier has performed his 
contracted obligation or not. The bank must pay according to its 
guarantee, on demand, if so stipulated, without proof or conditions. The 
only exception is when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has 
notice”.140 
 
It is perhaps inappropriate to say that the autonomy principle is ‘misplaced’ in the 
context of independent guarantees. Such a principle is of an indispensable importance 
to facilitate the smooth running of these instruments and consequently the 
international trade realm. However, it is certainly true that independent guarantees are 
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functionally different from documentary credits, and that the fraud defence 
application may vary or even be exchanged by another exception in order to protect 
the different parties who utilise such instruments.
141
 Yet, English courts “have 
regularly stated that the relevant legal principles are the same in both types of cases, 
and judicial authorities are used interchangeably”,142 and so the fraud exception itself 
is the only exception to the equally well-established autonomy principle in 
independent guarantees. Indeed, it is the aim of the rest of this chapter to explore 
whether the fraud exception, either in a subjective or an objective manner, is sufficient 
or whether English courts should recognise other exceptions in order to protect the 
different parties from fraudulent demands in this context.  
This following discussion is divided into four parts. The first part addresses the 
existent fraud standard test which English courts usually apply when an independent 
guarantee case appears before them. The second part aims to reveal the extent of 
effectiveness of an objective fraud test similar to that proposed in the last section 
which addresses the fraud standard in a documentary credit context. The third part 
examines the unconscionability exception, which has been devised in other 
commonwealth countries, and its chances of being adhered to in the English 
jurisdiction. The fourth and the last part is concerned with the underlying contract 
exception which has lately appeared in the English courts as a way by which an 
applicant can restrain the payment of a fraudulent demand in an independent 
guarantee context. As allegations of fraud are nearly always made in relation to 
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independent guarantees that require only a mere demand without documents,
143
 it is 
justifiable to narrow the exploration of this section to this type of guarantee. 
5.3.1. The common law fraud standard: a subjective test 
 
The problem of fraudulent claims afflicts independent guarantees as much as, and 
even more than, documentary credits.
144
 What constitutes fraud in independent 
guarantees has been described as “the most significant current problem”145 in this 
context. Indeed, for the purposes of the fraud exception, English courts have treated 
cases of independent guarantees as involving the same principles as those which apply 
in a documentary credit context.
146
 Accordingly, the common law fraud standard 
(intentional fraud), as has been established in the United City Merchants case, has 
been adopted by courts in independent guarantees cases.
147
 In relation to this, for 
example, Parker LJ, in GKN Contractors v Lloyds Bank
148
 stated that common law 
fraud is the relevant test.
149
 In explaining such a test when applied to an independent 
guarantee context, his Lordship provided that the required fraud: 
“refers to what may be called common law fraud, that is to say, a case 
where the named beneficiary presents a claim which he knows at the time 
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to be an invalid claim, representing to the bank that he believes it to be a 
valid claim”.150  
 
In the same manner, in State Trading Corp of India Ltd v ED&F Man Sugar Ltd,
151
 
Lord Denning has noted:  
 
“... that the buyer, when giving notice of default, must honestly believe 
that there has been a default on the part of the seller. Honest belief is 
enough. If there is no honest belief, it may be evidence of fraud. If there is 
sufficient evidence of fraud, the court might intervene and grant an 
injunction. But otherwise not. So long as the buyer honestly believes there 
is default on the part of the seller, that is sufficient ground for a notice of 
default to be given”.152  
 
As can be seen, a claim under an independent guarantee could be described as 
fraudulent where “it amounts to deceit on the part of the beneficiary, namely where 
the beneficiary cannot honestly believe in the validity of the claim”.153 The common 
law test in an independent guarantee context does focus on the beneficiary’s beliefs.154 
That is to say if the beneficiary has an honest belief he should obtain the independent 
guarantee amount whether his demand is justified or not.
155
 Many Dicta, which have 
been held in recent cases, echo what both Lord Denning and Lord Parker have found 
previously. For instance, in Uzinterimpex JSC v Standard Bank Plc
156
 the court 
referred to the no honest belief test in a case involving an independent guarantee. The 
same has been found by Arden LJ in the Banque Saudi Fransi case.
157
 Moreover, in 
the same manner, in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v Banca Popolare Dell’Alto Adige 
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SpA,
158
 Teare J. found that the fraud exception does apply where “[the beneficiary] 
could not honestly have believed in the validity of its demands”.159 
It should be noted that the difficulty in all the cases which require a common law 
fraud test is to convince the courts that the beneficiary‘s claim is made without his 
having any belief in his right to the amount he demands.
160
 In other words this fraud 
test must involve dishonesty.
161
 The absence of the required honest belief in 
demanding the guarantee is difficult to prove and this could pose a threat to the 
independent guarantee’s applicant “as he is at the mercy of the beneficiary’s 
judgement.”162 As Bertrams has noted: “criminal law notions of malicious intent 
which are not suitable in relation to guarantees” should be disregarded.163 It is 
submitted that the same criticisms which have been made of the same “difficult to 
prove”164 test in the documentary credits context apply here and as a result it should 
be disallowed.  
 
5.3.2.  An objective test of fraud 
 
It has been reiterated that independent guarantees are more dangerous to their 
applicants than documentary credits due to the absence of commercial documents 
which are involved in the latter’s payment mechanism.165 The bank receives a mere 
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demand which is usually created by the beneficiary himself
166
 and which does not 
provide any value as it does not represent any specific goods.
167
 Moreover, 
demanding an independent guarantee is an indication that the applicant is in difficulty 
and may be unable to reimburse the bank.
168
 Hence, the banks’ risk is greater than that 
in a documentary credit.
169
 Moreover, due to the absence of commercial documents, 
independent guarantees are open to abuse
170
 and as a result unfair or unjustified 
payment can occur.
171
 Indeed, “only limited protection is available under the fraud 
exception of English law”.172 The intentional fraud exception which the English 
courts apply has opened the door and led the way for other acts of injustice to be 
perpetrated and to go unpunished in an independent guarantee context.
173
 The 
applicants in independent guarantees are exposed to the risk of abusive calls which 
often take the issue beyond the intentional fraud test. In fact, it may well be that the 
applicant has breached the underlying agreement and so the beneficiary has truthfully 
represented that in his demand, yet, sometimes it could be that the beneficiary himself 
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was the one who caused, or at least partially induced, that breach.
174
 In other 
situations, the breach could be trivial, but the guarantee is still open to the 
beneficiary’s abuse.175 
The seminal Edward Owen case
176
 shows how harshly the intentional fraud test can 
operate against independent guarantees’ applicants and how potentially they are 
exposed to abusive calls.
177
 In this case, the plaintiffs were English sellers who 
opened an independent guarantee in favour of a Libyan buyer pursuant to a contract 
which through the former agreed to construct a quantity of glass fibres in Libya. It 
was agreed in their contract that the Libyan buyers would open an irrevocable 
documentary credit in favour of the English seller as a way to facilitate the payment of 
purchased glass fibres.
178
 However, the Libyan buyers did not open such a 
documentary credit but rather they demanded the independent guarantee amount. 
Accordingly, the English seller sought an injunction from the English courts in order 
to mitigate the risk of the abusive call which the Libyan seller had made. The English 
Court of Appeal found that the only exception which can be applied in such a context 
is the conventional fraud exception. In Lord Browne’s words: 
“I am prepared to assume (a) that the plaintiffs are right in saying that the 
buyers failed to comply with their contractual obligation as to the letter of 
credit and (b) that as a result the plaintiffs were entitled to treat the 
contract as repudiated by the buyers and to cancel it…But, in my view, 
even if these assumptions are right, this does not come anywhere near 
establishing fraud on the part of the buyers”.179 
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In the same manner, Lord Geoffrey Lane added: 
“I disagree that that amounts to any proof of or evidence of fraud. It may 
be suspicious, it may indicate the possibility of sharp practice, but there is 
nothing in those facts remotely approaching true evidence of fraud or 
anything which makes fraud obvious or clear to the bank. Thus there is 
nothing, it seems to me, which casts any doubt on the bank’s prima facie 
obligation to fulfil its duty…”.180  
 
The opportunity in front of the beneficiary to invoke an independent guarantee by a 
simple written demand without a proper proof of default rendered such an instrument 
open to abusive calls.
181
 This has led to independent guarantees being referred to as 
‘suicide credits’.182 Abusive calls occur where the beneficiary improperly draws the 
independent guarantee even when it is obvious that the applicant did not breach any of 
his obligations under the underlying contract. It is true that such a draw leaves the 
applicant free to sue the beneficiary of the independent guarantee on the underlying 
contract but such a method would not always provide the aggrieved applicant with a 
definite solution.
183
 According to Pierce:  
“Payments against an unfair claim are probably lost forever. Local laws 
and regulations can…make it difficult to reclaim payment made against an 
unfair demand”.184 
 
It has been said that “the fraud rule is an inefficient means of combating unjustified 
demands made under [independent guarantees]”.185 The subjective fraud exception of 
English law therefore leaves a protection gap. The question is: how should it be 
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filled?
186
 While some judges have suggested that the account party should accept such 
a protection gap by previously building such a risk into the price of their contract, this 
is not a practical solution as such a move would be commercially disastrous to the 
independent guarantee applicant who may as a consequence price himself out of the 
contract biddings.
187
 The problem of abusive calls has vexed courts in different 
jurisdictions for many years.
188
 Whilst “British courts are considerably more reluctant 
to grant protection against unfair calling,”189 a wider exception which focuses on the 
act (objective test) rather than the intent (subjective test) has been recognised in other 
jurisdictions.
190
 Such a test has been suggested repeatedly.
191
  
The aim of such an exception is to protect the interests of all bona fide parties 
concerned.
192
 In the USA the fraud exception has been widened to fill the protection 
gap which independent guarantees’ applicants are suffering from.193 Such a wide test 
dictates that the fraud exception could apply where the beneficiary demands the 
independent guarantee amount while his demand has no conceivable basis under the 
underlying contract.
194
 This test works in the following mechanism: taking the 
                                                 
186
 Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at 
p. 88 
187
 Ibid. 
188
 Ibid. at p. 106 
189
 Horn, N. & Wymeersch, E. “Bank-Guarantees, Standby Letters of Credit and Performance Bonds in 
International Trade” (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, 1990) at p. 32. One of the few 
English cases which an injunction has been granted in to prevent an abusive call is Elian and Rabbath v 
Matsas and Matsas [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 495. Such a grant has been criticised by Bennett. See: 
Bennett, H. ‘Performance Bonds and the Principle of Autonomy’ [1994] J.B.L. 574 at p. 58 
190
 For example, abuse of right has been found to constitute fraud in Canada. see: Sarna, L. “Letters of 
Credit: The Law and Current Practice” (Carswell Legal Publishers, 2nd ed., Toronto, 1986) at p. 145; 
Jeffery, S. ‘Standby Letters of Credit and the Fraud exception – An Update’ [2003] 18 B.F.L.R. 67 at p. 
104 
191
 Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at 
p. 88; 
Buckley, R. ‘Potential Pitfalls with Letters of Credit’ (1996) A.L.J. Vol. 70, 217, at p. 230; Jeffery, S. 
‘Standby Letters of Credit and the Fraud exception – An Update’ [2003] 18 B.F.L.R. 67 at p. 104 
192
 “Opinions of the ICC Banking Commission 1995-1996” ICC Publication No. 565 at p. 22 
193
 Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at 
p. 106 
194
 ‘Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5 (Letters of Credit)’ (1990) The Business Lawyer 
Vol.45, 1521 at p. 1615 
180 
 
underlying contract into consideration, if the beneficiary’s claim on the independent 
guarantee has no conceivable basis a fraudulent intent should be imputed to him.
195
 In 
Bertrams’s view: 
“This formula finds support in numerous decisions, as well as in legal 
writing, at least when one examines how the notion of fraud has been 
applied in concrete cases. Moreover, it has the advantage of being more 
specific and more comprehensible than other formulas which are marked 
by abstruseness. As evidence of malicious intent on the part of the 
beneficiary is not required, there is no need to clearly distinguish between 
the notion of ‘fraud’ and the notion of ‘abuse’. In this study fraud, 
therefore, compromises abuse”.196 
 
A survey of relevant case law and legal writings suggests that a call would be 
fraudulent, a) where the applicant completes the obligations assigned to him by the 
underlying contract, b) where the beneficiary breaches a fundamental obligation or 
perpetrates a serious misconduct in relation to the contract, c) where the independent 
guarantee has been called for breaches that occurred in other contracts which the 
guarantee does not cover, d) where a judgment of a competent arbitral or judicial 
court has been acquired against the beneficiary’s demand and e) where the beneficiary 
calls a tender guarantee although the contract has not been awarded to the 
applicant.
197
 
In any event, the fraudulent intent does not play a part under section 5-109 of the 
American UCC. Section 5-109 is clear that the fraud test that should be applied is the 
one which depends on the materiality of the act rather than the intent of the 
beneficiary. Accordingly, it is not every dispute which will justify the fraud exception 
application but rather only material disputes which relate to the essence of the 
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underlying contract.
198
 Interestingly, the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees 
and Stand-by Letters of Credit has pursued a similar approach to that of the UCC 
section 5-109.
199
 The UN Convention assists to ameliorate this problem by providing 
an internationally agreed general type of situation where an exception to the payment 
against a prima facie complaint demand would be justified”.200 In the UN Convention 
the beneficiary awareness plays no part in this respect.
201
 The solutions and rules 
which are found in this Convention “closely mirror the established case law”.202 The 
UN Convention rules, in this regard, are all objective and through these objective 
rules fraud can be determined. The UN Convention does not view the required fraud 
in the light of the common law test which dictates punishment for bad faith but rather 
it views it as an objective reality where the demand is not a legitimate one.
203
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While it has been said that the obligation of the banks is to honour their independent 
guarantees subject to the subjective fraud exception as has been explained in the 
discussion of documentary credits,
204
 it has been suggested that the objective test of 
fraud, which could apply through examining the quality of the performance of the 
underlying contract in order to achieve equity where the beneficiary’s breach is so 
egregious that an evil intent should be inferred, is the proper test.
205
 Nevertheless, the 
current author suggests that the application of the suggested objective test in this 
regard is not without its own shortcomings as it would not be easy to always apply it 
and even if it is applicable it should be applied cautiously and under certain 
conditions. 
Unlike documentary credits, which have been traditionally connected with import-
export trade, it is common to witness independent guarantees in different domestic 
business affairs.
206
 Independent guarantees have been used for a variety of functions 
and they are available for use in virtually all circumstances where an applicant owes a 
payment or a performance obligation to a beneficiary.
207
 Indeed, independent 
guarantees “are creature of contract and as such, can take various forms and offer 
different protective measures depending on what the parties are agreeable to”.208 It is 
submitted that such versatility and diversity in their use are the reasons behind the 
difficulty of applying an objective fraud exception in independent guarantees. In 
applying the fraud exception in a documentary credit fraud case, all that the judge has 
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to do is to examine the goods’ situation in order to determine whether the fraud 
exception applies or not.
209
 As Hapgood puts it: 
“In practice, it is easier to prove fraud in a document presented under a 
letter of credit than a fraudulent calling on a demand guarantee. For 
example, the falsity of a bill of lading can be established by one telephone 
call to the shipping line which purportedly issued it.”210 
 
Yet, independent guarantees are usually used as independent collaterals which do not 
guarantee a specific performance under the underlying contract (like e.g., repayment 
of advances). In such cases, in order to determine objective fraud under them, fraud 
should be clear in the sense that the purpose of the collateral is abused.
211
 Hence, the 
judge’s task would be very difficult and may be impossible as he has to examine the 
different obligations and rights under the main contract which itself could be very 
complex, divergent and unclear as to the purpose of the independent guarantee.
212
 It is 
true that independent guarantees “may seem similar enough to the [documentary 
credits] to justify identical legal treatment [but yet]…closer inspection, however, 
quickly reveals fundamental differences”.213 According to Horowitz:  
“The central argument will be that the application of the fraud defence to 
demand guarantees is very different from its application to commercial 
letters of credit. The principal reason for this distinction in application is 
that the structure and function of demand guarantees are different from 
those of commercial letters of credit”.214  
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It has been said that applying blindly the same rules which govern documentary 
credits to independent guarantees is inappropriate.
215
 Also it can be suggested that 
applying the objective fraud test which it is proposed to be applied in documentary 
credits is inappropriate in independent guarantees. If the same test is applied, the 
result will be “confusing, uncertain and frequently unfair.”216 This has been noted 
recently by Teare J. in the English case of Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v Banca 
Popolare Dell’Alto Adige SpA.217 In this independent guarantee case, Teare J. found it 
difficult to find fraud where there is a dispute to the performance of the concerned 
retail and building contract.
218
 In fact, no clear legal or factual basis for the demand is 
equivalent to the beneficiary’s shipment of rubbish in a sale of goods contract.219 In an 
independent guarantee case, where there is a dispute, courts should not interfere 
unless “it is easy, clear and straightforward that a beneficiary has no right to payment 
of demand guarantee”.220 Courts should not be allowed to interpret this as an 
invitation to explore different perspectives in relation to the underlying transaction in 
order to determine fraud as the consequence of such an approach would be harmful 
results. Indeed, by entering into a transaction which may be so easily abused, parties 
should note that there is a limited role which the courts can play in order to prevent 
such an abuse. Courts are not responsible for rewriting the bargains into which the 
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parties have entered.
221
 A court should be mindful of keeping a balanced approach 
between preventing the abuse of such instruments and maintaining the successful role 
which they play in the international trade realm which if interrupted frequently will be 
lost.
222
 As Mugasha suggests:  
“In reality, however, the court needs to be in a position to determine if the 
documents are fraudulent by reference to the underlying contract. On 
balance, the courts should only entertain those claims of fraud which can 
be expeditiously resolved without an inquiry into the state of performance 
on the underlying transaction”.223  
 
Having illustrated the inefficacy which the subjective and objective tests of fraud 
provide in the context of independent guarantees, the following subsections discuss 
other potential exceptions which have evolved in England or other jurisdictions such 
as the unconscionability exception, which has been evolved in other common law 
jurisdictions in order to eliminate the problem of abusive calls, and the underlying 
contract exception, which originally evolved in Australia and which later has found 
acceptance in England. 
 
5.3.3. The unconscionability exception in other common law countries 
 
The English approach, which has limited the exceptions to cases of intentional fraud 
only, has been described as the “hands off approach” in this regard.224 As has been 
illustrated earlier, the fraud exception’s narrow scope can be seen through the 
existence of the abusive calls problem.
225
 Therefore, different countries have pursued 
different measures. A view has emerged in these countries that independent 
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guarantees should not be treated identically to documentary credits and therefore a 
more liberal approach in respect of payment exceptions may be taken to restrain 
abusive calls.
226
 Accordingly, in Singapore and Australia they have recognised an 
unconscionability exception.
227
 The unconscionability exception notion first appeared 
in Singapore in the first half of the 1990s.
228
 At the beginning there were some 
question marks revolving around its recognition,
229
 but quite quickly it was expressly 
recognised.
230
 Since that time numerous injunctions have been granted by 
Singaporean courts on the ground that a call on an independent guarantee was 
unconscionable.
231
 The tenor of this exception dictates that a person should not cause 
hardship to others by violating their reasonable expectations. According to Mugasha:  
“Insistence on rights in circumstances which make that insistence harsh or 
oppressive will amount to unconscionable conduct. One can engage in 
unconscionable conduct even if one believes, wrongly, that one is acting 
within one’s rights”.232 
 
Such an exception, like the fraud objective test, focuses on the acts rather than the 
intent of the beneficiary in order to justify the independent guarantee payment 
restraint.
233
 The main rationale of this exception is that it works to fill the protection 
gap which has been left by the intentional fraud test that has been conventionally 
developed in England. Indeed, such an exception has been developed in order to 
                                                 
226
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 319 
227
 Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at 
p. 103 
228
 Bocotra Construction v Attorney-General (No.2) [1995] 2 SLR 733 
229
 Ibid. 
230
 GHL Pte Ltd v Unitract Building Construction Pte Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 604 
231
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 322, The following are some of the cases where an injunction has been granted on 
the ground of unconscionability in Singapore: Newtech Engineering Construction Pte Ltd v BKB 
Engineering Constructions Pte Ltd and Others [2003] 4 SLR 73; GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building 
Construction Pte Ltd and Another [1999] 4 SLR 604; Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong 
& Anor, Suit 1715/95, 11 July 1996, unreported (Lai Kew Chai J).  
232
 Mugasha, A. ‘Enjoining the Beneficiary’s Claim on a Letter of Credit or Bank Guarantee’ [2004] 
J.B.L. 515 at p. 519 
233
 Horowitz, D. “Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment” (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at p. 128. Indeed, the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of 
credit does contain provisions which in substance resemble the unconscionability exception. 
187 
 
mitigate the risk of the abusive calls which surrounded this context. Yet, the issue 
which has generated much debate in this regard is whether payment of an independent 
guarantee should be refused on the ground of unconscionability or not and whether 
English courts should recognise such an exception.
234
 
While it has been said that Singapore is the origin of this exception, it is submitted 
that an English case is the foundation which led Singaporean courts to recognise this 
exception.
235
 This English case is the case of Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman 
Contractors.
236
 In this independent guarantee case, Eveleigh LJ, in his oft-quoted 
statement, has noted that:  
“As between buyer and seller the underlying contract cannot be 
disregarded so readily. If the seller has lawfully avoided the contract 
prima facie, it seems to me he should be entitled to restrain the buyer from 
making use of the performance bond. Moreover, in principle I do not think 
it possible to say that in no circumstances whatsoever, apart from fraud, 
will the court restrain the buyer.”237 
 
It should be noted that his Lordship’s observations have focused on the acts of the 
beneficiary rather than his intent and beliefs. The Potton Homes case has borne some 
fruit in Singapore where the unconscionability exception has been recognised as an 
independent ground to restrain independent guarantees. While the actual decision of 
the Potton Homes case has conformed to that of the received orthodoxy which calls 
for an intentional test of fraud, it could be said that the above act-oriented obiter, that 
his Lordship has wondered about its future applicability, has constituted the basis of 
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the later Singaporean recognised exception.
238
 The unconscionability exception notion 
first appeared in the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Bocotra Construction Pte 
Ltd v A-G (No2).
239
 Soon after, such a notion was reinforced by Lai Kew Chai J. in 
Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong & Anor.
240
 In the words of Lai Kew 
Chai J.: 
“The concept of unconscionability to me involves unfairness, as distinct 
from dishonesty or fraud, or conduct of a kind so reprehensible or lacking 
in good faith that a court of conscience would either restrain the party or 
refuse to assist the party. Mere breaches of contract by the party in 
question would not by themselves be unconscionable”.241 
 
Such a statement and later Singaporean statements have quoted Lord Eveleigh’s 
above-mentioned observations which call for a focus on the act rather than on the 
difficult to prove intent when deciding whether to restrain an abusive demand made 
on an independent guarantee. As in the objective test, in applying such an exception a 
commercially objectionable demand, such as the Libyan buyers’ demand in the 
Edward Owen case, ought to be enjoined.
242
 For example, in GHL Ltd v Unitract 
Building Construction Pte Ltd
243
 the Singapore Court of Appeal held that it was 
unconscionable for the beneficiary to call on the independent guarantee, which was 
10% of the original contract price, when the price of the contract was later revised 
down. The Court of Appeal has expressly stated that it was making a deliberate 
departure from the conventional English approach.
244
 To this effect the court has 
stated: 
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“We are concerned with abusive calls on the bonds. It should not be 
forgotten that a performance bond can operate as an oppressive 
instrument, and in the event that a beneficiary calls on the bond in 
circumstances, where there is a prima facie evidence of fraud or 
unconscionability, the court should step in to intervene at the interlocutory 
stage until the whole of the circumstances of the case has been 
investigated”.245 
 
In Australia, while unconscionability is a recognised exception to the independent 
guarantee payment, a distinction should be drawn between unconscionability under 
common law and unconscionability under the statute. Indeed, unconscionability is 
recognised as an exception in the latter but not the former.
246
 There is no recognised 
unconscionability under the common law. However, it is recognised under s 51AA of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 which states that in commerce and trade a corporation 
should not be engaged in conduct that is unconscionable. Therefore, it applies there to 
unconscionable conduct in demanding an independent guarantee issued in trade and 
commerce.
247
 
The echoes of the unconscionability exception have recently appeared in the English 
Courts. The unconscionability exception has been referred to by Judge Thornton QC 
in TTI Team Telecom International Ltd v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd.
248
 The TTI Team 
case concerned a contract where the plaintiff TTI (the seller/ applicant) agreed to 
supply computer hardware and software to the defendants Hutchison (the buyer/ 
beneficiary). Hutchison had made an advance payment which covered part of the 
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contract price to TTI. TTI procured an independent guarantee in favour of Hutchison 
to guarantee the return of the advance payment amount in case the former did not 
discharge his obligation toward the latter. Later a dispute had arisen between both 
parties regarding some delays in TTI’s performance of the contract and accordingly 
Hutchison gave notice of his intention to demand the independent guarantee amount. 
However, TTI sought an injunction to restrain Hutchison from demanding the 
independent guarantee. Although granting an injunction had been refused by the court 
because the claim was not supported by sufficient evidence,
249
 nonetheless Thornton 
J.’s observations are of great importance to the unconscionability discussion and the 
potential availability of such an exception in England in the future. Thornton J. found 
that, apart from the long well-established fraud exception, an independent guarantee 
payment could be restrained in the case of: 
“a failure by the beneficiary to provide an essential element of the 
underlying contract on which the bond depends; a misuse by the 
beneficiary of the guarantee by failing to act in accordance with the 
purpose for which it was given; a total failure of consideration in the 
underlying contract; a threatened call by the beneficiary for an 
unconscionable ulterior motives; or a lack of an honest or bona fide belief 
by the beneficiary that the circumstances, such as poor performance, 
against which a performance bond had been provided, actually exist”.250  
 
 
It is worth noting that the TTI Team court has referred to some Singaporean cases in 
reaching the above observations. Thornton J.’s observations themselves, even obiter, 
do reflect a trend inside the English jurisdiction which welcomes the recognition of 
the unconscionability exception.
251
 Moreover, it should be noted that the different 
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situations which Judge Thornton has provided do resemble the tenor of the objective 
fraud test which has been applied by the American UCC Article 5 and by the UN 
Convention in this regard and which has been discussed above.  
While it has been suggested that such an exception should be adopted,
252
 it is 
submitted that the recognition of an unconscionability exception’s disadvantages 
outweigh its advantages.
253
 In fact, the unconscionability concept has not been fully 
defined. What constitutes unconscionability is not a clear-cut case but a matter of 
debate. This has been noted in the Dauphin International Engineering v HRH Sheikh 
Sultan Bin Khalifah case
254
 where the Singapore Court of Appeal has stated:  
“We do not think it is possible to define unconscionability other than to 
give some very broad indications such as lack of bona fides. What kind of 
situation would constitute unconscionability would have to depend on the 
facts of each case. This is a question which the court has to consider on 
each occasion where its jurisdiction is invoked. There is no predetermined 
categorisation”.255 
 
Indeed, it is in one way or another the same problem which the application of an 
objective test of fraud suffers from in this context. While it has been said that 
unconscionability is a “well defined” doctrine,256 it has been criticised by the 
majority. According to Hooley: “It is not entirely clear what constitutes 
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unconscionability…The uncertainty that this creates is obvious”.257 Ganotaki and 
Horowitz agree with Hooley that an exception of “unconscionability is uncertain”.258 
Similarly, Enonchong has described unconscionability as an “imprecise and vague 
ground for relief”.259 If recognised, an unconscionability exception will inject a 
considerable sum of uncertainty into this area of commercial activity where clarity 
and certainty are clearly needed. Such uncertainty will increase litigation and will 
involve the courts in complicated contract disputes and as a result will deprive these 
instruments of the unique value and quality which they enjoy.
260
 The 
unconscionability exception “process would undermine the autonomy principle”, 
which is well-entrenched in the independent guarantees context,
261
 as it goes far 
beyond the intentional fraud test and requires more analysis of the disputed 
underlying contract, of different facts and of the conduct of the beneficiary.
262
  
English courts have not shown themselves ready to embrace such an exception.
263
 
Recent cases, other than the TTI Team case, have not even discussed such a concept 
when an injunction has been sought by the independent guarantee applicants.
264
 Such 
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an approach in this regard is recommendable. It is suggested that the English law 
should not adopt the unconscionability exception.
265
 
 
5.3.4. The underlying contract exception in England and other common law 
countries 
 
The legal separation of the underlying contract from the independent guarantee 
undertaking should not be blindly stressed. Particularly, in a commercial context “the 
possibilities of the doctrine of commercial frustration are not to be ignored”.266 
Besides, disregarding the ordinary rules of contract would have dangerous results. 
Accordingly, it should be kept in mind that the underlying contract which ensues from 
an independent guarantee, however remote, is the base of the entire subsequent 
undertakings and without it such undertakings would not exist.
267
 Taking these 
observations into account, an exception to the autonomy principle of independent 
guarantees which has been described as the underlying contract exception has 
evolved.
268
 The basis of this exception dictates that if the parties view independent 
guarantees as being too fraud-prone then it is in their hands to change such a view.
269
  
Such a change could be achieved by the parties through including in their underlying 
contract the different details of the independent guarantee which is to be procured. 
These details include the independent guarantee’s purpose and precise scope. 
Accordingly, relying on these evident details, a court could restrain a beneficiary from 
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receiving the independent guarantee amount in a case where there is sufficient 
evidence that the purpose for which the guarantee has been initially procured has not 
materialised.
270
 What is noble about such an exception is that it could specifically be 
applied where there is an explicit term in the underlying contract which restricts the 
situations in which a demand could be made to obtain the independent guarantee 
amount.
271
 Applying such an exception does not involve banks in different disputes 
concerning the contracts. Since banks are not concerned with the underlying contract 
by virtue of the autonomy principle, it is courts that intervene to restrain a demand 
breaching the underlying contract’s express terms.272 
In such a context, there are two conflicting contractual rights in question: the 
beneficiary’s autonomous right to demand the independent guarantee amount and the 
applicant’s right under the underlying contract which restricts the beneficiary’s right 
to demand. The question which arises in this context and which this section aims to 
answer is which contractual rights should prevail and whether such an exception to 
the autonomy principle should be accepted to constitute a justified ground to restrain a 
beneficiary from his unjustified demand? 
In fact, Australia is the country where such an exception to the independent guarantee 
payment has been originated.
273
 The Australian courts had many opportunities to 
address the above question and accordingly it is suggested that it would be beneficial 
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to examine some of the Australian authorities which have been involved in this regard 
before turning to the English authorities.
274
 In Australia, courts have accepted that: 
“There is an exception for the principle of autonomy where there is an 
underlying contract between the applicant for the guarantee and the 
beneficiary which restricts the beneficiary’s power to demand payment 
under the guarantee”.275 
 
The high court case of Wood Hall Ltd v The Pipeline Authority
276
 is the seminal 
Australian case in this regard. Stephen J. found that if the underlying contract, from 
which an independent guarantee has ensued, does contain some restrictions to the 
availability of the guarantee amount then “the position might well have been 
different”277 and the court can interfere to restrain the beneficiary from demanding it 
in such a case. Since Wood Hall, Australian courts have relied heavily on Stephen J.’s 
approach as the foundation for judicial intervention in case it was alleged that a call 
had been made in breach of a term expressed in the underlying contract.
278
 
While it has been traditionally stressed that fraud is the only exception in England,
279
 
recent English cases do show that an underlying contract exception is a new ground to 
restrain a beneficiary from obtaining an independent guarantee amount where he 
demands it in breach of the underlying contract terms. Such an exception has been 
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firstly discussed in the case of Sirius Insurance Co v FAI General Ltd.
280
 The court in 
Sirius held that the importance of the autonomy principle should not be exaggerated 
where the beneficiary has expressly agreed with the applicant in the underlying 
contract that he will not draw on the independent guarantee unless certain conditions 
were fulfilled and they yet had not been fulfilled. In the Court of Appeal, May L.J., 
with whose judgement Carnwath L.J., and Wall L.J. agreed, has accepted the trial 
judge findings in that had this case been an injunction case the court should have 
granted an injunction to prevent Sirius from drawing on the independent guarantee 
when its demand is in breach of the underlying contract terms and conditions with 
FAI.
281
 To this effect the court has found:  
“Whilst the principle of autonomy which applied to letters of credit was of 
vital importance, there was no reason why the law should not give effect 
to an express agreement that a party would not draw down a letter of 
credit unless certain conditions were met”.282  
 
When the case reached the House of Lords, their lordships found that the underlying 
contract conditions had been satisfied and accordingly reversed the Court of Appeal 
decision.
283
 Obviously, in the Sirius case different courts have accepted the new 
exception.
284
 Similarly, in TTI v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd,
285
 a case which concerned an 
application by an applicant to restrain the beneficiary from demanding or receiving an 
independent guarantee payment, Judge Thornton QC appeared to entertain the 
underlying contract exception notion. His Justice found that an injunction might be 
granted in a case where the demand has been made in breach of the underlying 
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contract.
286
 There the underlying contract has expressly provided that the payment of 
the independent guarantee will only be exercised if this agreement terminated in 
accordance with Clause 35. Indeed, the independent guarantee itself has not restricted 
the beneficiary’s right to demand it as the underlying contract. Later a dispute arose 
between the parties and the beneficiary notified the applicant about his intention to 
demand the independent guarantee amount alleging that the underlying contract had 
terminated in accordance with Clause 35. However, the applicant applied for an 
injunction to restrain the payment of the independent guarantee, alleging that the 
beneficiary was in breach of the underlying contract conditions and particularly 
Clause 35. In its role the court examined the applicant’s allegations carefully and held 
that the demand was in accordance with Clause 35 and that there had been no breach 
of the underlying contract. Accordingly, the injunction application was refused. It is 
submitted that the decision would have been different had the court found that the 
underlying contract had not been terminated in accordance with Clause 35.
287
 
Therefore, the TTI case is supportive of the underlying contract exception. 
In the more recent case of Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd,
288
 Ensus UK Limited 
(Ensus) engaged Simon Carves Limited (SCL) to complete some works related to the 
provision of a process plant to produce bioethanol at a site in Teesside. According to 
the contract’s special conditions, SCL was to deliver to Ensus an independent 
guarantee as a security for any and all of its obligations under their contract. SCL 
procured the requested independent guarantee from Standard Chartered Bank.
289
 
Clause 3.7 of the contract provided that the independent guarantee would become null 
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and void if an Acceptance Certificate was issued by Ensus in relation to the work of 
SLC. Indeed, such a Certificate was issued but, nonetheless, some disputes arose 
between the parties later. While Ensus intended to demand the independent guarantee 
amount, SLC approached the English courts requesting an injunction to stop Ensus 
from demanding the independent guarantee. The issue which the court had to examine 
was whether it should or not grant an injunction to restrain the independent guarantee 
where the underlying contract contained some conditions which restricted Ensus’ 
rights to call it. At the beginning of his judgement, Akenhead J. illustrated that there is 
little jurisprudence regarding such cases. He found the Sirius case to be the most 
important case in England in this category.
290
 Interestingly, an injunction was granted 
but this time it was not dependent on the fraud exception but on this new separate 
exception which had been enunciated previously by the Sirius Courts where the 
conditions that restrict the beneficiary’s ability to draw on the independent guarantee 
have not materialised.
291
 To that Akenhead J. courageously stated:  
“In my judgement one can draw from the authorities the following: 
(a)…fraud is not the only ground upon which a call on the bond can be 
restrained by injunction…;(c) There is no legal authority which permits 
the beneficiary to make a call on the bond when it is expressly disentitled 
from doing so; (d) In principle, if the underlying contract, in relation to 
which the bond has been provided by way of security, clearly and 
expressly prevents the beneficiary party to the contract from making a 
demand under the bond, it can be restrained by the Court from making a 
demand under the bond”.292 
 
The Simon case is one of the rare English cases where an injunction has been granted 
to restrain an independent guarantee or a documentary credit payment. Indeed, 
Akenhead J.’s findings in this regard correspond with the above-mentioned Australian 
and English authorities which indicate that “a beneficiary may be restrained by an 
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injunction from making a call in breach of a contractual promise in favour of the 
person seeking the injunction”293 
Such an exception has been criticized for several reasons. Firstly, it has been said that, 
under such an exception, the bank’s position is unclear.294 That is to say: while the 
autonomy principle dictates that banks should merely check upon the conformity of 
the documents, the underlying exception recognition would involve banks in 
dilemmas as they would be required to investigate underlying contracts.
295
 Secondly, 
the opponents of this underlying exception argue that, if recognised, it will affect the 
commercial utility of independent guarantees and could cause uncertainty in this 
context.
296
 
It is submitted that these criticisms are unsound as they do not stand either legal or 
commercial right analysis. Firstly, the position of the banks is clear. As illustrated 
above,
297
 in this context, it is courts that would investigate underlying contracts and 
see whether the case before them is one which deserves an injunction or not. Banks 
should have no role in this regard and should stick to their documentary job.
298
 
Secondly, such an exception is one of the best ways that can be utilised in order to 
combat the abusive calls problem which independent guarantees suffer from. 
Combating the abusive calls problem will assist the commercial utility of independent 
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guarantees and not the other way around.
299
 The applicant should be able to protect 
himself from such harmful calls which would adversely affect his reputation and 
solvency. If the beneficiary of the independent guarantee has accepted not to demand 
its amount unless the conditions inserted in the underlying contract are satisfied, it is 
difficult to see how such an exception would affect the commercial utility of 
independent guarantees. Indeed, such a beneficiary should not “be allowed to hide 
behind the independence principle in order to break his promise in the underlying 
contract”.300 Thirdly, in regard to the problem of uncertainty which the opponents of 
this exception have proposed, it has been reiterated in the Simon case and the other 
above discussed cases that the restrictions and conditions, that are inserted in the 
underlying contract regarding the independent guarantee payment, should be clearly 
and expressly stated.
301
 As Callaway J., in the Australian case of Fletcher 
Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd,
302
 has stated: “Clauses in the 
[underlying] contract that do not expressly inhibit the beneficiary from calling upon 
the security should not be too readily construed to have that effect”.303 
The basis of this exception is that while the independent guarantee provides security 
for a valid claim in the beneficiary’s favour, the restrictions in the underlying contract 
are of so important nature as they reflect the way in which the parties have allocated 
the risk as to who should be out of the independent guarantee amount pending later 
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resolution between them.
304
 It is one thing that the beneficiary should not be 
prevented from demanding the independent guarantee amount where there is an 
underlying dispute between him and the beneficiary but a different thing to say that he 
should be allowed payment when he has already accepted that he will not demand 
payment unless certain conditions are satisfied. The question as to whether such an 
exception should be recognised should be answered in the affirmative. In requiring 
that the restriction should be clear and expressly stated, this exception has avoided the 
problem of uncertainty in identifying the scope and the reason behind the independent 
guarantee which both the fraud and the unconscionability exceptions suffer from. 
Rather than examining the different relations, rights and obligations in the underlying 
contract, all that a court has to do under this exception is to check whether a condition 
inserted in the underlying contract has been materialised or not.
305
 
 
5.4. Conclusion  
 
The ‘material misrepresentation’ is the test used by Lord Diplock to apply the fraud 
exception in England. A more accurate terminology to indicate “the position as it is 
now is ‘intentional fraud’”.306 Intentional fraud is similar to common law deceit and is 
narrower than the suggested objective test of material fraud.
307
 However, since the 
basis of the fraud exception is the maintenance of public policy, it is suggested that 
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there is no reason why such an exception is to be confined to situations of 
misrepresentations.
308
  
In a documentary credit context, the proposed objective test is justified in order to 
protect innocent parties and bankers and in order to prevent fraud.
309
 Indeed, it is not 
every instance of misconduct by the beneficiary that would interrupt a documentary 
credit payment. Ordinary contract disputes must be settled by the contract parties 
between themselves and totally apart from the documentary credit undertaking.
310
 On 
the one hand, to allow elective or injunctive dishonour just because the goods do not 
conform in quality to the underlying contract of sale terms would destroy the 
documentary letters of credit utility. On the other hand, to allow the beneficiary to 
receive the documentary credit amount merely because he sent rubbish in good faith 
would serve no commercial purpose. As one commentator has suggested:  
“A compromise between these two scenarios can be envisioned in which 
either the issuing bank or, ultimately, a court would balance the 
desirability of protecting the account party from the effects of fraud, 
against the benefits derived by ensuring the letter of credit is maintained 
as a useful commercial instrument and business device”.311 
 
It can be suggested that such a balanced approach, which applies the objective 
proposed fraud test, would best suit this context.
312
 If the beneficiary’s demand has 
some form of fraud other than that of a misrepresentation, why should the well-
established ex turpi causa principle not be involved? The United City Merchants was 
a case of misrepresentation and so it is not surprising that Lord Diplock described the 
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fraud exception as he did.
313
 Fraud should not be considered as “an ethical matter but 
as a technical issue”.314 In Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd.315 it has been suggested, 
even in obiter, that a material fraud test should be applied.
316
 
In an independent guarantee context, neither the fraud nor the unconscionability 
exceptions are efficient to mitigate the abusive calls problem. In applying both 
exceptions, a court will find it difficult to identify fraud or unconscionability. Recent 
cases show that English courts are ready now to utilise the underlying contract 
exception which their Australian counterparts have been using for three decades. It is 
submitted that such an exception is the best existing exception which could tackle the 
problem of abusive calls. It could be said that even with the existence of such an 
exception a protection gap might remain. Such an argument is right as some 
applicants might not insert any conditions which can restrict the independent 
guarantee payment and accordingly be again exposed to the same problem.
317
 Yet, 
this should not prevent vigilant and smart applicants, who wish not to be exposed to 
abusive calls, from benefiting from such an exception. Such an examination which the 
court can pursue through the underlying contract exception could encourage the 
different parties to deal in good faith.
318
 While it has been suggested that the best 
                                                 
313
 Warne, D & Elliott, N. “Banking Litigation” (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., London, 2005) at pp. 260-
261 
314
 Stoufflet, J. ‘Fraud in Documentary Credit, Letter of Credit and Demand Guaranty’ (2001) 106 
Dick. L. Rev. 21, at p. 25 
315
 Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd [2011] C.I.L.L. 3009 
316
 Ibid. at 3012. It should be noted that this case is an independent guarantee case. It is normal to find 
cases of documentary credits which apply independent guarantees dicta and it is also normal to find the 
contrary in English cases. For example, in Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [1987] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 171 at 174 a documentary credit case, dicta has been applied from cases of performance bonds 
regarding the autonomy principle and the fraud exception. Similarly, in Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG 
v Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd and Others [1994] 4 ALL E.R. 181 at 194, guidance was sought from 
independent guarantees’ cases for the application of the fraud exception in a documentary credit 
context. 
317
 Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at 
p. 97 
318
 Vaart, H. ‘Standby Letters of Credit and the Problem of Bad Faith Calls’ (1981) 8 Yale. J. World. 
Pub. Order. 36, at p. 44 
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method is to avoid utilising independent guarantees because of the potential for 
abuse,
319
 it is submitted that an “only in very limited circumstances”320 underlying 
contract exception could protect applicants and banks from such a risk. 
 
                                                 
319
 Wunnicke, B. Wunnicke D. & Turner P. “Standby and Commercial Letters of Credit” (Wiley Law 
Publications, 2
nd
 ed., New York, 1996) at p. 41 
320
 Enonchong, N. ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 1, 83 at 
p. 93 
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Chapter Six: Fraud Injunctions in Documentary Credits and 
Independent Guarantees  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the English courts’ application of injunctions to this particular 
area of law. The conditions by which the English courts limit the availability of 
injunctions in this regard are examined. Indeed, by virtue of the autonomy principle, it 
is familiar that banks should not be concerned with disputes which relate to the 
underlying contract that leads to the issuance of a documentary credit or an 
independent guarantee. As previous discussions have illustrated, banks’ duties should 
be limited to documents and nothing other than documents.
1
 However, to intervene 
and refuse payment contrary to the autonomy principle, banks should be provided 
with an established evidence of fraud. Such evidence, which is relatively high and 
difficult to prove, is used by the banks which refuse payment in case the party whose 
right of payment was rejected raises the issue before a court of competent 
jurisdiction.
2
  
Surprisingly, even provided with such compelling evidence, the bank might later 
discover that the fraud evidence which it holds does not constitute a sufficient 
evidence of fraud from the point of view of the court.
3
 By the same token, banks who 
select to pay on the assumption that a provided evidence of fraud is not a sufficient 
ground for withholding the payment, might find themselves liable for a wrongful 
                                                 
1
 See chapters three and four.  
2
 Hooley, R. & Sealy, L. “Commercial Law” (Oxford, 2009) at pp. 877-878. To that effect Hooley 
stated: “If the bank refuses to pay, it must be able to prove at the subsequent trial of the action that 
there was fraud on the part of the seller at the time of presentation of the documents. It is not enough 
for the bank to refuse to pay on the ground that it had evidence from which a reasonable banker would 
think that there had been fraud of the seller, whether or not fraud actually existed in fact.”; Rubenstein, 
N. ‘The Issuer’s Rights and Obligations Under a Letter of Credit’ (1984) 17 U.CC.L.J 129, at p. 165 
3
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 144 
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honour soon after.
4
 The bank’s reputation might be negatively affected in both 
situations.
5
 Moreover, in order for a bank to ascertain if a certain situation is 
fraudulent or not, it would be necessary to examine the parties’ intent and state of 
mind which the former are ill equipped to deal with.
6
  
Accordingly, and in order to avoid becoming involved in the endless dilemmas arising 
from the abovementioned situations, the practice shows that banks ask their 
customers, who allege that fraud has been perpetrated in an independent guarantee or 
a documentary credit context, to obtain a court’s injunction either to restrain the 
beneficiary from demanding payment (presenting documents or/and collecting 
payment) or to stop the bank itself from honouring the payment’s demand.7 In both 
situations and whether the court grants an injunction or not, the bank will guarantee 
that it remains on the safe side.
8
 When a court injunction is made against the bank or 
the beneficiary, the bank itself will guarantee that it will not be held liable for a 
wrongful dishonour when it refuses to pay.
9
 On the other hand, if the court refuses to 
grant the envisaged injunction, the bank should pay with the clear knowledge that its 
                                                 
4
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [1979] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 267, at 276-277, per Mocatta J.: “It cannot often be the case that at the time of or just prior 
to presentation of documents under a letter of credit the bank in question can show an established fraud. 
Accordingly, it may well be that procedure by way of injunctions can be of little practical value as a 
protection against fraudulent claims. However, there seems to be nothing in the authorities to prevent a 
confirming bank from raising the issue of fraud as a defendant after having refused to pay on the 
presentation of documents, though it may well be that it would be unlikely to take this course except 
against an indemnity by the customer or issuing banker”.  
5
 Goode, R. “Commercial Law” (London, 2004) at pp. 989-990 
6
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [1983] 1 
A.C. 168 (HL) 
7
 See, for example; Turkiye Is Bankasi v Bank of China [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 per Waller J; Groupe 
Josi Re v. Walbrook Insurance [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152; Kurkela, M. “Letters of Credit and Bank 
Guarantees Under International Trade Law” (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2007) at p. 180; Dolan, 
J. “The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits” (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 
Revised ed., Boston, 1996) at 7-38; Goode, R. ‘Abstract Payment Undertakings’ in Cane P. & 
Stapleton, J. (eds.), “Essays for Patrick Atiyah”, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 209, at p. 234; 
Leacock, S. ‘Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment of Letters of Credit in 
International Transactions’ [1984] Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 885 at p. 899 
8
 Rosenblith, R. ‘What Happens When Operations Go Wrong: Enjoining the Letter-of-Credit 
Transaction and Other Legal Stratagems’ (1985) 17 UCCLJ 307 at p. 326 
9
 Malek, A & Quest, D. “Jack: Documentary Credits” (Tottel Publishing, 4th ed., Sussex, 2009) at p. 
269 
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payment will not constitute a wrongful payment.
10
 Nonetheless, the English courts are 
well known for their non-interventionist approach in this regard.
11
 The implications of 
this non-interventionist approach have been reflected in applications for injunctions.
12
 
In addition to the robust fraud standard test which English courts stipulate in order to 
apply the fraud exception,
13
 they have burdened the party who requests this exception 
protection with other requirements.
14
  
Hence, this chapter is divided into seven parts. After the introduction, the second part 
provides a general overview of injunctions. The third part illustrates the limitations 
relating to the availability of injunctions in the letters of credit context. The following 
sections shed light on the requirements which English courts stipulate in order to grant 
an injunction in this context. The final part constitutes the conclusion of this chapter.  
 
6.2. A general overview of injunctions  
 
Interlocutory injunctions whilst varying in form share the same aim which is 
preserving the parties’ status quo before making the request for an injunction for a 
short period of time until a full trial court can consider the disputed matter.
15
 Usually, 
                                                 
10
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 153; Ellinger, E. “Documentary Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study” 
(University of Singapore Press, Singapore, 1970) at p. 196 
11
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 153; Demir-Araz, Y. ‘International Trade, Maritime Fraud and Documentary 
Credits’ (2002) 4 Int. T.L.R. & R. 128 at p. 130. To this effect Demir-Araz stated: “English courts are 
very reluctant in giving injunctions. They do not want to interfere with the autonomy of documentary 
credits. This is the reason why the requirements of fraud exception are highly demanding”; Schwank, 
F. ‘Bank Guarantees in German and Austrian Law’ (1982) I.B.L 7, at p. 7 
12
 Demir-Araz, Y. ‘International Trade, Maritime Fraud and Documentary Credits’ [2002] Int. T.L.R. 
Vol. 8(4), 128 at p. 129; Bertrams, R. ‘Counter-Guarantees in an Indirect, Independent (First Demand) 
Guarantee Structure’ [1997] B.J.I.B. & F.L. Vol. 12(8), 373 at p. 379 
13
 See chapter five for a detailed examination of the fraud standard test in both documentary credits and 
independent guarantees contexts.  
14
 Howard QC, M. Masefield, R. & Chuah, J. “Butterworths Banking Law Guide” (Butterworths, 
London, 2006) at pp. 535-536 
15
 Hanbury, H. & Martin, J. “Modern Equity” (London, 2005) at chapter 25; Bertrams, R. “Bank 
Guarantees in International Trade: The Law and Practice of Independent (First Demand) Guarantees 
and Standby Letters of Credit in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions” (Kluwer Law 
International, 3
rd
 ed., The Hague (Netherlands), 2004) at p. 405 
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a full trial court decision might not come out for a few months or even a few years by 
which time a claimant’s right might be exposed to some risks.16 Taking into 
consideration the urgent nature of some disputed matters, one can imagine how 
important an interlocutory injunction is.
17
 For example, a defendant might become 
insolvent or he might simply disappear.
18
 No more appropriate example can elucidate 
the important role an injunction plays better than a documentary credit or an 
independent guarantee fraud case. Unscrupulous beneficiaries who send worthless 
goods instead of the contracted for goods or who call on an independent guarantee 
where the terms allowing such a call have not yet materialised could vanish after 
perpetrating their fraud.
19
 Chasing these beneficiaries to other jurisdictions where 
legal impartiality is in question would not always offer the defrauded applicant a 
practical solution.
20
 An interlocutory injunction to refrain the defendant from acting 
on the letter of credit would insert a necessary layer of justice where an ordinary 
court’s procedures would reveal its inability to deal with such situations.21 
Originally, the English jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction was found in 
Section 25(8) of the 1873’s Judicature Act. The same section has been re-enacted 
after approximately fifty years. The 1925’s Supreme Court of Judicature Act 
(Consolidation) in Section 45(1) furnished courts with the power to intervene by 
                                                 
16
 Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) 
at p. 262 
17
 Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) 
at p. 262 
18
 Low, H.Y. ‘Confusion and Difficulties Surrounding the Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit: An English 
Perspective’ [2011] Int. J.L.M. 17(6), 462 at p. 467 
19
 Harfield, H. “Bank Credits and Acceptances” (The Ronald Press Company, 5th ed., New York, 1974) 
at p. 80 
20
 Jeffery, S. ‘Standby Letters of Credit and the Fraud exception – An Update’ [2003] 18 B.F.L.R. 67 at 
p. 105; Arora, A. ‘The Legal Position of Banks in Performance Bond Cases’ [1981] L.M.C.L.Q. 264 at 
p. 267; Davis, A. “The Law Relating to Commercial Letters of credit” (The Pitman Press, 3rd ed., 
London, 1963) at p. 145 
21
 Bradgate, R. White, F. & Fennell, S. “Commercial Law” (Oxford University Press, 9th ed., Oxford, 
2002) at pp. 273-274 
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means of injunctions where they find it “just or convenient” to do so.22 However, the 
current law which deals with the courts’ jurisdiction to grant such a remedy is the 
Supreme Court Act 1981, specifically, s. 37(1). Unfortunately, none of the sections 
have drawn the “just or convenient” boundaries and, accordingly, this places a high 
degree of uncertainty in this particular area of law. 
Guidance to the “just or convenient” concepts has been established by Lord Diplock 
in the seminal case of American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd.
23
 In that case the claimants, 
who were a company that manufactures medical equipment, sought an injunction to 
restrain the beneficiary from illegitimately using one of their medical patents. In 
delivering the judgement’s final verdict, Lord Diplock set up some conditions that a 
claimant should meet in order to guarantee the issuance of an injunction in his 
favour.
24
 Lord Diplock’s first condition to grant an injunction was that such a claim 
should not be “…frivolous nor vexatious; in other words, that the evidence before the 
court discloses that there is a serious question to be tried”.25 Secondly, his Lordship 
stipulated that what is called the balance of convenience should tip in favour of 
granting the injunction.
26
 The balance of convenience depends mainly on the 
availability of a remedy on damages that an applicant for an injunction can recover 
from the person an injunction is sought against. However, it should be noted that the 
balance of convenience does not solely depend on damages and their availability.
27
 
                                                 
22
 See, Kerr J. observations in RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1987] 
1 Q.B. 146  
23
 American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] A.C. 396 
24
 The same requirements have been reiterated by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan 
[1980] AC 331, at 337 
25
 American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] A.C. 396, at 407  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ibid. at 398  
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6.3. Limitations on the availability of injunctions in the context of 
documentary credits and independent guarantees  
 
Before examining the requirements which English courts insist on in order to grant an 
injunction in this context, it should be noted that such a relief is of a limited nature 
due to the special characteristics which such instruments enjoy.
28
 Firstly, the location 
of the party against whom an injunction is sought is an important factor which would 
affect the procedure to grant an injunction.
29
 For instance, an English court would find 
itself powerless to interfere with a bank’s right to pay the beneficiary or the latter’s 
right to demand payment where they are both located in a foreign country.
30
 Even if 
the court granted such an injunction to restrain foreign entities from acting on these 
instruments, the result cannot be guaranteed.
31
 In fact, English courts have refused to 
implement a foreign injunction within its jurisdiction when it has been asked and, 
accordingly, it would be rational for these courts to expect the same treatment back.
32
 
Therefore, the English injunctions should be limited to restrain those parties who 
reside inside its jurisdiction.
33
 To that effect, in a case where an English seller sought 
an injunction from the English courts to restrain an Iraqi bank from acting on an 
independent guarantee, Lord Ackner stated: 
                                                 
28
 Malek, A & Quest, D. “Jack: Documentary Credits” (Tottel Publishing, 4th ed., Sussex, 2009) at pp. 
280-281 
29
 Bertrams, R. “Bank Guarantees in International Trade: The Law and Practice of Independent (First 
Demand) Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions” 
(Kluwer Law International, 3
rd
 ed., The Hague (Netherlands), 2004) at p. 432 
30
 Sarna, L. “Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice” (Carswell Legal Publishers, 2nd ed., 
Toronto, 1986) at p. 185 
31
 Ibid. at p. 187 
32
 See: Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1233; [1981] 
3 All E.R. 607; [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 394 (CA) per Lord Denning. In Lord Denning words at [1981] 3 
ALL ER 607 at 613: “If the court of any of the countries should interfere with the obligations of one of 
its banks, it would strike at the very heart of that country’s international trade. No foreign seller would 
supply goods to that country on letters of credit because he could no longer be confident of being paid. 
No trader would accept a letter of credit issued by a bank of that country if it might be ordered by its 
courts not to pay”. 
33
 Bertrams, R. ‘Counter-Guarantees in an Indirect, Independent (First Demand) Guarantee Structure’ 
[1997] B.J.I.B. & F.L. Vol. 12(8), 373 at p. 379 
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“…that the Iraqi Courts will not recognize the injunction, with the result 
that Agromark [the beneficiary] will obtain a judgment against Rafidain 
[the issuing bank], must be considered as a very real one. If the positions 
were reversed and the sale contracts were governed by English law with 
an English sole jurisdiction clause, supported by performance bonds to 
provide security to the English buyers for the fulfilment in England of the 
sellers' obligations under the contract, we can readily appreciate the force 
of the argument that English Courts would not recognize an interim Iraqi 
injunction”.34 
 
Secondly, the complex relations which documentary credits and independent 
guarantees might involve on the one hand, and the short time between the demand on 
these instruments and payment on the other hand constitute other effectual factor 
which limits the availability of such a relief.
35
 An applicant who wishes to restrain a 
fraudulent beneficiary from demanding payment from a confirming bank abroad 
would find it difficult to travel to such a jurisdiction to apply for an injunction.
36
 Even 
if he travelled to such a jurisdiction he would be surprised to find out that the 
unscrupulous beneficiary has already been paid by the confirming bank.
37
 Moreover, 
the applicant himself would clash with that country’s difficult producers in order to 
get an injunction if the country has such a remedy in its legal vocabulary.
38
 On the 
other hand, the applicant will find it a “hopeless” case if he tries to restrain a 
                                                 
34
 Per Ackner L.J. in United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, at 
566 
35
 Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) at p. 159; Todd, P. “Maritime Fraud and Piracy” (Lloyd’s List, 2nd ed., London 2010) at 
p. 141;Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 
2007) at p. 256; Bridge, M. “The International Sale of Goods” (Oxford University Press, 2nd, ed., 
Oxford, 2007) at p. 305 
36
 Bridge, M. “The International Sale of Goods” (Oxford University Press, 2nd, ed., Oxford, 2007) at p. 
305; Weisz, G. & Blackman, J. ‘Standby Letters of Credit after Iran: Remedies of the Account Party’ 
(1982) 1 U. ILL. L. Rev. 355 at p. 360 
37
 Warne, D & Elliott, N. “Banking Litigation” (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., London, 2005) at p. 267; 
Barclay, A. ‘Courts Orders Against Payment under First demand Guarantees Used In International 
Trade’ [1989] J.I.B.L. Vol. 4(3), 110 at p. 113  
38
 Bergsten, E. ‘A New Regime for International Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of 
Credit: The UNICITRAL Draft Convention on Guaranty Letters’ (1993) 27 Int’l. Law. 859 at p. 874. 
To that effect he stated: “Judicial procedures vary widely, including in some countries the absence of 
an equivalent of a preliminary injunction”. 
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confirming bank due to the simple fact that there is no privy contract between him and 
such a bank.
39
 
Hence, an applicant will find that applying for an injunction to restrain his own bank 
which resides in his own country is the only efficient way to stop the fraudulent 
scheme.
40
 However, obtaining such an injunction is not easy as some limitations 
which restrict the availability of the injunction might confront him. The existence of a 
holder in due course would reduce his chances of acquiring such an injunction.
41
 For 
example, it is well known that a confirming bank which duly performs its duties under 
a documentary credit or an independent guarantee should not be prevented from being 
reimbursed by the issuing bank which instructed the former to open such a credit.
42
 
An English court should take into account the last factor when it is requested to grant 
an injunction.
43
 Accordingly, an English court should not interfere with the banks’ 
duties and rights unless it is provided with compelling evidence that the confirming 
bank has paid the beneficiary whilst it knows about such a fraud which renders it 
                                                 
39
 Per Ackner L.J. in United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, at 
560; GKN Contractors v Lloyds Bank Plc [1985] 30 BLR 48 at 62; Hooley, R. & Sealy L. 
“Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials” (Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2009) at p. 879; 
Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) at 
p. 264; Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2010) at p. 159; Hapgood, M. “Paget’s Law of Banking” (Butterworths, 13th ed., 
London, 2007) at p. 873; Goode, R. ‘Surety and On-Demand Performance Bonds’ [1988] J.B.L. 87 at 
p. 91; Goode, R. ‘Reflections on Letters of Credit – IV’ [1981] J.B.L. 73 at p. 76 
40
 Pierce, A. “Demand Guarantees in International Trade” (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993) at p.96 
41
 Credit Agricole Indosuez v Generale Bank [1999] 2 ALL ER (Comm) 1009. In this case Rix J has 
provided at p. 1015: “Once the beneficiary has been paid the purpose of the fraud exception, which is 
to prevent a beneficiary benefiting from his fraud, is spent. That the fraud has to be both clear and clear 
to the knowledge of the paying bank at the time of payment is the substance of the way in which the 
exception was expressed in Edward Owen… Once an authorised payment has been made under the 
letter of credit it seems to me that a paying bank is entitled to the reimbursement which is promised it 
by the issuing bank”; Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 315 
42
 Malek, A & Quest, D. “Jack: Documentary Credits” (Tottel Publishing, 4th ed., Sussex, 2009) at p. 
287; Justice, J. ‘Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations – Part 2’ (1977) 94 Banking L.J. 493 at 
pp. 503-504; Finkelstein, H. “Legal Aspects of Commercial Letters of Credit” (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1930) at p. 172 
43
 UCP 600 Article 7(c) provides: “An issuing bank undertakes to reimburse a nominated bank that has 
honoured or negotiated a complying presentation and forwarded the documents to the issuing bank”. 
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embroiled in the fraudulent scheme.
44
 In practice, an injunction to restrain a foreign 
party is almost impossible.
45
 Moreover, restraining a foreign confirming bank whose 
good faith is not in question would be more than impossible.
46
 However, even though 
it rarely occurs, if the court is convinced that such a confirming bank is embroiled in 
the fraud it would restrain the issuing bank that resides in its jurisdiction from 
reimbursing the fraudulent confirming bank. Otherwise, an applicant will bear the 
ultimate loss ensuing from the fraudulent scheme the perpetrators of which he chose 
to deal with from the beginning.
47
 
Nevertheless, this would not be the case where the letter of credit does not involve a 
holder in due course. Indeed, in such a situation the applicant’s chances of acquiring 
an injunction would be stronger against both the fraudulent beneficiary and the bank. 
Having illustrated the limitations on the availability of the remedy of injunctions, 
which emanate from the special nature of these instruments, one can proceed to 
examine the merits and the drawbacks which the English courts have developed in 
handling this area of law. 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Donnelly, K. ‘Nothing for Nothing: A Nullity Exception in Letters of Credit?’ [2008] J.B.L. Vol.4, 
316 at p. 323 
45
 United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554; Power Curber 
International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1233; Discount Records Ltd v 
Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 315 
46
 Rendell, S. ‘Fraud and Injunctive Relief’ (1990) 56 Brook. L. Rev. 111 at pp. 115-116; Rosenblith, R. 
‘What Happens When Operations Go Wrong: Enjoining the Letter-of-Credit Transaction and Other 
Legal Stratagems’ (1985) 17 UCCLJ 307 at p. 312 
47
 Rosenblith, R. ‘What Happens When Operations Go Wrong: Enjoining the Letter-of-Credit 
Transaction and Other Legal Stratagems’ (1985) 17 UCCLJ 307 at p. 312; Finkelstein, H. “Legal 
Aspects of Commercial Letters of Credit” (Columbia University Press, New York, 1930) at p. 242 
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6.4. The first requirement: an established case of fraud 
 
6.4.1. The established fraud test  
 
Formerly, the practice had been developed that a plaintiff requiring an injunction 
“…must establish to the satisfaction of a court a strong prima facie case”.48 This 
means that the applicant must show that he has a real prospect of success in a full trial 
court if an injunction is granted. This relatively high degree of proof constituted a 
difficulty for applicants seeking injunctions to restrain other parties.
49
 However, the 
advent of the American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd
50
 turned things upside down. Lord 
Diplock made it clear that the previous trend, requiring a prima facie case to grant 
injunctions, should be neglected. His Lordship presented a more flexible and 
obtainable requirement, namely, “…a serious question to be tried”. In such a test all 
that the applicant has to show is the existence of a disputed issue which deserves 
further litigation. 
However, applications to English courts for interlocutory injunctions in documentary 
credits and independent guarantees have been affected by the fact that any 
intervention to stop payment in these contexts should be based on the fraud 
exception.
51
 Indeed, if a test which can be easily obtained such as “a serious question 
to be tried” would work as a barrier to stop a letter of credit payment, these 
instruments would lose the prominent role which they play in the international trade 
                                                 
48
 Per Atkin L.J. in Smith v Crigg Ltd [1924] 1 KB 655, at 659. To the same effect, e.g., see: JT 
Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1964] 3 All ER 102 (HL) at 111, where Pearce L.J. (with whom other 
Lords concurred) questioned if the appellant have provided a prima facie case; Cavendish House 
(Cheltenham) Ltd v Cavendish-Woodhouse Ltd [1970] RPC 234, at 235 where Harman, L.J. stated that: 
“Therefore you start off with a prima facie case. That, of course, is the essential prelude to the granting 
of interlocutory relief”; DC Thomason & Co Ltd v Deakin (1952) Ch 646, at 660 & 671; Fellow & Son 
v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122, at 131 
49
 Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) 
at p. 264 
50
 [1975] A.C. 396, at 407 
51
 See, for example: United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American 
Accord) [1983] 1 A.C. 168; RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] 1 
QB 146, 155 
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realm.
52
 Accordingly, Lord Diplock’s above requirement has been discarded by later 
authorities and legal commentaries.
53
 The traditional view was that a requirement to 
show an established or clear case of fraud should replace Lord Diplock’s first 
requirement.
54
 Therefore, a serious claim which does not comprise an established case 
of fraud would not suffice to obtain an injunction.  
The requirement of an established or clear case of fraud had been firstly stipulated for 
in Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd.
55
 In this case the English court refused 
to grant an English buyer an injunction to restrain his English bank from reimbursing 
a French confirming bank under a documentary letter of credit. The court in refusing 
to restrain the English bank from reimbursing the French bank found that “fraud must 
be clearly established”.56 Similarly, in Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v National 
Westminster Bank Ltd and Others,
57
 an English seller opened three independent 
guarantees in the favour of his Egyptian buyer through the National Westminster 
Bank. The independent guarantees were confirmed through different Egyptian banks. 
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The three guarantees were provided by the English seller to the Egyptian buyer to 
guarantee the former’s fulfilment of his obligations under the underlying sale contract.  
Unfortunately, disputes about the performance of the sale contract have arisen and as 
a result the Egyptian’s side called on the independent guarantees. At the beginning, 
the English seller had been successful in his application for an injunction to restrain 
the bank from paying the Egyptians. However, before long, the bank had applied to 
discharge the previously granted injunction. Kerr J. who found that the case is “…not 
of an established fraud at all”58 decided to discharge the granted injunction and gave 
the judgment for the claimant bank.  
The well-known case in this regard, Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v Barclays Bank 
International Ltd,
59
 supports the same conclusions as above. In this case, the plaintiff, 
an English seller, contracted to sell Libyan buyers some particular goods. The sellers, 
and in exchange for the issuance of a documentary letter of credit in their favour, were 
required to provide the Libyan buyers with an independent guarantee for ten per cent 
of the sale contract’s price to assure that they duly performed their obligations under 
the latter. However, the Libyan buyers did not provide the contracted for documentary 
letter of credit.
60
 Nevertheless, the latter, who appeared to be in default,
61
 approached 
the bank and demanded the independent guarantee amount. Therefore, the English 
sellers resorted to the courts asking for an injunction to restrain the bank from paying 
the Libyan buyers.  
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While an injunction was accepted by one judge and refused by another one 
subsequently in the lower courts, the Court of Appeal, (consisting of Lord Denning, 
Lord Browne and Lord Geoffrey Lane) tipped the balance towards the latter judge’s 
end and refused to grant an injunction. In justifying the reason for the court’s 
refraining from interfering by means of injunctions, Lord Denning stated that it is 
only in cases of “established or obvious fraud”62 that a court would interfere to grant 
an injunction contrary to the autonomy principle. To the same effect Lord Browne has 
found that “it is certainly not enough to allege fraud; it must be ‘established’, and in 
such circumstances I should say very clearly established”.63 Nonetheless, the learned 
court in considering the particular facts of the case had not found the Libyan sellers’ 
call on the independent guarantee fraudulent and, accordingly, it was impossible to 
satisfy the established fraud proof test which they stipulated for. 
Illustrating the matter in the same manner pursued above without taking into 
consideration the special facts of each single case, led many authors to advocate that 
the “established fraud” is the only test English courts apply when a documentary 
credit’s or an independent guarantee’s applicant seeks an injunction to restrain a bank 
or a beneficiary from acting on these instruments.
64
 While they have repeatedly 
criticised such a test and described it as difficult to obtain and high to reach, none 
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have offered a convincing rational explanation as to why English courts have 
developed such a test and in what circumstances it should be applied.
65
 However, 
contrary to the majority view, it is suggested that such a test is sound if the special 
facts that lead to its issuance are taken into consideration. 
In Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays International Ltd,
66
 Lord Denning 
upheld Kerr J.’s discharging of the injunction previously granted. To this his Lordship 
found that: 
“This is a new case on a performance bond or guarantee which must be 
decided on the principles applicable to it. Seeing that the bank must pay, 
and will probably come down on the English suppliers on their counter-
guarantee, it follows that the only remedy of the English suppliers is to 
sue the Libyan customers for damages”.67 
 
In fact, pursuant to the instructions of the English sellers, the independent guarantee 
issued by Barclays Bank was confirmed through a second bank in the buyer’s country. 
The situation there was similar to a confirmed letter of credit.
68
 The English sellers 
promised the instructing bank, Barclays Bank, to pay once the request for the 
independent guarantee amount had been made; Barclays Bank itself promised the 
Umma Bank (the Libyan issuing bank) to pay once it had requested the independent 
guarantee amount and the Umma Bank in its turn promised the Libyan buyers to 
affect the independent guarantee payment on demand. All promises to pay were to be 
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affected without the need for any proof which shows the discharging of any certain 
obligations.  
The Libyan buyers, in accordance with the terms of the independent guarantee, had 
approached the Umma Bank and called on the independent guarantee. The Umma 
Bank in its turn had duly honoured the demand pursuant to the independent guarantee 
terms and, accordingly, returned to the English bank asking for reimbursement. The 
English sellers when they knew that such a call had taken place approached the 
English courts to restrain Barclays Bank from paying the Umma Bank. When an 
injunction had been initially issued by the English courts, Barclays Bank had 
contacted the Libyan bank asking about the possibility of stopping the independent 
guarantee payment. However, the reply was disappointing as the bank there in Libya 
had already honoured the call. The Umma Bank response was as follows: 
“We are not in a position to comply with its [the injunction] contents. 
Subject matter must be settled between concerned [parties]…Please 
authorise us urgently…regret [we] hold you responsible for any 
consequences resulting from non-execution”.69 
 
In such a case restraining Barclays Bank from reimbursing the Umma Bank would be 
inconsistent with the assumption upon which the latter entered into a contract with the 
former. Banks in independent guarantees, as is the case with documentary credits, are 
not concerned with the actual performance of the underlying contract which leads to 
the issuance of such instruments.
70
 Moreover, it is an inherited particularity of the law 
of letters of credit that if a bank “…does as it is told, it is safe; if it declines to do 
anything else, it is safe; if it departs from the conditions laid down, it acts at its own 
risk”.71 The English court while admitting that the Libyan buyers were in default, 
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Rep. 49  
220 
 
found it a difficult situation in which to intervene, especially between parties (banks) 
whose good faith is not under question.
72
 Barclays Bank promised the Umma bank to 
repay the independent guarantee amount once the Libyan buyers called on the 
guarantee and in view of that it should fulfil its promise. As Lord Denning puts it: 
“So there it is. Barclays Bank International has given its…promise to pay, 
to Umma Bank on demand…the demand was made. The bank must 
honour it. This court cannot interfere with the obligations of the bank.”73 
 
With a lack of established or obvious fraud on their part, nothing should deprive the 
Umma bank from being reimbursed. This elucidates why Barclays Bank itself had 
applied for the injunction to be discharged. As Hooley states: 
“Where the fraudulent conduct of the beneficiary or other person 
presenting the documents is clear and obvious to the bank, then the bank 
should not pay against the documents and it will not be entitled to 
reimbursement from the applicant or other instructing party”.74 
  
But to say that the Umma Bank is not entitled to be reimbursed where fraud has not 
been clear or established to its knowledge conflicts with documentary credits and 
independent guarantees law and practice. While not all of the Edward Owen judgment 
aspects impress the current author,
75
 it is advocated that the fraud proof test applied in 
this case is the consistent test which suits well the special nature of such a case. The 
presence of the Umma Bank, which has honoured its obligation in good faith as an 
issuing bank, has prevented the English court from interfering by means of 
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injunction.
76
 Indeed, as elucidated above,
77
 the case was one where an applicant’s 
right to apply for an injunction is of a limited nature.
78
  
In the same manner and for the same reasons, the court refused to impede the payment 
process by means of injunctions in Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank.
79
 The 
existence of a French bona fide confirming bank, which has honoured the seller’s 
draft in a documentary credit context without any slightest suspicion that to their 
knowledge fraud had been perpetrated, prevented the issuance of such an injunction. 
The court found that the English bank (Barclays Bank) had to reimburse the French 
bank which has duly honoured the French sellers’ drafts even though the latter was 
fraudulent. Taking into consideration the special facts of the case, the court had 
limited the situations in which it can intervene against an innocent bank to that where 
fraud can be “clearly established” in the bank’s side.80 As Fellinger puts it “Fraud is a 
legal matter and, as such, [banks] should not be permitted to make judgments on the 
evidence”.81 Unless banks are provided with an established proof of fraud, they 
should not be held liable for its perpetration. To the same effect, Bridge stated:  
“…the onus lies on the applicant to provide the bank with the appropriate 
compelling evidence. That evidence must speak for itself: the applicant 
‘must not simply make allegations and expect the bank to check whether 
those allegations are founded or not’. A bank is not a detective agency and 
cannot be expected to investigate whether there is substance behind an 
inconclusive case presented by the applicant.”82 
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It is submitted that the approach advocated by English courts above should be 
maintained because it imitates banks’ assumptions and the protection they envisage in 
such a context.
83
 It should be noted that English courts have stipulated for the same 
fraud proof test in cases where a letter of credit applicant refuses to reimburse an 
issuing bank that has paid the beneficiary or a confirming bank in accordance with the 
payment undertaking terms.
84
 In such cases, English courts have ruled in favour of the 
bank unless the applicant can show an established case of fraud which the issuing 
bank had knowledge of. 
Those who allege that an established, obvious or clear proof of fraud should be 
constantly presented before courts in order to restrain a letter of credit, erect their 
allegations on a misunderstanding emanating from the celebrated case of Sztejn v J 
Henry Schroder Banking Corp.
85
 In this case, Shientag J., for the purpose of the 
motion therein found that “the allegations of the complaint must be deemed 
established and ‘every intendment and fair inference is in favour of the pleading’”.86 
However, the author argues that even though Justice Shientag deemed the allegations 
of the complaint established, nothing in the case itself suggests that the court was not 
prepared to interfere unless a proof of established fraud was brought to its attention. 
Indeed, his Justice deemed such allegations to be established in order to satisfy a New 
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York rule of procedure.
87
 Moreover, there were no suggestions that the plaintiff buyer 
had provided the court with any evidence other than a mere complaint alleging fraud 
on the side of the seller. Hence, it is difficult to infer from the Sztejn facts that Justice 
Shientag had set up a high proof test. Had a confirming bank been involved in the 
Sztejn and an injunction been sought where this bank had already honoured its 
obligations in good faith, an established proof of fraud would be an unavoidable 
necessity in such a context.
88
 
6.4.2. The only realistic inference test 
 
Acknowledging that an established proof of fraud can be brought up to serve the 
above particular situations,
89
 English courts have developed other more obtainable 
fraud proof tests which might apply more efficiently to other situations.
90
 This can be 
seen in the United Trading Corp S.A v. Allied Arab Bank case.
91
 There, the sellers, 
United Trading Corporation S.A., had entered into numerous sale contracts with 
Agromark (a State Establishment for Agricultural Products Trading which was 
controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture) to sell the latter foodstuffs. All the 
sale contracts were financed through documentary letters of credit. However, an 
independent guarantee, to be issued and confirmed by the Rafidain Bank (a state bank 
of Iraq) in favour of Agromark in order to secure United’s performance of their 
obligations under the contract of sale, was one of the sale contracts’ clauses. United 
Trading had not approached the Rafidain Bank directly and rather they had instructed 
their own bankers to carry out such a task and to issue the independent guarantees. 
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Disputes had arisen between the sellers and the buyers about the rights and obligations 
of both parties under the sale contracts and, accordingly, Agromark approached its 
bank, the Rafidain, and called on the independent guarantees. When United heard 
about the calls incident it rushed to the court and sought interlocutory injunctions to 
restrain its bankers, the Rafidain Bank and Agromark from acting on the independent 
guarantees. 
In the court of first instance, Mr Justice Neill granted the plaintiffs’ sellers the 
injunctions they sought to obtain. However, and less than 10 days after an inter partes 
hearing, his Justice discharged the ex parte injunctions which had been granted earlier 
by him even though he had directed that the pre-granted orders should not be drawn 
up until a longer period of time had elapsed.
92
 The reason behind his later judgment 
discharging the injunctions is to be found in the subsequent sentences: 
 “. . . The evidence is not so plain and cogent as to establish that the 
demand by [Agromark] is fraudulent. It may be suspicious. It may require 
investigation. But the authorities, as I see it, show I should only act where 
the evidence is quite clear. In my judgment, it does not reach the high 
standard of proof required.”93 
 
However, the sellers appealed and the matter reached the Court of Appeal where 
Ackner LJ, taking into account the special facts of the case, announced a new flexible 
test of proof.
94
 His Lordship found that it would be sufficient for a court to apply a 
more accessible test of fraud rather than blindly applying the high established fraud 
test. It seems that his Lordship found it easier to grant an injunction where the party 
for which restraint is being sought does not enjoy the protection available to a holder 
in due course which has been illustrated above in the Edward Owen case.
95
 Indeed, 
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Agromark had called on the independent guarantee but the Rafidain Bank had not 
paid them by the time of the hearing of this case. His Lordship refused to accept the 
defendants’ allegations claiming that a higher test of fraud is the proper test to be 
applied and that a court would not interfere unless “every possibility of an innocent 
explanation is excluded”.96 His Lordship found that applying a high proof test of fraud 
in this case would be pointless and that “the respondents are over-stating the standard 
of proof” required to apply the fraud exception. His Lordship to that effect stated that: 
“…we would find it an unsatisfactory position if, having established an 
important exception to what had previously been thought an absolute rule, 
the Courts in practice were to adopt so restrictive an approach to the 
evidence required as to prevent themselves from intervening. Were this to 
be the case, impressive and high-sounding phrases such as 'fraud unravels 
all' would become meaningless”.97 
 
Therefore, his Lordship advocated a new test following the principles laid down in the 
American Cyanamid case.
98
 To that effect he found that “If the Court considers that 
on the material before it the only realistic inference to draw is that of fraud, then the 
seller would have made out a sufficient case of fraud”.99 His Lordship recognised that 
an important phrase like “fraud unravels all” would be a theoretical elusion if an 
established proof of fraud was required in order to grant an injunction in such cases.
100
 
After all, the court had refused to re-grant the previous dismissed injunctions. Lord 
Ackner, to that effect, stated: 
“…although the plaintiffs have provided, on the available material, a 
seriously arguable case that there is good reason to suspect, certainly in 
regard to some of these contracts, that the demands on the performance 
bonds have not been honestly made, they have not established a good 
arguable case that the only realistic inference is that the demands were 
fraudulent”.101 
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However, while his Lordship has advocated a new test which would facilitate granting 
injunctions where fraud is perpetrated in such a context, he failed to draw a distinction 
between cases where “the only realistic interference is that the demands were 
fraudulent” should be applied and other cases where the test of an established fraud 
should be applied. It is unclear whether his Lordship intended the realistic inference 
test to apply equally and exclusively to all cases where an injunction is sought to stop 
fraud in a letter of credit context, or if it is limited to cases where no bona fide parties 
(e.g., the Libyan bank in the Edward Owen case) are involved. It would have been a 
better approach if he had wiped out the ambiguity surrounding such an area of law. 
In fact, it can be said that English courts have gone beyond the test applied in the 
United Trading Corp S.A v. Allied Arab Bank and proposed another fraud proof test 
so as to allow the issuance for injunctions in a more supple manner. Such a new test 
can be found in the often critiqued case Themehelp Ltd v West.
102
 In Themehelp the 
parties entered a sale contract according to the terms of which the seller agreed to sell 
a particular business. It was agreed that the buyer would disburse the procured 
business’s price all the way through instalments at some particular arranged dates. 
The seller stipulated for the opening of an independent guarantee by the buyer in his 
favour, in order to guarantee that the latter will properly carry out his obligations 
under the sale contract and most importantly to guarantee that he pays the agreed 
instalments punctually. The buyer duly opened such an independent guarantee.  
However, whilst things had been moving normally, the buyer discovered that the 
seller had misrepresented some facts in the underlying contract which rendered the 
contract fraudulent. The buyer approached courts alleging that such a contract was 
                                                 
102
 [1995] 3 W.L.R. 751 
227 
 
fraudulent and therefore it should be rendered void and null. The buyer, furthermore, 
claimed damages for being placed in such a position. While the seller refuted such 
fraud claims, the buyer continued with his allegations and eventually requested the 
court to issue an injunction to restrain the seller from calling on the beforehand given 
independent guarantee.  
An injunction had been granted by Kay J. at the first instance court. Similarly, the 
Court of Appeal maintained the injunction except Evans LJ who dissented. The court 
found that an injunction could be granted where the applicant can show a “seriously 
arguable” case of fraud.103 While the case is one of the infrequent cases where an 
English court has granted an injunction pursuant to the fraud exception, nonetheless, 
the basis which upon the court granted the injunction is to some extent 
questionable.
104
 The court justified the approach it pursued by alleging that the proof 
test of fraud and its stringency should depend on the party against which an injunction 
is sought. To that effect Balcombe L.J stated:  
“The same considerations of policy do not apply where…[an] injunctive 
relief is sought to stop the beneficiary from making such a demand 
pending the trial of the action in which the issue of his fraud will be 
determined. In such a case I see no reason why the ordinary principles for 
the grant of interlocutory relief should not apply”.105 
 
His Lordship found that the proof test should not be applied differently from that laid 
down by the American Cyanamid guidelines where the party sought to be restrained is 
the beneficiary.
106
 While their Lordships’ broad suggestion, in that the test of proof 
should be different depending on the party sought to be restrained, is consistent to 
some extent with the approach illustrated above in Edward Owen and United Trading 
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cases, the current author disagrees with their Lordships. It is submitted that the test of 
fraud in documentary credits and independent guarantees should be different from that 
applied in the American Cyanamid, taking into account the special characteristics of 
these instruments and the role they play in the international trade realm.
107
 On the one 
hand, if the fraud proof test is too easy to fulfil and so injunctions are too easy to 
obtain, letters of credit will lose the prominent role which they have played.
108
 On the 
other hand, if the fraud proof test is so difficult to fulfil, fraud will undermine the trust 
which upon these instruments are based. Accordingly, a practical test such as the only 
realistic inference would suit better the particular nature of such instruments where no 
third innocent parties are involved. Moreover, the line of thought which advocates 
that an injunction would be less destructive to the autonomy principle where it is 
sought against a beneficiary rather than a bank must be refuted. Whether the 
injunction is sought against a bank or a beneficiary, do the results differ? Without a 
doubt, the results will be the same: depriving the beneficiary of the payment until a 
full trial court can adjudicate the disputed matter. It would have been a better 
approach if their Lordships had distinguished between injunctions against normal 
parties who are not innocent third parties and who did not acquire the holder in due 
course status and those who, on the contrary, enjoy such protection.
109
 Indeed, the 
distinction between injunctions against banks and beneficiaries was the essence of 
Lord Evans’ dissent. 
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Accordingly, the approach pursued in the Themehelp case should be disregarded.
110
 
The fraud proof test developed there, if applied by later authorities, will undoubtedly 
undermine the important role which letters of credit are playing in the trade realm.
111
 
In such a case, English courts should follow Czarnikow-Rionda v. Standard Bank
112
 
where the court therein returned to the United Trading test which reflects the special 
characteristics of these instruments.
113
 It is suggested that the United Trading test 
should be always applied where no innocent third parties are involved; the court in 
such an instance should ask: has the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that fraud is 
the only realistic inference? On the other hand, the Edward Owen test which requires 
an established proof of fraud should be maintained as well. This test should be applied 
where injunctions are sought against innocent third parties whose good faith is not in 
question; the court in such an instance should ask: has the plaintiff provided sufficient 
evidence that fraud has been established, clear and obvious?  
In Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China
114
 the plaintiffs alleged that a bona fide 
issuing bank should not be entitled to reimbursement from the instructing bank where 
the call on the independent guarantee was fraudulent. The plaintiffs contended that the 
proper test to apply is Lord Ackner’s test, but the court there found that such a test is 
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inappropriate due to the special facts of the case in consideration.
115
 The Court of 
Appeal applied the Edward Owen test which stipulates for the fraud proof to be 
“firmly established as the proper criterion”.116  
While it has been repeatedly said that the established fraud test is one of the main 
reasons why English courts refuse to interfere by means of injunctions to prevent 
fraud from occurring in a letters of credit context,
117
 the above discussion reveals that 
this line of allegation is misleading. English courts’ dual proof test of fraud fulfils the 
expectations of the different parties utilising such instruments.
118
 An English court 
will look on the legal status of the party whom the plaintiff is seeking to restrain and 
based on that it will apply the appropriate test according to the situation. Accordingly, 
it is suggested that the English approach to this area of law is consistent. Yet it is 
suggested that English courts should clarify such a difference in future cases in order 
to prevent unexpected misapplications. Having illustrated the first requirement of the 
American Cyanamid guidelines and its application in letters of credit contexts, the 
following sections will proceed to examine the other requirements usually requested 
by English courts to grant an injunction. 
 
6.5. The second requirement: a cause of action 
 
In many of the cases where fraud was alleged to restrain a letter of credit, it has been 
argued by the defendants (banks and beneficiaries) that a cause of action against them 
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has not been presented and as a result an injunction should not be granted.
119
 On the 
other hand, applicants for injunctions appeared worried about providing a cause of 
action in order to guarantee the issuance of the requested injunction.
120
 This section 
examines this requirement and the extent to which English courts have stipulated for 
its existence in order to grant an injunction. Is such a requirement necessary to obtain 
an injunction in a documentary credit or an independent guarantee context? Should 
the presence of this requirement depend on the legal position of the party an 
injunction is sought against? The answer to these questions can be found below. 
6.5.1. Letters of credit which involve holders in due course  
 
Undeniably, even though it has not been stipulated for in the American Cyanamid,
121
 
in order to obtain an injunction from an English court a cause of action has been 
frequently demanded.
122
 However, this requisite has not been adhered to always and 
some exceptions to it have been recognised.
123
 At this early stage, it can be said that 
injunctions based on a fraud case in documentary credits and independent guarantees 
contexts are one of these exceptions but yet the matter is not without its own 
problems.
124
 In a letter of credit context, it has been said that the bank’s knowledge of 
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the fraud is the cause of action and a court will not grant an injunction without its 
existence.
125
 Interestingly, this requirement can be traced back to the same line of 
authorities which stipulated for an established test of fraud as the test of proof 
sufficient to invoke the fraud exception. In RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank Ltd
126
 the court therein found that it would not interfere with the 
flow of letters of credit “except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks 
have notice”.127 In the same way, in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank 
International Ltd, Lord Denning embraced the same view that the applicant in order 
to obtain an injunction has to show a “clear fraud of which the bank has notice”.128 
Geoffrey Lane L.J adopted the same approach where he stipulated for “fraud obvious 
or clear to the bank” in order to grant an injunction.129 Furthermore, in Bolivinter Oil 
SA v Chase Manhattan Bank, Sir John Donaldson M.R. supported the above 
authorities stating that “The evidence of fraud must be clear, both as to the fact of 
fraud and as to the bank’s knowledge”.130 
However, as two banks or even more were involved in the above cases, it is difficult 
to distinguish which bank’s knowledge was intended to constitute the required cause 
of action. While all of the above authorities have stipulated for fraud where “the bank 
has notice” or instances where it is “clear to the bank’s knowledge”, one might ask 
which bank is meant to have such knowledge. Is it the issuing bank or the confirming 
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bank and does that make any difference? The author argues that the existence of this 
element of fact surrounds this particular area of law with a significant amount of 
uncertainty. 
The approach which calls for the necessity of a cause of action in a letter of credit 
context can find further support in the Czarnikow-Rionda v Standard Bank case.
131
 
There the plaintiffs had instructed their own bank (the defendant) to open a number of 
documentary credits in favour of their sellers. Pursuant to the credit terms, Standard 
Bank had instructed two Swiss banks to confirm the documentary credits. In their 
turn, the Swiss banks had confirmed the credit and duly advised the sellers of its 
existence. After a period of time, the sellers sought to discount the documentary 
credits.
132
 Accordingly, the Swiss banks discounted their drafts. However, alleging 
that fraud was existent in the underlying transaction, Czarnikow-Rionda sought to 
obtain an injunction to stop Standard Bank from reimbursing the Swiss banks. The 
injunction request was rejected by Rix J. for a number of reasons, amongst them being 
the fact that the applicant had not provided the bank with knowledge of the cause of 
action. He found that such a requirement:  
“…was implicit in the argument before the court and in Lord Diplock’s 
[in the American Accord case] citation with approval of the Sztejn and 
Edward Owen cases. When, therefore, Lord Diplock stated that the fraud 
exception was an application of the doctrine that ‘fraud unravels all’, he 
was not, in my respectful opinion, speaking as broadly as might be 
thought. It would be less pithy but more accurate to fill out the dictum by 
saying that fraud unravels the bank’s obligation to act on the appearance 
of documents to be in accordance with a credit’s requirement provided 
that the bank knows in time of the beneficiary’s fraud”. 133 
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While Rix J. insisted on the necessity of a cause of action in such a confirmed 
documentary credit context, in order to grant an injunction to restrain the issuing bank 
from reimbursing the confirming bank, yet as can be noticed, again it is not clear from 
his statement which bank is meant to know about the fraud. It is not apparent whether 
his Justice intended to confine such a requirement to confirming banks merely or 
whether it includes issuing banks as well. A clarification to this matter can be found in 
the United Trading case. In this case, Lord Ackner found that: 
 “…the Court has the jurisdiction to grant a quia timet injunction if the 
plaintiffs can establish that Rafidain [the issuing bank of an independent 
guarantee] is threatening to commit a breach of a duty owed to the 
plaintiffs”.134  
 
As has been discussed in the previous section, where an independent guarantee or a 
documentary credit comprises a second bank which confirms such an instrument, the 
latter’s relation with the first issuing bank resembles that of the issuing bank with its 
applicant.
135
 Hence, a confirming bank which pays a beneficiary without the existence 
of an established proof of fraud should not be prevented from being reimbursed.
136
 
However, if the confirming bank pays after it has been provided with an established 
proof of fraud, it will not be eligible to be reimbursed.
137
 In other words, a confirming 
bank that pays, although fraud is established to the knowledge of other parties apart 
from this bank, where it does not know about the fraud and where such established 
fraud is not clear to its knowledge, would not be held liable for the fraud and should 
be entitled to reimbursement. Conversely, if the bank knew about the established 
fraud and yet selected to pay, it would find itself unable to ask for reimbursement. 
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Accordingly, if the confirming bank’s knowledge of the fraud constitutes what is 
meant to be a cause of action, then a cause of action would be an imperative necessity 
in order to prevent it from seeking reimbursement from the issuing bank.  
Such a requirement is important to protect these confirming banks’ expectations 
which they envisage when they accept to confirm a letter of credit. A cause of action 
in such cases is an essential requirement which an applicant has to discharge in order 
to obtain his desired injunction to restrain the issuing bank from reimbursing the 
confirming bank. The relevant day for establishing such knowledge on the bank’s part 
identically resembles that required to be provided in a full trial case by an applicant 
who refuses to reimburse his bank and claims that the latter’s payment was fraudulent. 
As Lord Ackner suggests “We doubt that this is really open to contest”.138 Indeed, the 
applicant has to prove that the confirming bank’s knowledge of the alleged fraud 
existed prior to the time at which the latter has paid the ultimate fraudulent 
beneficiary.
139
 If the applicant can simply prove that the confirming bank acquired the 
knowledge of the fraud after the latter had already affected payment, then the former’s 
allegations would not suffice to form a cause of action against the bank. Indeed, “The 
bank would not have been in breach of any duty in making the payment without the 
requisite knowledge”.140 Hence, the approach pursued above by the English 
authorities in requiring an established fraud which the confirming bank has 
knowledge of, is recommended when an applicant seeks an injunction in a confirmed 
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letter of credit context. However, in the Edward Owen case, Lord Browne, who 
refused to grant the English sellers an injunction, said: 
“…it is quite impossible to say that fraud on the part of the buyers or the 
Umma Bank [the issuing bank of the independent guarantee] has been 
established, still less that Barclays bank [the instructing bank of the 
independent guarantee] had knowledge of it”.141  
 
Whilst Lord Ackner has confined the requirement of the bank’s knowledge to that of 
an independent guarantee’s issuing bank (the same as a documentary credit’s 
confirming bank), it seems that Lord Browne has expanded the boundaries of such a 
requirement to include the knowledge of the instructing bank (the same as a 
documentary credit’s issuing bank). Hence, taking into consideration the statement of 
the court, as given above, in the Edward Owen case, an injunction would not be 
granted unless both banks have knowledge of the fraud.
142
  
With respect, it is suggested that such an approach is untenable. An issuing bank’s (in 
a documentary credit context/ an instructing bank in an independent guarantee 
context) knowledge of the fraud should not constitute a barrier in front of other bona 
fide confirming/issuing banks which pay beneficiaries without acquiring such 
knowledge. The autonomy principle supports this conclusion.
143
 Whether 
issuing/instructing banks have knowledge or not that should not work to harm 
confirming/issuing banks which confirm these undertakings on the assumption that as 
long as they do what they are told to do they will inevitably be reimbursed. What 
counts in a confirmed credit as a cause of action is the confirming bank’s knowledge 
and not that of the issuing bank. An issuing bank’s knowledge should not affect the 
reimbursement operation. Unless an applicant can show that the confirming bank has 
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paid a fraudulent beneficiary though the fraud is established to its knowledge, the 
former would not succeed in his interlocutory injunction application.  
6.5.2. Letters of credit which do not involve holders in due course 
 
Requiring a cause of action in confirmed documentary credits and independent 
guarantees contexts has strongly affected the operation of granting injunctions where 
no holders in due course parties are involved.
144
 Questions as to whether a cause of 
action against an issuing bank, where no bona fide holders are involved, is needed to 
obtain an interlocutory injunction have been indistinctly raised.
145
 Does the 
knowledge of the fraud by the issuing bank constitute an inescapable condition which 
the applicant has to provide in order to guarantee the issuance of an injunction? The 
remaining part of this section is dedicated to answer such a question. 
It should be said that the existence of questionable statements such as that delivered 
by Lord Browne above have greatly influenced the operation of granting injunctions 
in such situations. The general English view has been that a cause of action is needed 
whenever an injunction is requested to restrain a bank from paying a letter of credit.
146
 
Yet, this work suggests that a cause of action should not be stipulated for in order to 
restrain an issuing bank from paying a fraudulent beneficiary where no holders in due 
course are involved.  
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As Kerr J., in R. D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd. 
and Others, puts it: “The courts have discretion to grant interlocutory injunctions 
whenever it is just or convenient to do so”.147 Where the issuing bank has yet not paid 
the fraudulent beneficiary and there are no other concerned banks or holders in due 
course who paid in good faith, the requirement of the former’s knowledge of the fraud 
should not work as an obstruction to allow fraudulent beneficiaries to benefit from 
their own fraud.
148
 Such a requirement seems absurd and escaping with the money 
obtained through fraudulent schemes would be the ultimate result if the issuing bank 
does not know about the fraud. Stipulating for such a requirement means that courts 
will interfere to stop fraud if banks know about it. However, the courts will allow the 
utilization of letters of credit as fraud instruments as long as the banks do not know 
about such a fraud. Such an approach turns a blind eye to the fact that in asking for a 
court’s interlocutory injunction the applicant seeks to protect himself and the non-
aware bank, who would be interested in the actual performance of the underlying 
contract, at the same time from the beneficiary’s concealed fraud.  
In addition, the applicant requests such a stop-payment method to protect the bank 
from interfering with legal issues which the latter is ill-equipped to deal with and 
which it is protected from by virtue of the autonomy principle. Indeed, if the bank 
knows about the fraud and welcomes to interfere with the operation of such 
instruments, requiring an injunction will be senseless. One would expect that a court 
will interfere to prevent fraud by means of injunctions where banks do not know 
about the fraud and not the other way around.
149
 Accordingly, fraud prevention should 
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suppress the requirement that an injunction’s applicant has to provide a cause of 
action against the bank. However, where holders in due course are involved, a cause 
of action in a confirmed letter of credit context has what justifies its request, namely: 
protection for bona fide confirmers and holders in due course whose good faith is not 
in question.  
Support for this approach can be found in Bolivinter Oil S.A. v Chase Manhattan 
Bank.
150
 Therein, the plaintiffs’ Counsel argued, where it is arguable to say that the 
court seemed convinced with such an argument, that a cause of action requirement 
should not be a barrier to prevent granting injunctions where the result of a declining 
approach would ultimately lead to the swindler seller profiting from his own fraud. 
The Counsel argued that:  
“The basis of the jurisdiction is not the power of the court to grant an 
injunction restraining a breach of contract. The plaintiff does not have to 
establish that the payment enjoined would constitute a breach of 
contractual duty owed to the plaintiff by the bank. The basis of the 
jurisdiction is wider; the power of the court to intervene where necessary 
to prevent fraud. The plaintiff has to show that his legal rights are 
threatened by the fraud of the beneficiary.”151 
 
Ironically, if ‘fraud unravels all’152 is the essence of the fraud exception’s existence, it 
is hard to justify emphasising insignificant requirements which could negatively affect 
granting injunctions.
153
 Such requirements, which initially have been developed 
outside the letters of credit context, should be neglected if their insertion would not 
properly serve the special nature of these instruments and the expectations of their 
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users.
154
 While stipulating for such a requirement is justified where a holder in due 
course is involved, this should not be the case where no bona fide holders are existent. 
In what the author describes as a misconception, English courts rely on the American 
Sztejn case as an authority which stipulates for a cause of action whenever an 
injunction is requested.
155
 Rix J., as seen above, argues in the same manner that the 
Sztejn supports this view. The misconception has emanated from reciting the 
following statement delivered by Justice Shientag:  
“…On the present motion, it must be assumed that the seller has 
intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer. In such a 
situation, where the seller’s fraud has been called to the bank’s attention 
before the drafts and documents have been presented for payment, the 
principle of the independence of the bank’s obligation under the letter of 
credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller”.156  
 
While the general view developed has been that Sztejn supports the cause of action 
requirement where no holders in due course are involved, it can be said that this view 
is erroneous. Indeed, while Shientag J. has pointed up the banks’ obligations in cases 
where they have been provided with a sufficient proof of fraud, nothing suggests that 
a court will not interfere unless this sufficient proof is brought to the bank’s 
attention.
157
 In this case there was also nothing which suggests that the issuing bank 
has acquired the knowledge required to constitute a cause of action. The absence of 
the cause of action did not prevent the court from interfering by means of injunctions. 
Besides, the defendants’ claim, that a cause of action against them was not presented, 
did not affect the court’s steadiness not to discharge the granted injunction. 
Accordingly, the Sztejn case itself, where the defendants were an advising bank whose 
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task was confined to merely collecting documents on behalf of the issuing bank, does 
not support the need of a cause of action requirement. Had a bona fide confirming 
bank been involved in the case, it would not be a surprise that a cause of action 
against such a bank had been required. 
Bridge, amongst others,
158
 suggests that: “The question of the bank’s knowledge of 
the fraud does, however, become academic in the context of interim relief”.159 To that 
effect he cited a piece of Phillips J. judgement in Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v 
Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd.
160
 (a letter of credit where no holders in due course were 
involved) where the latter said: 
“…the requirement that there must be clear evidence of the bank’s 
knowledge of fraud is academic once the proceedings have reached the 
inter partes stage. At this point, the evidence of fraud will be placed 
simultaneously before the court and before the bank which is party to the 
proceedings. If the court concludes that there is clear evidence of fraud, it 
will necessarily conclude that the bank has acquired knowledge of the 
fraud”.161 
 
Indeed, Philips J. observations have, to a great extent, been embraced by later 
authorities. In Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank Plc
162
 (a no holders in due 
course case) the court went beyond Phillips J. statement and neglected such a 
requirement to the extent that it did not even discuss it.
163
 The defendants had asked 
the plaintiffs to open an independent guarantee and so it had been duly opened. One 
of the independent guarantee terms required the defendants to notify the plaintiffs that 
they would call on the guarantee fourteen days before the actual call. Yet, the 
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defendants called on the independent guarantee without notifying the applicants as 
required by the guarantee terms. In view of that, the applicants applied for an 
injunction to stop the bank from paying the fraudulent beneficiaries. Interestingly, 
Cresswell J. therein solely examined the fraud proof and on the light of it he granted 
the requested injunction.
164
 
It is suggested that the approach which Bridge, Phillips J. and Cresswell J. have 
pursued is recommendable. Where a court finds that fraud is existent, an issuing bank 
will acquire the knowledge of this fraud inevitably.
165
 Accordingly, an injunction’s 
applicant should not be required to provide such already evidential existing fact. 
Bridge suggests that the court’s question should be “whether the applicant has 
adduced sufficient evidence in the court proceedings” and if the applicant does so by 
adducing the required fraud evidence, nothing should deprive him from obtaining the 
injunction which he is seeking.
166
  
While such an approach is welcomed, it would have been a better approach if they 
had distinguished between cases where no holders in due course are involved, and that 
where the latter are present. Distinguishing between these two situations is an 
important issue which both courts and legal commentators have overlooked during the 
past years. The dual approach pursued in the previous section in regard to the fraud 
proof test should be applied when a court asks whether a cause of action is needed to 
grant an injunction. On the one hand, in seeking an injunction to restrain an issuing 
bank from reimbursing a confirming bank, the applicant has to show an established 
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fraud with a cause of action namely the confirming bank’s knowledge of such a fraud. 
This justifies the reason why the cases which stipulated for an established proof of 
fraud had always attached this requirement, that the fraud should be known to the 
bank itself. It is the knowledge of the confirming bank and not that of the issuing bank 
which counts as a cause of action. On the other hand, where an applicant seeks to 
restrain an issuing bank or a beneficiary in the absence of other confirming banks or 
holders in due course, the situation should be different.
167
 In such a case, an applicant 
merely has to show the more adequate test that “the only realistic inference is fraud” 
with no cause of action. Providing an already present knowledge to the issuing bank 
in such cases would be a superfluous illusion.  
It is not surprising, in the light of failure to distinguish between both the above 
situations, to see contradictory statements as to whether a cause of action is required 
to grant an injunction or not. The above examined list of authorities shows that while 
in some cases a cause of action has not been adhered to as a requirement to invoke the 
fraud exception, judges in the other cases have found themselves unable to grant an 
injunction unless a cause of action is provided. In light of the above confusion and 
contradictory attitudes to this particular area of law it would not be a surprise to find 
statements which blindly stipulate for a cause of action in order to grant an injunction 
regardless of the different contexts within which it is sought, like the following one 
where Rix J., in the Czarnikow-Rionda case, stated: 
“I accept that in Deutsche v Walbrook Mr Justice Phillips raised the 
question whether it is necessary for the claimant to have any cause of 
action, and sought to answer it in the negative by reference to the 
acceptance of his proposition in Bolivinter; but I have already ventured to 
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suggest that Sir John Donaldson’s judgement in Bolivinter does not 
support that view of the matter”.168 
 
Indeed, where an injunction has been sought to restrain an issuing bank from 
reimbursing a confirming bank, his Justice was unable to find any other way except to 
stipulate for a cause of action in order to grant an injunction. Unfortunately, inability 
to distinguish between situations where confirming banks are involved from that 
where only issuing banks are involved, led Rix J. to wrongfully criticise other 
judgements in order to justify the route he has taken. Once the problematic cause of 
action requirement to grant an injunction in a letter of credit context has been 
illustrated, one can continue to examine the last requirement, namely, the balance of 
convenience. 
 
6.6. The third requirement: the balance of convenience 
 
6.6.1.  A background 
 
Having provided the court with a serious issue to be tried in addition to a cause of 
action which justifies his claim, an injunction’s applicant in order to obtain the 
required interlocutory relief has to satisfy the last requirement pursuant to the 
American Cyanamid guidelines which is, namely, that the balance of convenience is 
in favour of granting the injunction.
169
 In fact, in determining where the balance of 
convenience lies and whether it is in favour of granting the injunction or not, the 
adequacy of damages test constitutes the crucial test which a court will apply. 
Accordingly, even if an applicant for an injunction successfully satisfies the first two 
requirements discussed above, if the court finds that the defendant (the bank or the 
beneficiary in our case) would be able to compensate the applicant for losses which 
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might afflict him in the case that an injunction is not granted, the court will not grant 
the requested injunction.
170
  
Nevertheless, if the court concludes that the defendant would not be able to 
compensate the applicant for an injunction later in a full trial court, granting an 
injunction would after that be dependent on the applicant’s solvency.171 In other 
words, a court will not grant the applicant an injunction unless it is satisfied that he 
would be able to compensate the defendant for any losses which he might sustain in 
case the latter succeeds afterwards at a full trial court. In sum, in order to obtain the 
interlocutory relief, the applicant for an injunction has to show the defendant’s 
inability to compensate him if an injunction is not granted and, at the same time, his 
ability to compensate the defendant if he fails later to support his preliminary claims 
before a full trial court. If the applicant satisfies this dual adequacy of damages test, 
then an injunction will be granted in his favour.
172
  
In addition to the adequacy of damages which constitutes the main test, it should be 
said that other factors might play an influential role in whether a court determines to 
grant an injunction or not. The availability of a freezing injunction (Mareva order)
173
 
might affect negatively the process of granting an interlocutory injunction.
174
 The 
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banks’ reputation and whether granting an injunction would affect it forms another 
factor which a court might take into consideration whilst weighing the balance of 
convenience. Taking this into consideration, the following subsections are meant to 
examine such requirements and the extent to which English courts have stipulated for 
its existence in order to grant an injunction in a letter of credit context.  
  
6.6.2. The adequacy of damages test 
 
In what can be described as a succinct summary of the current English law position in 
respect of the operation of interlocutory reliefs and their availability in a letter of 
credit context, Bertrams has noted that: 
“The conclusion with respect to English law should be that even if the 
account party were to succeed in clearly establishing fraud by the 
beneficiary, thus bringing him within the fraud exception, and even if such 
fraud were known to the bank, applications for a stop-payment order 
[injunctions] against the bank would fail on the balance of convenience 
test”.175 
 
The dominant view which English courts have developed, concerning the inability to 
distinguish between circumstances which necessitate the existence of a cause of action 
and those which do not, has left the impression that an interlocutory injunction is of 
little application if not altogether non-existent. This is mainly due to the fact that such 
an approach has shifted the main reason behind the requested injunctions which is, 
namely, fraud prevention to that other questionable reason, which has been sometimes 
poorly applied in the wrong place, namely, the knowledge of the bank. Based on such 
an erroneous conception, the short line of cases, where English courts have enjoyed 
the rare (because usually an injunction’s applicant will fail to satisfy the first two 
requirements and accordingly there will be no need to discuss such an undue 
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requirement) opportunity to discuss the balance of convenience requirement,
176
 show 
that the courts have been mistaken in determining the identity of the person who 
should correspond to the injunction’s applicant as a defendant whilst weighing the 
balance of convenience.
177
 Although a distinguishing approach between instances 
which include a holder in due course and those which do not will be drawn in order to 
illustrate the different aspects of the balance of convenience and the repercussions 
which might ensue from adhering or not to such a requirement, it will be concluded 
that, when a fraud case is present, the better approach which English courts should 
apply in both instances is to neglect such a requirement which originally has been 
developed outside the unique context of the letter of credit. 
The approach calling for the balance of convenience, as the third requirement which 
the applicant must satisfy in order for the court to grant an injunction, can be seen in 
the oft-cited statement of Kerr J., in the Harbottle Mercantile Ltd v National 
Westminster bank Ltd, where he provided: 
“The plaintiffs then still face what seems to me to be an insuperable 
difficulty. They are seeking to prevent the bank from paying and debiting 
their account. It must then follow that if the bank pays and debits the 
plaintiffs’ account, it is either entitled to do so or not entitled to do so. To 
do so would either be in accordance with the bank’s contract with the 
plaintiffs or a breach of it. If it is in accordance with the contract, then the 
plaintiffs have no cause of action against the bank and, as it seems to me, 
no possible basis for an injunction against it. Alternatively, if the 
threatened payment is in breach of contract…then the plaintiffs would 
have good claims for damages against the bank”.178 
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In fact, the same approach was followed a few years ago in Czarnikow-Rionda v 
Standard Bank,
179
 where Rix J. was adamant that the balance of convenience in such 
cases would militate against granting the required injunctions on the assumption that 
the bank always would be a solvent party whose ability to compensate the injunction’s 
applicant is not in any doubt. In both the above cases the question was whether an 
injunction should be granted to restrain the issuing bank from reimbursing the 
confirming bank. Both courts found that even if the confirming bank had acquired the 
knowledge of the established, clear and obvious fraud required to grant the injunction, 
the matter should be left to the issuing bank to determine whether it is going to 
reimburse the confirming bank or not. Undoubtedly, an issuing bank in such a 
circumstance will be able to compensate the applicant for the damages that the latter 
might sustain from such a fraudulent payment.
180
 Similarly, the confirming bank also 
will be able to compensate the issuing bank if the former breached the underlying 
contract concluded between them. The solvency of banks is well known and as a 
result an injunction would not be granted once it reached the balance of convenience 
stage.
181
 This approach in both respectful Judges’ view is necessary to maintain the 
integrity and the autonomy of the banks’ commitments in this context.182 
6.6.3.  Looking at the adequacy of damages test from another angle 
 
Yet, it is suggested that, instead of maintaining integrity, such an approach will 
ultimately leave banks in an unenviable situation.
183
 Indeed, in a confirmed letter of 
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credit, an issuing bank instructs a confirming bank to do some works, which the 
former cannot do for one reason or another, in return for an amount of commission.
184
 
On the one hand, the issuing bank will reimburse the confirming bank for any money 
which the latter pays in accordance with the contract between both banks as long as 
the latter acted in a good faith.
185
 On the other hand, an issuing bank can return to the 
confirming bank to recover any amount of money which the former has paid to the 
latter where it is found that the latter has performed its duties contrary to the contract 
terms concluded between the two banks.
186
 However, this should not be the case 
anymore if an applicant can show that the confirming bank itself is embroiled in a 
fraud scheme in any form (e.g., fraud happened under its knowledge). The fact that a 
confirming bank would usually be a solvent party should not work to harm issuing 
banks where a clear and sufficient case of fraud to the knowledge of the former bank 
has been adduced by the applicant to the court. Indeed, granting an injunction in such 
cases would save time and efforts which an issuing bank would waste in prosecuting 
the confirming bank. The result of further litigation in a foreign country would not 
always provide the issuing bank with a practical solution especially where other 
parties are fraudsters.
187
  
Moreover, in applying the balance of convenience requirement stated by their Justices 
above, it seems that the only concern of English courts is to protect letters of credit 
applicants. Their approach suggests that as long as applicants can recover fraudulent 
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payment, protecting issuing banks is unimportant. Such an approach which protects 
the applicants’ interests and overlooks that of other bona fide parties such as issuing 
banks is absurd. Issuing banks like applicants should be protected from fraud and 
fraudsters, and courts should recognise such a fact. Indeed, if the essence of the fraud 
exception illustrated by Lord Diplock in the American Accord is: 
“The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail 
himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non 
oritur actio, or, if plain English is preferred ‘fraud unravels all’. The court 
will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out 
fraud”.188 
 
it is difficult to justify the approach pursued by Rix J. and Kerr J. above. While the 
confirming bank is not the beneficiary referred to by Lord Diplock’s above statement, 
it is arguable that such a complicit bank’s position, where it facilitates the 
beneficiary’s fraud scheme which certainly would not transpire without the bank 
benefiting from it, is equal to the fraudulent beneficiary position. The last argument 
can find a conclusive support in his Lordship’s last sentence where he stressed the 
courts’ role in not allowing the carrying out of fraud by a dishonest person whoever 
he is. After all, it should not be forgotten that in such a case the beneficiary himself is 
fraudulent and accordingly, the court should prevent him from benefiting from his 
own fraud rather than developing approaches which help the spreading of this 
injurious phenomenon.  
It has been said that: “a bank is not a detective agency and cannot be expected to 
investigate whether there is substance behind an inconclusive case presented by the 
applicant”.189 A bank usually would not take the initiative in assessing the strength or 
truthfulness of the allegation of the applicant. Indeed, a bank, whose abilities do not 
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qualify it for such work, is not the institution capable of verifying such claims and 
there must be doubt whether it would suffice to stop the reimbursement process or 
not.
190
 As Lord Ackner has observed in the United Trading case: 
“The grant of an injunction would not be upon the basis that they had 
established fraud, but only on the basis that on the available evidence it 
was seriously arguable that fraud had occurred. Such a finding does not 
indicate success in the final action, nor does the failure to obtain an 
interim injunction predicate failure when the case is ultimately heard”.191 
 
Notably, even what courts find as a sufficient proof of fraud in an interlocutory stage 
would vary from what a full trial court would recognise as a sufficient evidence of 
fraud later on.
192
 If this is the case with the very institution established and well 
equipped to investigate such instances, one can imagine to what extent a bank 
decision would be fragile. Relying on the English approach, an issuing bank which 
from the beginning advises its applicant to obtain a court’s injunction in order to 
avoid becoming embroiled with assessments which it is ill-equipped to deal with, will 
shockingly find itself facing the very same position it tried to keep away from. 
Accordingly, if the bank accepted its applicant’s allegations and refused to reimburse 
the confirming bank it would find itself bound to compensate the latter for the 
damages it sustained as a result of the previous refusal to reimburse it in addition to 
the letter of credit due amount.  
On the other hand, if the same bank refused to take seriously its customer allegations 
it would find itself defrauded by the confirming bank. In such a situation the issuing 
bank will find itself bound to return the letter of credit amount to its applicant should 
it have breached the contract concluded between them. Even if it has paid the 
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untrustworthy confirming bank in good faith, the issuing bank will be held liable for 
the letter of credit amount, which it has already paid for its applicant who previously 
warned it of such a payment’s implications. With such an approach consequences 
would be harmful in both ways to issuing banks.
193
 
Furthermore, the autonomy principle does support this line of argument. In fact, banks 
should not investigate extraneous matters as their work is documentary in nature.
194
 
Whilst maintaining the integrity and autonomy of the banks’ commitments is one of 
the reasons upon which Kerr J. and Rix J. have based their approach, it is suggested 
that such an approach necessities banks’ interference with matters beyond documents 
in order to protect their own interests. In pursuing such an approach, a bank will find 
itself compelled to undermine the very base which English courts have taken into 
account whilst stipulating for the balance of convenience requirement. 
Implementing such an approach can be seen where a court might from the very 
preliminary stages refuse to interfere to stop payment by means of injunctions relying 
on the balance of convenience requirement. Relying on such an approach, courts 
might not test out the fraud allegations and whether they are sufficient to invoke an 
injunction or not.
195
 Rather, as long as the defendant is a solvent party (a bank) who 
can fully compensate the applicant for the damages that might afflict him, the court 
will deprive banks from benefiting from any assisting preliminary findings it usually 
reaches about the alleged fraud and its strength which might be of good use to banks 
in determining whether to pay or not.
196
 Such an approach has been pursued by Rix J. 
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in the Czarnikow-Rionda case.
197
 Rix J. was of the view that as long as the defendant 
is a bank, whose solvency is beyond any doubt, fraud allegations should not be 
considered. The balance of convenience would solely on its own suffice in refusing to 
grant the injunction. Unfortunately, pursuing Rix’s approach, an issuing bank, rather 
than limiting its duties to check documents on their face, would find itself carrying out 
its own external investigations, which might not always be successful, in order to 
protect its own interests.
198
 Such an approach is subject to the same criticism which 
the general approach above, calling for the balance of convenience requirement, 
suffers from. Hence, while such a requirement does protect applicants, it is 
commended that in a confirmed letter of credit the balance of convenience 
requirement should be neglected as it does not provide banks with the security which 
these institutions require.
199
 
The same questions arise where an injunction is sought against an issuing bank where 
no holders in due course parties are involved. While the balance of convenience is to 
some extent justified in the above context, where it does protect the applicants but not 
issuing banks from fraud, it is arguable to say that stipulating for such a requirement 
where no holders in due course are involved would not provide the envisaged 
protection which the applicants look for either.  
As has been illustrated above, in such a context, a cause of action against neither the 
non-existent confirming bank nor the issuing bank should constitute an obstacle 
before the applicant who seeks to restrain a fraudulent beneficiary. It is true that if the 
issuing bank knows about the fraud it should not pay and if it pays it would be a 
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solvent party who would be able to compensate the defrauded applicant for the 
damages inflicted on him. However, the problem arises when the issuing bank does 
not acquire sufficient knowledge which might make it liable for damages after paying 
the fraudulent beneficiary.
200
  
In what can be described as a vicious circle, if courts insist on not granting an 
injunction because of applying the balance of convenience against the issuing bank, 
the beneficiary will ultimately run away with the money he obtains through fraud 
limiting remedies for the applicant to pursue the former into foreign jurisdictions.
201
 
Common sense suggests that even following such an unscrupulous beneficiary into 
foreign jurisdictions would not be a practical solution because in the same manner that 
this beneficiary vanished from the English jurisdiction it would vanish again similarly 
from other jurisdictions.
202
 An issuing bank which does not know about the fraud 
would not be held liable for such a fraud. Blindly weighting the balance of 
convenience against the issuing bank in such cases would ultimately lead to a refusal 
to grant the required injunction and thus open the doors wide for the fraudulent 
beneficiaries to benefit from their own fraud with all the ease that they need.
203
  
The approach English courts have pursued in Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v. Midland 
Bank Plc
204
 is worth noting in this regard. Creswell J. granted an injunction where the 
“only realistic inference is that the demand was made fraudulently”. It should be 
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noted that neither the cause of action nor the balance of convenience (which his 
Justice did not even consider) constituted a barrier in front of the court to restrain the 
bank from paying the fraudulent beneficiary. Had his Justice applied the balance of 
convenience and weighted it against the bank, an injunction would not have been the 
outcome of the case. Moreover, Lorne Stewart Plc v. Hermes Kreditversicherungs 
AG, Amey Asset Services Ltd
205
 supports this trend where an interlocutory injunction 
is sought against a beneficiary. To this effect, Garland J. found that simply the: 
“balance of convenience is in favour of preserving the status quo rather than 
provoking further litigation between [beneficiaries] and [applicants], or [banks] and 
[beneficiaries]”.206 In the same manner in Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd it has 
been provided: 
“Broadly, they are that the calling of the bond as in this case gives rise to a 
very real risk of damage to the commercial reputation, standing and 
worthiness of [the applicant] which would be very difficult to quantify; 
there would be a very real risk that [the applicant] would not pre-qualify 
for tenders because often tenderers have to disclose whether there have 
been recent calls on the bonds and if so on what grounds”.207 
 
Interestingly, in the Simon case it has been found that the balance of convenience 
favours granting the injunction especially where the applicant is a solvent person who 
could compensate any damages which would later affect the beneficiary or the bank. 
Having illustrated the adequacy of damages test implications, the next subsection is 
meant to examine other factors which English courts take into consideration in this 
context in order to decide where the balance of convenience should tip. 
 
 
                                                 
205
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6.6.4. Banks’ reputation and the availability of freezing injunctions  
 
English courts have repeatedly said that a balance of convenience is required in order 
to obtain an injunction to stop the payment of a letter of credit as it protects the banks’ 
reputation.
208
 In their view banks should be left free to discharge their obligations and 
commitments which they acquire in a letter of credit context. To that effect, Lord 
Ackner stated: 
“The plaintiffs' position must be contrasted with that of the banks… If this 
Court were to grant an injunction which was recognized by the Iraqi 
Courts, then, if the plaintiffs subsequently failed in the action, the damage 
would consist of the loss of interest which [the bank] would have to pay to 
[the beneficiary] and injury to its reputation as a bank. The loss of interest 
on its own could amount to a very large figure -- several million dollars -- 
and the damage to its reputation would be very difficult to quantify”.209 
 
Lord Ackner’s view was that by granting an injunction which would restrain the bank 
from paying the beneficiary the former’s reputation would be affected.210 In his view, 
the bank therein would be seen as a bank which does not fulfil its commitments and 
accordingly would not be trusted by further traders who wish to use its services in 
similar transactions. Moreover, he warned that, in a case where an injunction is 
granted, if the plaintiffs failed to prove fraud in subsequent litigations (a full trial 
court), the damages which the bank might sustain would amount to a very large sum 
of money which the plaintiffs’ ability to compensate is questionable. With respect, 
Lord Ackner’s view in this respect is arguable. Indeed, the bank’s reputation 
argument is a double-edged sword. While it is arguable that a bank’s reputation would 
                                                 
208
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be affected by not paying the beneficiary,
211
 it would be affected in the same manner 
if it pays the beneficiary.
212
 In other words, a bank’s reputation where it does not pay 
would be negatively affected from the beneficiaries’ point of view. Similarly, if the 
bank pays its reputation would be affected negatively from the applicant’s point of 
view. In neither case the bank’s reputation would go unaffected.  
However, it is suggested that the bank’s reputation would not be affected where it 
obeys a court order.
213
 A court order, firstly, protects the bank itself from 
beneficiaries’ fraud where the former is interested in the actual performance of the 
underlying contract which such payment undertakings are serving. Secondly, such an 
order, which is issued by the very institution created to investigate whether fraud is 
existent or not, protects the bank from investigating external facts which might not 
justify the bank’s refusal or acceptance to pay later on when the matter reaches a full 
trial court.
214
 Thirdly, a bank would be seen as an institution which makes bad 
financial decisions and its reputation would be affected more harshly where it 
facilitates fraud rather than being seen as a bank which does not pay the beneficiary 
because it obeys a court order which suggests that the beneficiary is a fraudulent 
person who does not deserve payment.
215
 Finally, banks enter such contracts as the 
applicants’ agents to perform a certain job and once they have performed it they are 
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paid an amount of commission which is commensurate with this job.
216
 Accordingly, 
banks should take into account while pricing their services that a court order might be 
an available remedy which an applicant might activate once fraud has suddenly 
appeared. 
It has been argued that the availability of freezing injunctions (formerly known as 
Mareva injunctions) which a court might grant, should in appropriate situations limit 
the availability of interlocutory injunctions.
217
 Indeed, this was the main argument of 
Evans L.J. for not granting an interlocutory injunction in Themehelp Ltd v. West.
218
 In 
this case, he said that “The present case cries out for Mareva relief”. However, his 
brethren Lordships in this case, Balcombe and Waite L.J.J., were of the view that a 
freezing order would not suffice to protect the applicant’s interests in such a case and, 
accordingly, it should not work to destruct granting an interlocutory injunction.
219
 It is 
submitted that the approach pursued by Balcombe and Waite L.J.J. is a rational one 
for two reasons.
220
 Firstly, if a freezing order has been granted, that would not 
guarantee the applicant that what he paid would be returned in full where the 
beneficiary owes money to other creditors.
221
 Indeed, the amount of money restrained 
by means of freezing injunctions would be distributed equally between different and 
numerous creditors and the letter of credit applicant will not acquire a priority right 
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amongst these creditors to recover his money.
222
 The other reason is that such a 
remedy would be inefficient where the beneficiary has no assets in the jurisdiction in 
which a freezing order is sought within.
223
 Accordingly, such an approach which does 
not fully protect the applicant should not be recognised.
224
 Indeed, if courts are willing 
to interfere why should they not interfere in a way which provides the applicants with 
the full protection which they envisage when knocking at the courts’ doors asking for 
justice? 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
The autonomy principle dictates that banks should not interfere with the underlying 
contract concluded between the parties from which a letter of credit ensues.
 225
 As 
long as the required documents do conform to the terms of the letter of credit the bank 
must pay. However, when a fraud case is alleged and a bank cannot infer the validity 
of these allegations, the best place to hear such allegations is courts.
226
 Where the 
interval between the demand and the actual payment is short, an applicant can ask for 
the courts’ temporary services to restrain the beneficiary from demanding payment or 
the bank from paying. This service comes in the form of interlocutory injunctions and 
who seek it has to satisfy some requirements in order to obtain it. 
While the applicant has the right to seek an injunction against the beneficiary or the 
issuing bank, the more realistic way is to try to restrain involved parties who reside in 
his country. This emanates from the fact that other parties are usually resident in 
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foreign jurisdictions’ whose legal and political orientation cannot be predicted. 
Moreover, due to the speedy operation of such undertakings, an applicant arriving in 
such a foreign jurisdiction would probably find that the confirming bank has already 
paid.  
In granting an injunction against an issuing bank, a court should distinguish between 
two situations: cases where holders in due course are involved and cases where they 
are not. Where a holder in due course is involved he acquires special rights and as 
long as he does not know about the fraud he should not be held liable for it. However, 
this is not the case where no holders in due course are involved. In both cases it is true 
that where banks have already paid despite the existent fraud which is unknown to 
them, the applicant will ultimately bear the losses because he is the person who chose 
to deal with the fraudulent beneficiary. Nonetheless, the situation should be different 
if the applicant can show that a holder in due course is embroiled in the fraud where 
the issuing bank has not yet paid. Indeed, the requirements to enjoin the issuing bank 
in the two situations are different and courts should take this into account when 
hearing an injunction case. 
A dual approach which suits both situations can be found in the English judgements in 
this regard. English courts have developed satisfactory approaches to the first 
requirement established by the American Cyanamid case which they have in an 
appropriate manner turned to meet the special nature of the fraud exception. Both, as 
discussed above, the “established case of fraud” and “the only realistic inference is 
fraud” proof standards are required depending on the context in which in an injunction 
is required. However, lower proof standards such as that of “arguable case of fraud” 
presented by the Themehelp court should be rejected as it neither suits the nature of 
these instruments nor satisfies the expectations of the different parties utilising it. 
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While attacked by judiciary and legal commentators, a cause of action in a confirmed 
letter of credit is required to deprive the latter bank from being reimbursed. This 
should not be the case where no holders in due course are involved. In the latter case 
fraud prevention should suppress other superfluous requirements attaching to it, which 
will be unnecessary. This justifies the contradictory views which English courts have 
developed as to this requirement in order to grant an injunction. 
The last requirement as to the balance of convenience should be neglected or at least 
courts should recognise that in weighing it the applicant’s litigant should be the 
fraudulent party who always will not be a solvent party and whose willingness to 
reimburse the applicant or the issuing bank for losses they may sustain is in doubt. 
Weighing the balance of convenience against banks leads to refusal to grant the 
injunction and accordingly a failure to protect either issuing banks or applicants. The 
approach pursued in Kvaerner John Brown and Lorne Stewart cases where both 
courts have neglected assessing such a requirement is recommended. This approach 
protects issuing banks from playing the role of courts in investigating fraud 
allegations and their strength in order to protect itself in future litigations. Indeed, if 
applying the American Cyanamid general guidelines would not properly fit the special 
nature of these letters of credit, developing these guidelines to suit these instruments’ 
particular nature should not constitute a barrier in front of courts to achieve envisaged 
justice. 
While the three requirements have been applied by the English courts differently from 
one case to another, mistaken views, such as that made by Rix J. in the Czarnikow-
Rionda case with respect to the cause of action requirement, may be seen over and 
over in this particular area of law. It would not be surprising that this will be the case 
if English courts continue this approach which does not clearly make a distinction 
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between requirements needed in the different contexts. Unless the English judiciary 
illustrates the differences in the requirements needed in each case, a letter of credit 
applicant will remain uncertain as to the requirements he should provide a court with 
in order to obtain an injunction and so be protected from fraudsters.  
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Chapter Seven: Letters of Credit Fraud: A Jordanian Perspective 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the way in which the Jordanian law has tackled the problem of 
fraud in the letters of credit context. While the discussion in this chapter will begin 
with looking at the position in a number of Arabian Middle Eastern countries, later 
discussion will focus on Jordan in particular. Such limitation of focus in this chapter is 
attributed to the fact that the Jordanian judiciary, in contrast to other Arabian Middle 
Eastern countries, has heard some fraud cases in the last few years. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Following the introduction, the second 
section of this chapter provides a general background about the way in which the 
Arabian Middle Eastern jurisdictions have dealt with letters of credit. As is well 
known, the Islamic law serves as one of the law sources in most of the Arabian 
Middle Eastern countries and, therefore, this section will also provide an overview of 
the Islamic law position in this regard. The third section is concerned with the 
Jordanian jurisdiction in particular. In this section, an overview of the manner this 
jurisdiction has dealt with letters of credit is provided. Taking into consideration the 
legislative vacuum and the shortage of supplementary law sources, a primary research 
by means of interviews with some Jordanian judges was conducted.
1
 This section 
critically analyses the existing secondary data available and the new primary data 
collected through the interviews. Accordingly, the first subsection provides general 
analysis of the legislation available in this respect in both the Jordanian Commercial 
and Civil Acts. The next subsection is concerned with other available data whether 
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primary or secondary. The provided analyses in this section take the form and the 
order which has been pursued in the previous chapters and therefore fraud in the 
documents, the scope of fraud, the standard of the fraud required in order to apply the 
fraud exception and the injunctions in such a context comprise the main subsections 
focused on in this part. The conclusion is to be found in the fourth section.
2
 
 
7.1. Letters of credit in the Arabian Middle Eastern region: a 
general background  
 
7.1.1. Introduction  
 
The use of letters of credit does not stop at some specific geographic boundaries and 
is not restricted to some countries. By virtue of its unique location, the Middle East 
has played a vital role in international trade in various fields. Like developed 
countries, Middle Eastern countries perform a leading role in the use of letters of 
credit.
3
 This has been observed by Kerr J., in the English case of RD Harbottle 
(Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd, where he found that: 
“Performance guarantees in such unqualified terms seem astonishing, but I am told 
that they are by no means unusual, particularly in transactions with customers in the 
Middle East”.4 
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Arabian Middle Eastern countries relied on foreign contracts financed by means of 
letters of credit for the advancement of various fields.
5
 Indeed, the petroleum industry, 
which the region is well known for, leads to the issuance of hundreds of letters of 
credit daily in order to facilitate the different contracts ensuing from this industry.
6
 
Letters of credit in their different forms and types became an imperative instrument 
without these countries would find it difficult to run their affairs.
7
 
 
7.1.2. The legal position of letters of credit in the Arabian Middle Eastern 
region  
 
Arabian Middle Eastern countries, which are civil law countries, can be divided into 
two categories in relation to the way they have dealt with letters of credit.
8
 The first 
category countries have neglected letters of credit and did not regulate them neither by 
special legislation nor by inserting some articles into their commercial acts.
9
 This 
category includes: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian 
territories. On the other hand, the second category countries have regulated letters of 
credit by inserting some articles addressing the operation of these instruments 
specifically into their commercial acts.
10
 This category includes: Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Yemen and Bahrain. 
What is interesting in this regard is that, while there are some differences in the 
wording between some articles of these different commercial laws, in general the 
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same principles have been adopted by these different countries.
11
 For example, the 
commercial laws of all of these countries have defined independent guarantees and 
documentary credits in the same way and all of these laws have stressed the 
importance of the autonomy principle in these contexts.
12
 On the one hand, for 
example, the Kuwaiti Commercial Law, Number 68 of the year 1980, under Article 
382 has defined an independent guarantee as:  
“A promise which a bank issues pursuant to its customer’s instructions 
which dictates paying an amount of money to the beneficiary without 
condition or restrictions if the latter asked for it during a certain time 
which the independent guarantee does provide…”  
 
Article 385 of the same Kuwaiti Law stresses the importance of the autonomy 
principle by providing: “A bank does not have the right to refuse paying the 
beneficiary for some reason which is due to the bank – applicant or the beneficiary – 
applicant relationships”. On the other hand, for example, a documentary credit has 
been defined under Egyptian Commercial law, Number 17 of the year 1999, in Article 
341/1 as: “A contract which through a bank promises to open a credit pursuant to one 
of its customers’ instructions in favour of another person who is called the 
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beneficiary”. Moreover, the second section of the same Article has stressed the 
importance of the autonomy principle in a documentary credit context.  
However, what we are mainly concerned about here is the absence of provisions 
which tackle the problem of fraud in these laws. It has been argued that the absence of 
provisions regulating fraud in these contexts could be attributed to the fact that such a 
fraud has not been presented before these countries’ courts prior to the enunciation of 
these laws.
13
 Case law outcomes in these countries do not differ from what has been 
drawn from their different commercial laws. Different cases have stressed the general 
principles of the documentary credits and independent guarantees operations. For 
example, in the Egyptian Court of First Instance decisions num. 1189/49 on 13-02-
1984 and 2084/58 on 29-05-1989 the courts illustrated the importance of the 
autonomy principle in the independent guarantees context by stating that:
14
 
 “The bank should not refuse to pay the beneficiary the amount of the 
independent guarantee because of a reason which is related to the 
relationship between the bank and the applicant or the relationship 
between the beneficiary and the applicant”.15 
 
Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, decision num. 422/1420, issued by the Saudi Dispute 
Settlement Committee on 25-01-2000, noted the importance of the autonomy 
principle which facilitates the smooth functioning of international trade.
16
 Similarly, 
The Emirati Court of First Instance of Abu Dhabi in its decision num. 894/79, issued 
on 16-03-1981, noted the importance of the autonomy principle.
17
 Yet, while most of 
these countries’ courts have had the chance to comment on many different aspects of 
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documentary credits and independent guarantees law, such courts have not addressed 
the problem of fraud within such a context.
18
 
The jurisprudence in these countries has played a notable role in shaping the law of 
documentary credits and independent guarantees.
19
 For instance, AL-Kilani suggests 
that legal scholars have played the main role in shaping the law of independent 
guarantees in Egypt and other Arabian Middle Eastern countries.
20
 In addition, the 
Egyptian Institution of Banking Studies has played a great role in shedding light on 
the legal characteristics of both documentary credits and independent guarantees.
21
 
However, it is surprising to know, after efforts which have been spent in researching 
the different books and articles written by scholars in these different countries, that 
most of the jurisprudence in this regard does not offer a discussion of the fraud 
problem. The remaining small part of this jurisprudence, which offered some 
discussion on the fraud problem, did so by copying other foreign countries’ legal 
position (notably England) in this regard.
22
  
Notably, countries of both categories have paid huge attention to the international 
initiatives in this regard.
23
 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) sets of 
rules, such as the UCP and the URDG,
24
 have been referred to frequently by these 
countries’ courts whenever a case comprising a letter of credit is pleaded before 
                                                 
18
 Except the Courts of Jordan which will constitute the main focus of the following discussion. See: 
Awad, A. “Khitabat Al-Daman Al-Masrefieh” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabieh, Cairo, 2007) at p. 355 
19
 For example Nassar does provide a good summary of independent guarantees’ different principles. at 
pp.170-172  
20
 Al-Kilani, M. “Amaliat Al-Bonok” (Dar Al-Thakafa, Amman, 2009) at p. 331 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 See, for example: Al-Kilani, M. “Amaliat Al-Bonok” (Dar Al-Thakafa, Amman, 2009); Awad, A. 
“Khitabat Al-Daman Al-Masrefieh” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabieh, Cairo, 2007); Nassar, N. & Nassar, S. 
“Al-Damanat Al-bankieh fi Al-Tijarah Al-Dwalieh fi Ktabien” (Al-Ihram, Cairo, 1997) 
23
 Most of the banks in this region apply the UCP rules to the documentary letters of credit which they 
issue. Cases heard before the different countries’ courts assure this fact. For example, the UCP rules 
have been applied to the letters of credit disputed in the Jordanian cases which have been analysed in 
this chapter. 
24
 Such sets of rules have been discussed thoroughly in chapter two. 
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them.
25
 In fact, some of the second category countries which have regulated letters of 
credit with special provisions in their laws did not promulgate enough provisions to 
cover all aspects of the operations of the letters of credit. These aspects include, for 
example, the strict compliance principle and the fraud exception. However, to address 
the legislative vacuum, these countries have referred to the ICC rules (UCP and 
URDG) in their legislations and stated that these rules are given the force of national 
laws and should be applied to offset the shortfall of legislation in relation to 
unaddressed matters. To this effect, for example, Article 341/3 of the Egyptian 
Commercial Law, Number 17 of the year 1999, has provided: “In the absence of a 
specific provision in this regard, the UCP rules which have been issued by the 
International Chamber of Commerce are to be implemented”.26 
Yet, a criticism that could be made of the application of these ICC different rules is 
that none of them have inserted special rules to tackle the fraud problem which occurs 
in this context.
27
 Besides, it should be noted that in some of these countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia, a judge would not usually apply a law or a set of rules which the parties 
agree to govern their contract. A judge in such a country would apply general rules of 
law with their main source being the Islamic Law (Sharia). Taking this into 
consideration, the next part of this section is dedicated to exploring the Islamic Law 
position in this regard. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 See, for example: The Jordanian Court of Cassation, Case num. 152/75, Journal of Jordanian Bar 
Association (1976) at p. 173 
26
 For example, the same has been provided by the Syrian Commercial Law no. 33/2007 under Article 
241and the Qatari Commercial Law no. 27 of the year 2006 under Article 399 in regard to documentary 
credits and Article 423 in regard to independent guarantees.  
27
 See chapter 2. 
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7.1.3. The Islamic Law (Sharia) position 
 
The most acceptable sources of the Islamic law are: the Holy Quran, Sunna and Ijma’. 
On the one hand, the Holy Quran is the first source and the most important source of 
Islamic Law. In Islam it is believed that the Holy Quran is the direct words of God 
which have been revealed to his Prophet Muhammad (peace upon him) through the 
Angel Gabriel. The Holy Quran comprises the social, political, moral, philosophical 
and economic basis which Muslim society is built on. On the other hand, the Sunna is 
the other main primary source of the Islamic Law. Sunna comprises the religious 
speech and actions of Prophet Muhammad (peace upon him) which have been 
narrated through his Companions and Islamic Imams. Moreover, Ijma’ is the 
agreement of the Muslim community on religious issues. 
28
  
For example, when a Saudi judge hears a dispute concerning an independent 
guarantee, in the course of applying or interpreting a certain rule or principle, his 
point of view would be affected by the basic principles which the Islamic Law 
provides.
29
 In Saudi Arabia the main source of law is Islamic Law. While the Islamic 
Law does not stand as the main source of law in most of the Arabian Middle Eastern 
countries, this piece of law is recognised as one of the effective sources of law in 
these countries.
30
 The Islamic Law in these countries stands as a source for civil and 
criminal law hence it has an important part to play in personal status law and 
commercial law.
31
 While the Islamic law is full of principles and rules which arrange 
the different rights and responsibilities of the different parties, this subsection is 
                                                 
28
 Zweigert, K. & Kotz, H. “Introduction to Comparative Law” (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed., Oxford, 
1998) at p. 304 
29
 Nassar, N. & Nassar, S. “Al-Damanat Al-bankieh fi Al-Tijarah Al-Dwalieh fi Ktabien” (Al-Ihram, 
Cairo, 1997) at p. 177 
30
 Zweigert, K. & Kotz, H. “Introduction to Comparative Law” (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed., Oxford, 
1998) at p. 304 
31
 Nassar, N. & Nassar, S. “Al-Damanat Al-bankieh fi Al-Tijarah Al-Dwalieh fi Ktabien” (Al-Ihram, 
Cairo, 1997) at p. 177 
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concerned with the following question: what is the Islamic law’s position in relation 
to letters of credit and their fraud problem? 
Documentary credits and independent guarantees have been defined by Islamic 
scholars in a similar manner to that of other scholars and different laws.
32
 Yet, Islamic 
jurisprudence has construed the legal relationship between the bank and the applicant 
which arises from documentary credits and independent guarantees as an agency 
relationship.
33
 As a result, under Islamic Law, dealing with such instruments is 
permitted as long as the bank is getting a commission in return for its work and the 
applicant does not pay the bank unless the latter is duly discharged from its 
obligations according to the contract.
34
  
In the Holy Quran, God has prohibited fraud by referring to it in various places. One 
of these places is Surat AL-Mutaffifin (the chapter of defrauders). In this Surat, verses 
one to six, God has said:  
“Woe to those who give short weight, who, when they take by measure 
from others, take it fully, and when they measure or weigh for them, they 
give them less than what is due. Do they not think that they will be raised 
up again on a Great Day? The Day when all mankind shall stand before 
the Lord of the worlds”.  
 
In Medina (one of the Saudi Arabian cities), in the time of Prophet Muhammad, fraud 
by means of giving short weight and measure was prevalent among the people. Hence, 
God has sent down this Surat and as a result people started to give full weight and 
measure. Another example, which highlights the prohibition of fraud in Islam, could 
                                                 
32
 Al-Saraj, M. “AL-Nizam Al-Masrefi Al-Islami” (Dar AL-Thakafa, Cairo, 1989) at p. 112; Al-Jondi, 
M. “Fekeh Al-Ta’amol AL-Mali wa Al-Masrefi Al-Hadith” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabieh, Cairo, 1989) at 
p. 160 
33
 Al-Saraj, M. “AL-Nizam Al-Masrefi Al-Islami” (Dar AL-Thakafa, Cairo, 1989) at p. 118; Abd Al-
Azeem, H. “Khitab Al-Daman Fi Al-Bonok Al-Islamieh” (Al-Ma’had Al-Alami Le Al-Fekr Al-Islami, 
Cairo, 1996) at p. 57 
34
 Ibid.  
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be found in Surat Al-Shu’ara’ (the chapter of poets), in verses 181 to 183, where God 
has ordered people to:  
“Measure in full, and do not be of those who reduce. And weigh with a 
proper balance. And do not give the people their goods diminished, and do 
not roam the earth causing turmoil.”  
 
Fraud is also condemned under the Sunna. This can be seen in the following Hadith 
(speech of Prophet Muhammad) where Prophet Muhammad (peace upon him) has 
stressed the prohibition of fraud. In his words, while reproaching a dishonest seller, he 
(peace upon him) said: “Whosoever deceives us is not one of us”.35  
These verses and Hadith obviously do demand that people discharge appropriately 
their commercial commitments and do not defraud other people. The above 
mentioned verses in their tenor implied a fortiori prohibition of different fraud acts. 
The Hadith takes a similar approach. As can be seen, Islam is keen to prevent such 
acts which include different deceitful and illegal dealings. While there are no verses 
or hadith which have directly addressed the fraud problem in a letter of credit context, 
it could be safely said that, in view of the verses and Hadith mentioned above, fraud is 
generally prohibited under Islamic law and that this includes fraud perpetrated in 
documentary credits and independent guarantees. 
7.2. The Jordanian position 
 
7.2.1. Introduction 
 
The situation in Jordan is different from the other above mentioned countries in this 
respect. Whilst no Jordanian legislation is dedicated to cover this area, the Jordanian 
                                                 
35
 Abo Horaira narrated this in Sahih Al-Bokhari and Muslim. These two books, Sahih Al-Bokhari and 
Sahih Muslim, are the main books where many different Hadith have been written and saved. 
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judiciary,
36
 unlike its neighbours, has recently heard some letters of credit fraud 
disputes. It must be noted that the relatively few cases, regarding fraud in the letters of 
credit context, heard by the Jordanian courts did not tackle all the different aspects of 
fraud exception which have been illustrated thoroughly in the previous chapters. For 
this reason, the author found that an empirical element of research by means of 
interviews had to be conducted with Jordanian judges in order to make tackling 
different aspects of the Jordanian fraud exception a possibility.
37
  
In the following subsection the relevant legislation provided by the Jordanian 
Commercial and Civil Acts is highlighted. Taking into consideration the failure of 
these Acts to address the fraud problem in the letters of credit context, other relevant 
supplementary sources of law, such as case law, are examined in the succeeding 
subsections. The outcomes of the conducted interviews will be analysed thoroughly in 
these subsections. 
7.2.2. The Jordanian Commercial and Civil Acts 
 
Before the issuance of the Jordanian Civil Act, Number 43 of the year 1976, civil 
rights and responsibilities in Jordan were governed by the Ottoman Majalet Al-
Ahkam AL-Adlieh which was issued in 1876.
38
 This can be attributed to the fact that 
Jordan had been part of the Ottoman Empire before the latter’s collapse and the 
emergence of Jordan as an independent country. After the Ottoman’s collapse, while 
different Arabian countries have chosen to adopt different foreign civil laws, the 
Jordanian legal community has refused to follow these countries and it rather chose to 
                                                 
36
 Jordanian courts are divided into two main divisions; civil and criminal. They are also generally 
divided into three stages of litigation namely: Courts of first instance, Courts of Appeal and the Courts 
of Cassation. Indeed, there are specialised courts which deal with specific matters such as the labour 
and the customs courts. State security matters are also heard by a special court.  
37
 More about the interviews’ different aspects and mechanism can be found in Appendix 1.  
38
 AL-Fakahani, H. “Al-Waseet fe Shareh AL-Kanoon AL-Madani Al-Ordoni Rakam 43 Sanat 1976” 
(AL-Dar AL-Arabieh lel Mawsoa’at, Cairo, 1978) 
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establish a new contemporary civil law which accords with Islamic principles.
39
 
Although Jordan as a country acquired its independence in 1946, the issuance of such 
a civil law was delayed until 1976. Such a delay can be attributed to the political and 
economic instability which the region has been surrounded by in that time.
40
 The 
Jordanian Civil Act saw the light on 01-08-1976 after it had been approved by the 
Jordanian Parliament. 
Similarly, the Ottoman Commercial Law remained in effect until the time when the 
Jordanian legislator issued the current Commercial Act Number 12 in 1966. In this 
respect, the Jordanian legislator has followed the Syrian and Lebanese steps which 
they embodied in the previous Syrian Commercial Law of the year 1949 and the 
current Lebanese Commercial Law of the year 1942.
41
 Moreover, the Jordanian 
legislator issued other different legislations which can be considered as 
complementary to the Jordanian Commercial Act. These complementary legislative 
pieces covered the areas of industrial and commercial property, commercial agencies, 
transportation and e-commerce in general. The reason behind such complementary 
laws is to face the evolution of international trade in the various different fields.
42
 
Jordanian legislators did not address the letters of credit operations in the Commercial 
Act Number 12 of the year 1966. This could be attributed to the absence of such 
instruments in Jordan at the time of preparing this Act which was issued in 1966.
43
 
However, interestingly, a general reference to financial credits (as they have been 
described) has been provided as follows: 
                                                 
39
 Such as Egypt which has adopted the French approach in this regard.  
40
 Melhem, M. ‘Al-Tatawor AL-Tareki lel Kanoon AL-Madani AL-Ordoni’, an Article published on 
01-12-2011 at Alrai Newspaper. Available at http://alrai.com/article/6286.html Last accessed on 25-03-
2013 
41
 Al-Tarawneh B. & Melhem, B. “Mabade’ AL-Kanoon Al-Tijari” (Dar AL-Masirah, Amman, 2012) 
at p. 3 
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 Ibid. at p. 4 
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 Al-Kilani, M. “Amaliat Al-Bonok” (Dar Al-Thakafa, Amman, 2009) at p. 332 
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“If a financial credit has been issued to guarantee a second party's rights 
and the bank in its role authorized such a credit, withdrawal or amendment 
to this credit is no longer legal without authorization from the second 
party in question. In such a credit, the bank is obligated to execute the 
credit once the documents are submitted".
44
 
 
Even though no mention of letters of credit has been provided by the Jordanian 
legislator, one can notice that the autonomy principle is in some way referred to by 
the above mentioned Article. While the term financial credits is surrounded by 
ambiguity as it is not clear what such a concept stands for and what financial 
instruments it covers, it is still noteworthy that the legislature has introduced the 
notion of the autonomy principle even if it was intended to be applied in a different 
context. Article 2 of this Commercial Act has provided some solutions where such an 
Act does not regulate the commercial matter in question. This Article reads as 
follows: 
“(1) If no explicit text is available in this act, then the Civil Act rules 
should be applied to commercial issues; (2) However, Civil Act rules 
should only be applied in accordance with the special principles of the 
commercial law”. 
 
As can be seen, by virtue of the above quoted Article, the Civil Act rules can be used 
in order to replace the legislative vacuum in the Commercial Act. However, it should 
be noted that such a use should not contradict the special principles that govern 
Commercial Law. Article 122 of the Commercial Act leads to the same conclusion 
where it provides: “The financial transactions which are not regulated or mentioned 
by this Act are subject to the Civil Act rules which address many different sorts of 
contracts”. Yet, no rules related to letters of credit can be found in the Civil Act rules. 
However, some rules which do address different fraud practices in general can be 
found. Article 145 of the Jordanian Civil Act states: “If a contracting party deceives 
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 Article 121/1 (Act no. 12/1966) 
276 
 
the other party the latter can terminate the contract if it has been proved that such a 
deceit is material”. Furthermore, Article 148 provides: 
“If deceit emanates from a third party other than the contracting parties 
and the deceived party can prove that such a deceit has been perpetrated 
under the knowledge of the other contracting party, the deceived party can 
rescind the contract”. 
 
Interestingly, the tenor of Articles 145 and 148 resembles that of the fraud test (the 
common law fraud) which was implemented by Lord Diplock in the United 
Merchants case
45
 and which thereafter has been adhered to by succeeding English 
courts. Like the dictum delivered by Lord Diplock, knowledge and materiality have 
constituted the pillars and by their existence an act can be considered as deceitful and 
fraudulent.  
Taking into consideration section 2 of Article 2 of the Commercial Act which 
deprives the application of the Civil Act rules if applying them would contradict the 
principles of the commercial law, a question arises as to whether the Jordanian courts 
have adhered to the Civil Act’s above-mentioned rules when a letter of credit fraud 
dispute has been brought before them? In other words, have Jordanian courts applied 
this fraud test which resembles that of the common law in the letters of credit context? 
Moreover, have the Jordanian courts pursued an approach which is similar to that of 
their English counterpart in this regard?  
  
7.2.3. Letters of credit fraud in the Jordanian law 
 
Although, the Jordanian Commercial Act has not encompassed documentary credits 
and independent guarantees in its numerous folds, Jordanian case law has addressed 
several aspects of these financial instruments. For example, the Jordanian Court of 
                                                 
45
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [1983] 1 
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Cassation has defined documentary credits in its decision number 152/75 of the year 
1976.
46
 To this the Court of Cassation provided that:  
“A documentary credit is a promise ensuing from a bank upon the request 
of the applicant (buyer) and by which the bank is obliged to pay the 
goods’ price to the beneficiary (seller) under some conditions”. 
 
Like other Arabian Middle Eastern countries, the autonomy principle, which dictates 
that the letter of credit is independent from the contract in association with which it 
has been issued, has been expressly stressed in the many different cases heard by the 
Jordanian courts. For instance, the Court of Cassation decision number 1554/1999, of 
the year 1999, provided that: “The obligation of the bank under the letter of credit is 
independent from the sale of goods contract on which it was based.”47 
Yet, what is distinct about the Jordanian judiciary in this regard is that it has dealt 
with the fraud problem. This section is not meant to discuss the different relationships 
and principles which ensue from a letter of credit, but it is meant to highlight the way 
the Jordanian courts have dealt with the fraud problem. Hence, letters of credit 
documentary fraud, the scope of the fraud, the standard of the fraud and the 
injunctions’ relief are analysed in this section. 
 
7.2.3.1.  Letters of credit documentary fraud 
 
So far as the author is aware, this particular issue, fraud in the documents, has not 
been tested before the Jordanian courts. This could be attributed to the fact that no 
case disputing such a matter has come before the Jordanian courts. Where neither 
legislation nor case law offer a solution before the Arabian Middle Eastern courts, 
these courts have frequently referred to the jurisprudence in order to decide a dispute 
                                                 
46
 The Jordanian Court of Cassation, Case num. 152/75, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association (1976) 
at p. 173 
47
 See, also, Court of Cassation decisions number: 2077/1998, 511/1995 and 1776/1998. Available at 
Adaleh Centre for Legal Information Publications (the 11
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which has been pleaded before them. Hence, it would be useful to find out what the 
Arabian Middle Eastern jurisprudence holds for such a matter. It is interesting to 
know that only one Arabian Middle Eastern letters of credit book has been relied on 
extensively by the Jordanian courts in deciding issues which arise in this regard.
48
 In 
this book Awad states that: 
“The submission of false documents is considered as fraud. Such kind of 
fraud should prevent accepting the documents and executing the letter of 
credit. And if the beneficiary has a solid right in triggering the letter of 
credit payment by the submission of the required documents, such a fact is 
conditioned to situations where the beneficiary submits genuine and 
truthful documents in the appropriate time specified in the letter of 
credit”.49 
 
It is noteworthy to see that Awad has found that to make a conforming presentation 
the beneficiary has to submit genuine and truthful documents and nothing less. 
Notably, Awad has criticised the English House of Lords decision in the United City 
Merchants case.
50
 The learned author has found that the formulation which the House 
of Lords has pursued is problematic.
51
 Awad found that this formulation, which would 
not allow banks to refuse false documents unless the bank can ascertain that the 
beneficiary himself has intentionally participated in falsifying the documents or at 
least that such falsification has been done under his knowledge, works to the 
detriment of banks and the autonomy principle.
52
 Moreover, while he has 
acknowledged that the UCP exempts and protects banks from any responsibility 
regarding the documents’ genuineness or falsification in situations where such falsity 
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 Awad, A. “Al-Itimadat Al-Mostanadieh: Derasah le Al-kada’a wa Alfekeh Almokaran wa Kawa’ed 
Sanat 1983 Al-Dwalieh” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabieh, Cairo, 1989) 
49
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is difficult to discover, he assured that this should not be the case where such falsity is 
apparent to the banks.
53
 In contrast to the English conventional view in this regard, in 
Awad’s view the fact that the document is false in any respect, whether fraudulent or 
not, would give the bank the right to refuse the beneficiary’s submitted documents. 
Remarkably, Awad’s view accords with the current author’s findings which call for a 
genuinity pre-requisite in this respect as illustrated in chapter three. 
The outcomes of the interviews, which have been conducted with the Jordanian 
judges, correspond with Awad’s and the current author’s view in this regard. All of 
the interviewed judges were of the view that the beneficiary’s intent, whether 
fraudulent or not, should not constitute a barrier in order to refuse non-genuine and 
false documents. Al-Shraideh, Al-Kharabsheh, Al-Smadi, Al-Akhras and other 
judges, who preferred to stay anonymous, were of the view that the non-genuinity of 
any of the documents would be a sufficient ground for the banks to refuse accepting 
the documents presented by the beneficiary. They all noted that the banks’ position 
and the importance of the documents necessitate the application of a non-genuinity 
defence in this regard. For example, Judge Al-Smadi provided that:  
“Irrespective of who was the reason behind the non-genuinity of the 
presented documents, the bank has to refuse accepting such documents 
when it knew that they are non-genuine. It is not the task of banks to 
investigate neither who is responsible for such non-genuinity nor why it 
has been committed”.54 
 
Markedly, Judge Al-Smadi has given some examples which make him believe that a 
bank could easily know whether a document is a genuine one or not. He gave the 
example of a ship which does not sail from Jordan. In this manner, he found that a bill 
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280 
 
of lading which evidences the shipment of some particular goods from Jordan by the 
latter ship would apparently constitute a non-genuine document.
55
  
In view of these reasons mentioned-above, the author believes that if a case which 
resembles the English United City Merchants case was heard by the Jordanian courts 
the result would be contrary to Lord Diplock’s views and in accordance with what has 
been reached in England by the Court of Appeal. Whether one of the documents 
presented is nullity or not and whether there is fraud perpetrated therein or not, it is 
submitted that a non-genuinity defence would be applied rather than a fraud exception 
in this respect.  
 
7.2.3.2. The fraud scope: documents, underlying transaction or both? 
 
Through examining the Jordanian jurisdiction it has been found that the international 
prolonged debate regarding the place of fraud, which would justify the execution of 
the fraud exception, has not found a place in Jordanian case law. In its decision 
number 835/2004,
56
 the Jordanian Court of Cassation found that fraud in the 
underlying transaction should interrupt the autonomy principle and, accordingly, 
banks should refuse to pay beneficiaries when evidence to such a fraud is available in 
their possession before the payment has occurred.
57
 
In this case a Jordanian buyer entered into a contract with a Canadian seller to supply 
the former with equipment and furniture for his hospital. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
Jordanian buyer’s instructions, a Jordanian bank (The Housing Bank) opened a 
documentary letter of credit which was confirmed through a bank in Canada in favour 
of the Canadian seller. The contract between the parties included the shipment of nine 
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new equipment and furniture containers. However, when the shipment arrived, the 
customs declaration showed that it was only five containers which had been shipped 
and that they contained used and damaged furniture and medical equipment. As a 
result, the Jordanian buyer approached the Jordanian courts and sought to restrain the 
Jordanian bank from paying the documentary letter of credit amount. The Court of 
First Instance
58
 granted the injunction sought by the Jordanian buyer to stop the 
bank’s payment and likewise the Court of Appeal59 did. When the matter reached the 
Court of Cassation it did not hesitate to confirm what had been concluded by the 
lower courts. 
The Court of Cassation’s decision number 1215/200560 illustrates the Jordanian 
situation in this regard with further clarity. In this case, a Jordanian buyer entered into 
a contract with an English seller in order to supply the former with some certain oil 
materials. Consequently, a documentary letter of credit was issued by a Jordanian 
bank (The Export and Finance Bank) and confirmed through an English bank. The 
documentary letter of credit required the seller to submit a bill of lading and some 
other documents in order to acquire the letter of credit amount. What is distinctive 
about such a requirement is that neither the bill of lading nor any of the other 
documents required by the buyer demonstrated the nature of the goods. The buyer 
simply requested a bill of lading and other usually demanded documents, which 
buyers ask for in a letter of credit context, without identifying any special conditions 
or specifications. When the goods arrived in Jordan, it was discovered by the Royal 
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 Decision Number 1586/2003. Not published. 
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 Issued on 2005, Adaleh Centre for Legal Information Publications (the 11
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Scientific Society
61
 that what had arrived was not the required goods according to the 
sale contract, but rather unusable used oil mixed with water and other pollutants. 
Therefore, the Jordanian buyer sought the courts’ relief by means of an injunction. 
Indeed, the injunction was granted and when the matter was disputed before the Court 
of First Instance
62
, the Court of Appeal
63
 and the Court of Cassation, they all 
concluded in the Jordanian buyer’s favour. According to the Court of Cassation: 
“While the documents required by the letter of credit are intact in both 
facial and technical aspects, they are forged because they included unreal 
information about the contracted for oil material. If the documentary letter 
of credit and the underlying sale contract are two autonomous contracts 
this would not be the case anymore where there is fraud. Fraud invalidates 
the sale contract and this would extend to the bank’s relationship with the 
seller”.64 
 
Interestingly, the Jordanian Court of Cassation did not find any problem in examining 
the underlying sale contract in order to decide whether fraud had been perpetrated in 
such a contract or not. Although the documents had been duly submitted by the 
English seller pursuant to the Jordanian buyer’s instructions, this did not preclude the 
Jordanian courts from intervening and examining the underlying contract in order to 
investigate the presence of fraudulent actions.  
Have the Jordanian courts limited the application of the fraud exception to what has 
been described as fraud in the documents or does mere fraud in the transaction suffice 
in order to trigger the fraud exception? While some of the interviewees, Al-
Kharabsheh, Al-Akhras and Judge A, were of the opinion that fraud wherever 
perpetrated in a letter of credit context should disrupt the payment process, other 
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interviewed judges, Al-Shraideh, Al-Smadi, Judge B, Judge C and Judge D, were 
adamant that the boundaries of fraud should be limited to merely fraud that is 
perpetrated in the documents. Thus, it seems that the scope of the fraud exception is 
still a vexing matter that has not been settled amongst the Jordanian judges. 
Judge A assured that he has granted an injunction in a letter of credit case where fraud 
has been perpetrated in the underlying transaction.
65
 The scenario of this case, as it 
was articulated by this judge, is interesting and worth highlighting. In this case a 
Jordanian buyer had contracted with a Chinese seller for the supplying of some 
mobile phones. The contract stipulated that the Chinese company should not enter into 
the same contract for the supply of mobile phones with any other Jordanian buyers. 
Accordingly, a documentary letter of credit was opened to finance the sale contract. 
However, the Jordanian buyer found that another Jordanian company was selling the 
same mobile phones under the auspices of the same Chinese sellers. The Jordanian 
buyer sought an injunction in order to prevent his bank from paying the fraudulent 
Chinese sellers. While both the documents and the goods were intact, the Jordanian 
judge found that the Chinese seller was fraudulent when he sold the same kind of 
mobile phones to another Jordanian buyer contrary to the contract terms provided 
between them and the first Jordanian buyer. Neither examining the underlying 
contract nor calling the second Jordanian buyers to hear their testimony constituted a 
barrier before the court in order to apply the fraud exception. In deciding whether to 
stop the letter of credit payment or not the judge found that the Chinese seller was 
guilty of fraud and accordingly he granted the sought injunction. 
                                                 
65
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However, other Jordanian judges have demonstrated an unwillingness to expand the 
fraud scope as they claimed that such an expansion would disrupt the autonomy 
principle.
66
 The reasons by which they justified their unwillingness to expand the 
fraud scope are the same as those much often-cited and mentioned by English judges 
and legal writers who oppose such an expansion.
67
 Maintaining the letters of credit 
utility and marketability and the importance of the autonomy principle were the 
reasons that for example, Al-Shraideh and al-Smadi gave to justify their adherence to 
limiting the fraud scope. To this effect Al-Shraideh provided: 
“It should not be looked to the underlying contracts in order to stop a 
fraud process in a letter of credit context. The court discretion should be 
limited to that fraud which accompanies documents and nothing more. 
The reason behind this limitation is the fact that any intervention with 
underlying contracts in this regard would undermine the letters of credit 
boundaries”.68 
 
The approach taken by the Jordanian courts corresponds with the international 
conventional view in this regard.
69
 From the author’s personal point of view, such an 
approach is successful and should be welcomed because what is supposed to be 
fought against is fraud irrespective of the place in which it is perpetrated. Limiting the 
application of the fraud exception to documents means that some buyers will continue 
to suffer from the sellers’ fraud merely because it has been carried out in the 
transaction rather than in documents.
70
 Conversely, some of the judges seem to have 
neglected the fact that adhering to such limitation would affect the letters of credit and 
the autonomy principle which governs it in a negative way. They neglect the fact that 
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by becoming financial instruments susceptible to fraud, letters of credit would be 
abandoned by traders.
71
 
 
7.2.3.3. The fraud standard 
 
In its decision num. 835/2004, the Jordanian Court of Cassation has stated that: 
“…the documentary letter of credit…has stipulated that the imported 
goods have to be new and conforming to the credit. Hence, shipping 
goods incompatible with such a stipulation prevents the bank from paying 
the money referred to in the documentary letter of credit as long as the 
seller has not complied with the credit stipulations and any argument to 
the contrary is in contrary with reality and law”.72 
 
In this case, the Court of Cassation found that shipping the goods in a condition 
different from the one stipulated for in the documentary credit should not go 
unpunished. The Jordanian court has focused on the condition of the goods 
themselves merely in determining whether to stop the documentary letter of credit 
payment. The intention of the seller has not constituted a main factor in determining 
the fraud existence. It should be noted that fraud has been inferred by examining the 
goods’ condition itself and not the intent or the state of the seller’s mind. In other 
words, the case facts were sufficient for the Jordanian court to trigger the fraud 
exception. The court found that shipping five containers filled with damaged or used 
medical equipment instead of nine filled with brand-new equipment does constitute 
fraud. In the court’s view such an act could not be considered anything but fraud and 
fraud only. 
In such a case, it is suggested that carriers would not jeopardize their reputation by 
perpetrating fraud as suing them would not constitute a difficulty as long as their 
place of residence and work are well known. It is submitted that in most of the cases it 
                                                 
71
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is sellers who have the interest to defraud buyers. If an injunction is not granted, it is 
sellers who would vanish and suing them later would constitute an illusory relief.
73
 
Although if it is not the seller but a third person, with whom the seller has contracted 
to provide the goods, who has perpetrated the fraud, as between the seller and the 
buyer the former should bear the consequences of such fraud. It would be easier for 
the seller, who has chosen such a fraudulent person to deal with, to sue this person 
and to bear the consequences of such an unsuccessful choice.
74
 The buyer in such an 
instance contracts with the seller on the assumption that he will receive the goods 
regardless of the source from which the later would obtain the goods and of any 
relations which he may enter into. Hence, whether such a fraud is perpetrated by the 
seller or other third parties, it is the former who should be responsible for it and it is 
he who would be in a better position to be sued.
75
 
The same findings have been established by the Court of Cassation in its decision 
number 1215/2005.
76
 In the same manner as that pursued in the above mentioned 
case, the Jordanian court found that the shipment of goods which do not conform to 
the letter of credit terms would impede the payment process. To this the court has 
provided: 
“…for a documentary letter of credit to be considered as a strong 
guarantee in the seller’s favour, things contracted for should move into the 
correct direction as envisaged by the credit parties. The letter of credit 
should be a settlement of an honest business transaction and the seller’s 
behaviour should not involve fraud.” 
 
                                                 
73
 Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) 
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It should be noted that the learned court did not neglect the fraudulent intention 
importance, but, as had been held in case number 835/2004, this court pursued the 
approach calling for detecting the required intent from the case particular facts. To 
this point the court provided that “If documents are facially conforming but in fact 
they are not because of the seller acts or his knowledge, the bank has to refuse the 
presented documents”. While the court did express its concerns toward the intent 
requirement, this did not constitute a barrier before the applicants to stop the credit 
payment as is the case in England.  
In England, the courts in order to grant an injunction focus their attention mainly on 
the presence of intent before looking into the case particular facts.
77
 As seen in many 
cases, such as the Edward Owen
78
 and the Discount Records,
79
 the English courts 
found that a fraudulent intent should be proved even when the case particular facts 
cannot be explained by a word other than fraud. However, it is interesting to notice 
how the Jordanian Court of Cassation in this case has ruled that fraud has been 
perpetrated from the case particular facts. In the words of the court: 
“…the technical inspection certificate shows that the goods are not the oil 
material contracted for but unusable used oil which has been filled in 
coated barrels that avers the perpetration of fraud by the seller”. 
 
The Jordanian Civil Act rules which address fraud in general, and which to a great 
extent resemble that adhered to by the English courts, have not been applied by the 
Jordanian judges in this context. It seems that the Jordanian judges have found it 
difficult to apply such rules in a commercial context where they would work to the 
detriment of the documentary credits’ applicants and contrary to the letters of credit 
envisaged mechanism. Interestingly, the interviewees’ responses in this regard are 
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compatible with the current author’s view expressed in chapter five and with that 
reached by the Court of Cassation in the above mentioned cases.
80
  
The judges, who have been interviewed, frequently expressed their rejection of 
applying civil rules in a commercial context where the former would not fit or work 
properly in the latter. These judges have found that, by virtue of Article 2/ 2 of the 
Jordanian Commercial Act, applying the civil rules which address fraud in general 
would contradict the principles of the commercial law. The judges have noted that 
letters of credit enjoy special characteristics and hence it needs a special fraud 
standard. In Judge Al-Kharabsheh’s words: 
“The fraud standard which the court will be looking for is that which 
could be inferred from the case facts and not from the parties’ intents. 
Applying the latter in the letter of credit context would deprive applicants 
from the protection they seek”.81  
 
One of the questions discussed with the judges is whether any breach related to the 
underlying contract would be considered as fraud and whether there should be a line 
drawn between what can be considered as fraud and what cannot be. In this regard the 
judges have illustrated that not any breach of the contract would suffice to be 
considered as fraud. They noted that it is the facts of the case itself through which 
fraud can be determined and be distinguished from a mere breach of contract which 
does not suffice to stop the payment process. To this, for instance, Judge Al-Smadi 
has noted that: “Only egregious fraud is the one which unravels everything”.82 In 
addition, their Justices have provided that such a line would vary from one case to 
another case taking into consideration the nature of the goods, the time of the 
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shipment, the parties’ expectations and many other variables which cannot be 
confined in one category.
83
 
The Jordanian case law and the judges’ views in this regard are remarkable. It is 
submitted that the Jordanian approach that has been pursued towards the fraud 
standard is easier to obtain than that of its English counterpart. Focusing on the intent 
rather than the perpetrated act is one of the main reasons which caused the English 
fraud exception to be viewed as a theoretical relief rather than a practical one.
84
 The 
short time between the presentment of the required documents and the actual payment 
of the letter of credit makes providing a proof of the seller’s intent a very difficult task 
in front of the buyers who look to stop the payment process. Nevertheless, the 
Jordanian approach does not place barriers in front of the buyers who seek to stop a 
letter of credit payment on the basis of fraud. The fraudulent intention can be inferred 
from the case particular facts. Moreover, similar to the approach pursued in the 
American Sztejn case,
85
 the Jordanian judiciary seems to be aware of the fact that not 
every trivial breach of contract would stop the payment but that it is limited to cases 
that warrant the court’s intervention because of the ferocity of such a breach. 
Yet, while the Jordanian approach to the fraud standard is to a great extent clear in the 
case of documentary letters of credit, the same cannot be said about independent 
guarantees. It is true that many of the independent guarantee law’s aspects, such as the 
autonomy and the strict compliance principles, have been considered by the Jordanian 
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courts in many different cases.
86
 However, nothing regarding the fraud problem can 
be found in these cases. Nothing can be found in the jurisprudence and no fraud cases 
in this context have been before the courts yet. Interestingly, all the interviewed 
judges have refused to discuss independent guarantees’ fraud because, as they 
demonstrated, they do not have as yet sufficient background to enter into such a 
discussion. Therefore, it is suggested that the vacuum related to independent 
guarantees in this regard is not merely a legislative one, but it is a vacuum at all levels 
which also includes case law and jurisprudence. While a blind eye can be turned on 
the documentary letters of credit position because of the other supplementary legal 
sources or the judges’ presented knowledge available in this regard, the situation is 
different in the context of independent guarantees.  
A judge hearing a fraudulent case in this regard would be surprised to know that he 
can be guided by nothing in order to give good reasons for his judgement. It is 
submitted that this would result in harmful results to the disputed parties.
87
 A party 
who is involved in an independent guarantee which is governed by the Jordanian law 
would be surprised to know that this law does not provide any help in relation to his 
rights or duties in the case of a fraudulent demand. This could lead these parties to 
avoid the application of the Jordanian law in this regard. In some cases it would lead 
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to avoiding dealing with Jordanian parties who would insist on implementing such a 
law which is ambiguous in this regard. This can be clearly understood in such an 
international context where each of the parties would prefer to resort to its own 
country’s legal system. Thus, in order to avoid such complications, it is submitted that 
a reform to this area of law is urgently needed in order to protect different Jordanian 
and international traders, who apply the Jordanian law in their various contracts, and 
to facilitate Jordan’s trade transactions in general. 
It should be noted that the case facts which have been narrated by judge A above,
88
 
where he accepted to scrutinise the contract terms in order to find whether the Chinese 
sellers had sold mobile phones to other Jordanian buyers where the contract prevents 
them from doing so, support the chance of recognising an underlying contract 
exception such as that which has been proposed and applied recently by the English 
courts in Jordan.
89
  
 
7.2.3.4. Letters of credit fraud Injunctions 
 
The Jordanian Civil Procedure Act, Number 24 of the year 1988,
90
 has allocated some 
provisions to deal with injunctions. Article 32 of this Act provides: 
“…the judge of urgent matters, without permanently prejudicing the 
parties’ rights, may grant a temporary injunction until a full hearing court 
can adjudicate the disputed matter if requested to grant an injunction in a 
case where: 1- the matter is urgent and the right of the party seeking an 
injunction would be lost if no judiciary relief is granted in that time…”91 
 
Notably, this Article has stipulated that for granting an injunction an element of 
urgency should exist. Although the determination of the urgency of the disputed 
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matter is under the discretion of the judge of urgent matters, injunctions sought to stop 
a letter of credit on the fraud basis have been usually considered as urgent.
92
 The 
potential loss of the letter of credit amount makes such a matter an urgent one which 
merits an injunction.
93
 By the virtue of Article 32, the judge who grants an injunction 
grants it temporarily, without adjudicating the rights of the different parties, until a 
full court can hear the matter disputed.
94
 Accordingly, in the absence of a special 
provision that regulates the injunctions’ procedure in a letter of credit context, a letter 
of credit applicant can ask for this judiciary relief in order to stop the fraudulent 
beneficiary from collecting the fruits of his dishonesty. 
Unlike the English approach,
95
 the fraud proof standard does not constitute an 
obstacle in front of an applicant who seeks the Jordanian courts’ relief to restrain the 
bank from paying the fraudulent beneficiary. On the one hand, the banks’ need for 
acquiring an established standard of fraud in order to refuse to pay on its own the 
fraudulent beneficiary has been frequently illustrated by the Jordanian courts.
96
 The 
importance of this requirement is well understood as it protects the bank and justifies 
its refusal to pay in later potential litigation.
97
 On the other hand, the requirement of 
an established fraud standard has not been adhered to by the Jordanian courts in the 
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case of injunctions.
98
 None of the Jordanian cases discussed above, where injunctions 
have been granted, showed the need for such a difficult test of proof in order to grant 
the requested injunctions. The Jordanian courts have applied a test which is to a great 
extent identical with the “only realistic inference” test applied in some of the English 
cases.
99
 The applicant under such a test is not required to prove that fraud has been 
perpetrated beyond any doubt as in the established test, but what he has to do is to 
show from the facts and the documents presented that the only reasonable explanation 
is that there is fraud in the transaction. 
Whilst it is submitted that applying such a test is a successful step counted in favour 
of the Jordanian approach as it provides practical rather than theoretical means to 
obtain an injunction, the Jordanian application to this standard is not without its own 
problems. In fact, the Jordanian courts do not distinguish between the two main 
categories which injunctions in a letter of credit context may be divided into as 
illustrated in Chapter Six.
100
 Jordanian courts have applied the test that resembles the 
“only realistic inference” in both categories. This includes cases where a holder in due 
course is involved and cases where no holder in due course is involved in the letter of 
credit transaction. It is submitted that, although such an approach is applauded in the 
latter category, this would work to the detriment of banks in particular and the letters 
of credit mechanism in general if applied to the first category. 
In case num. 1215/2005,
101
 it seems that the Jordanian Court of Cassation has 
neglected the fact that, when the injunction was sought before it to stop the Jordanian 
bank from reimbursing the English confirming bank, the English bank had already 
                                                 
98
 For example: Court of Cassation case number 1215/2005. Issued on 2005, Adaleh Centre for Legal 
Information Publications (the 11
th
 issue, 2009) 
99
 For example: Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] Q.B. 84; [1995] 3 W.L.R. 751 (CA); United Trading 
Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd. [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 554 (CA) 
100
 See section 6.4.  
101
 Issued on 2005, Adaleh Centre for Legal Information Publications (the 11
th
 issue, 2009) 
294 
 
discharged its documentary duties and paid the letter of credit amount. The Jordanian 
court neglected such a fact and granted an injunction to stop the Jordanian issuing 
bank from reimbursing its English counterpart which had duly fulfilled the obligation 
entrusted to it. The same course has been pursued in the Court of Cassation case 
number 835/2004.
102
 The Jordanian issuing bank has been prevented from 
reimbursing the Canadian confirming bank because of the test applied in this case. 
Although the issuing bank has frequently, before the three different level of courts, 
reminded the court of the special role which the confirming bank plays in confirmed 
credits, this has not been given any particular attention by these courts. Interestingly, 
the same approach has been pursued where no confirming bank has existed. This can 
be seen in the Court of First Instance decision num. 407/2009
103
 where an 
injunction
104
 has been granted on a similar basis as that of “the only realistic” test 
applied occasionally by English courts. 
As previously pointed out in Chapter Six, a moment’s reflection would reveal that the 
established fraud test is the one which suits the category of injunctions where a holder 
in due course, such as confirming and negotiating banks, is involved. This test would 
serve better both the banks’ expectations and the autonomy principle which maintains 
the smooth running of such instruments in the world trade realm. Furthermore, 
applying the “only realistic inference” test is recommended in the second category 
which does not involve a holder in due course. Accordingly, in the absence of a 
confirming bank and where the issuing bank has not paid yet there would be no 
problems if the later test is applied. In such a case, the autonomy principle which 
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protects the banks’ and parties ‘expectations would not work against granting the 
requested injunction.  
While English courts have been usually inclined to apply the strict established test in 
both categories,
105
 the Jordanian courts seem to apply the “only realistic inference” 
test in both categories. Neither the English nor the Jordanian courts have noticed that 
each test has to be applied to the category which suits it. On the one hand, it is 
submitted that applying the English approach in this regard would mean that no 
injunctions would be available in a letter of credit context. On the other hand, 
applying the Jordanian approach would destroy the autonomy principle application in 
the letters of credit context. Hence, it is suggested that it would be a better approach if 
both jurisdictions learn from each other’s experience, and so apply both tests each in 
its category, in order to enhance their approach to this particular area of law.  
Providing a cause of action, which has been frequently required by the English courts 
in order to grant an injunction,
106
 is not required by the Jordanian courts in this 
respect. It seems that the fact that there is fraud somewhere in the letter of credit 
transaction is itself sufficient to overlook such a requirement. However, it should be 
noted that while such an approach is recommended in cases where there are no 
holders in due course, this should be avoided in cases where a holder in due course is 
involved.
107
 The confirming bank’s knowledge of the perpetrated fraud should be 
proved in order to acquire the requested injunction against the issuing bank. Banks 
issue and confirm letters of credit on the assumption that as long as they discharge 
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their documentary duties in good faith they will be reimbursed.
108
 Therefore, if these 
banks are prevented from collecting the money which they have already paid through 
issuing and confirming letters of credit, such instruments will lose their marketability 
and reputation.
109
 Letters of credit would be abandoned because of the potential risks 
that they would involve and that might harm the moral and physical interests of these 
banks. 
The cause of action point has been discussed with the interviewed judges. At the 
beginning of the discussion in this regard, most of the judges were adamant that the 
approach pursued by the Jordanian courts is a correct one. Nevertheless, they have 
rejected the views about which they have previously been adamant and changed their 
mind after thinking about such matters from different perspectives. When the learned 
judges looked at the matter from the banks’ perspective they realised how dangerous 
it would be to grant an injunction in a confirmed letter of credit context where the 
foreign confirming bank has already paid in good faith the letter of credit amount. The 
judges have realised that in such a case the maintenance of the autonomy principle 
should prevail against fraud unless there has been an established case of fraud which 
the confirming bank knows about before the time it paid. According to Judge Al-
Shraideh: “A holder in due course should be sheltered from later defences where he 
does not know about it”.110 Al-Smadi, Al-Kharabsheh, Al-Akhras, Judge A and other 
judges have all expressed views which agree with Judge Al-Shraideh’s view. While 
the Jordanian courts’ approach to the first category, which includes holders in due 
course, is unfortunate, it is submitted that their approach concerning the second 
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category, where no holders in due course are involved, is recommended in this regard 
and that judges have expressed views which accord with such a fact.  
Unlike English law, the balance of convenience also has not comprised a requirement 
by the Jordanian courts when an injunction to stop a letter of credit is sought. Instead 
of applying legal principles which have been developed outside the letters of credit 
context, such as the balance of convenience requirement, the Jordanian courts in the 
different cases brought before them have required the applicant to present a guarantee 
in order to grant the required injunction.
111
 The reason behind such a guarantee is to 
assure the court that the applicant’s claims are genuine and not just a device through 
which he can delay the letter of credit payment.
112
 Such a guarantee may be used later 
to compensate other parties (the banks and the beneficiary) from losses which they 
may sustain from delaying the payment in case it turns out that the applicant’s claims 
were false.  
All of the interviewed judges assured the soundness of such an approach. They were 
of the view that the balance of convenience requirement is redundant and that 
providing a guarantee instead would constitute a more useful requirement because of 
what it provides in terms of practical and effectual implications in this regard.
113
 The 
judges found that rather than looking to the issuing banks in weighing such a balance 
it should be the fraudulent beneficiary that the court should weigh the balance against. 
Accordingly, they were of the view that where fraud has been proven the balance of 
convenience will always tilt in favour of granting the required injunction and 
therefore there is no point in considering such a requirement. In judge A’s view: 
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“The balance of convenience does not constitute a requirement which 
Jordanian courts ask for in order to grant an injunction in a letter of credit 
fraud case. I cannot see the benefit from stipulating for such a 
requirement… Asking the injunction’s applicant to provide a guarantee is 
more useful in this regard”.114 
 
It is noteworthy that the English debate regarding whether an injunction is sought 
against the bank or the beneficiary himself has not been controversial in Jordan.
115
 
The reason behind the absence of this debate may be attributed to the absence of the 
balance of convenience requirement itself. The interviewed judges have frequently 
assured such a conclusion. 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
 
While it is only case law which addresses the fraud problem in the letters of credit 
context in Jordan, the Jordanian judge, as provided by Article 3 of the Jordanian 
Commercial Act, has the discretion to apply the case law if he wishes to.
116
 Although 
such precedents have been usually applied in most of the cases, the Jordanian judge is 
not obligated to do so. This also applies to other Arabian Middle Eastern countries 
which this work considers.
117
 Jordanian judges seem to be affected by the 
international views in this regard. This can be clearly seen where it is suggested that 
the judge’s view depends on what he reads from international texts and cases.118 
Accordingly, under the current Jordanian position, an applicant’s success in his 
application to restrain a letter of credit payment will ultimately depend on the judge’s 
personal view to this area of law. For example, an applicant would be surprised to 
                                                 
114
 An interview with Judge A, of the South Amman Court of first instance, on 20-09-2011 
115
 See subsection 4.3.2 
116
 Article 3 of the Jordanian Commercial Act provides: “If there is no legal provision that can be 
applied, the judge may be guided by case law, the jurisprudence and the requirements of fairness and 
commercial practice”. 
117
 For example, Article 3 of the Syrian Commercial Act, Number 33 of the year 2007, provides the 
same as to that of its Jordanian counterpart. 
118
 For instance, all of the Jordanian cases in this regard have referred to different English and 
American cases and texts in order to justify the approaches which they have pursued. An interview 
with Judge A, of the South Amman Court of first instance, on 20-09-2011 
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know that the same facts that qualified him for an injunction in a previous case would 
not qualify him in another case because it is heard by another judge whose views are 
different from his preceding fellow. In Goode’s words: 
“There is a divergence of views not only between different law systems, 
but even within the same law system both on what constitutes a defence to 
a claim on a credit and on the approach to be taken by the court on an 
application for interim injunctive relief.”119 
 
While most of the analysed cases and conducted interviews show that Jordan has 
developed, to some extent, a recommended approach in this regard, it is submitted 
that this would not guarantee the decisions or directions of future litigation. In fact, 
misapplications have been seen in some of the analysed cases. These include, for 
example, the fraud proof standard and the cause of action requirement. This also could 
be expected where there are no rules in the different law sources which regulate the 
fraud exception application in the context of independent guarantees. Similarly, it is 
also submitted that such misapplications might occur at an Arabian Middle Eastern 
level where there are no rules in the different law sources which regulate the fraud 
exception application.  
The draftsmen of the ICC rules have, since the promulgation of the first edition of the 
UCP in 1933, brought up many reasons to justify their deliberate neglect to introduce 
rules that regulate fraud in this context. The main reason stated by these draftsmen is 
that it would be a better approach to leave such an issue to national laws and judges 
who can determine the best ways to tackle such a problem as it better suits them.
120
 It 
is suggested that the ICC draftsmen should take into consideration that their approach 
has, at least from an Arabian Middle Eastern perspective, proved to be ineffective 
                                                 
119
 Goode R, “Transnational Commercial Law, Texts, Cases and Materials”, (Oxford Press, Oxford, 
2007) at pp. 353-354  
120
 For example Article 1.05(c) of the ISP98 expressly states: “These rules do not define or otherwise 
provide for defences to honour based on fraud, abuse, or similar matters. These matters are left to 
applicable law”. 
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and, accordingly, introduce some provisions to regulate the fraud problem in their 
next publications and revisions. Similarly, it is also suggested that Arabian Middle 
Eastern legislators should take such a matter into consideration and accordingly 
promulgate rules that tackle such a thorny matter.  
In the meantime, Arabian Middle Eastern countries are invited to adopt the UN 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit to tackle the 
shortage of law which they suffer from regarding fraud perpetrated in the independent 
guarantees context.
121
 Nevertheless, taking into consideration the legislative vacuum 
concerning documentary letters of credit fraud at the national and international level, 
it is suggested that the only aid is expected to come from the ICC draftsmen.
                                                 
121
 It is noteworthy that out of the few countries which have ratified the Convention there are two 
Arabian Middle Eastern Countries, namely; Kuwait and Tunisia. Indeed, it is recommended that the 
other Arabian Middle Eastern Countries take the same initiative and ratify this Convention. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
8.1. Findings and recommendations 
 
This work has critically examined the fraud exception application to the autonomy 
principle of documentary credits and independent guarantees under the English and 
Jordanian law. This examination has been pursued in order to explore the problems 
associated with this exception application in both jurisdictions and consequently to 
propose some legal reforms which would solve such problems and so prevent or at 
least mitigate fraud occurrence. The importance of such an examination lies in the fact 
that independent guarantees and documentary credits are prolific in international trade 
realm and that fraud could badly affect these instruments’ viability, parties which use 
them and commerce in general.
1
  
In this work it has been argued that, whilst the autonomy principle plays a vital role in 
international trade, the courts should facilitate the fraud exception application and 
recognise other exceptions, such as the non-genuinity and the underlying contract 
exception, where the former exception would be unable to prevent fraud occurrence. 
The current author suggests that the current English fraud exception is narrow and 
problematic for four reasons; firstly, the fraud exception has been applied where 
banks receive documents and have to decide from their face whether to pay or not. 
Hence, under English law, banks, whose work is of a documentary nature, are 
required to establish fraud in order to stop an independent guarantee or a documentary 
credit payment. Yet, in this work, the current author suggests that such an application 
would place banks in an unenviable position. Secondly, a general view has been 
                                                 
1
 Schulze, WG. ‘The UCP 600: A New Law Applicable to Documentary Letters of Credit’ [2009] 21 
SA Merc LJ. 228 at p. 228  
302 
 
established that the fraud exception application is limited to fraud that is perpetrated 
in the documents rather than fraud which might be perpetrated in the underlying 
contract which has evolved through these instruments. However, it has been suggested 
in this work that this distinction is an illusory one and would serve to increase 
fraudulent conducts rather than to decrease such conducts. 
Thirdly, under English law, a fraudulent intent has to be proved in order to apply the 
fraud exception. Yet, this work argues that such a proof is hard to obtain if the short 
time between the fraudulent beneficiary’s call on the instrument and the time at which 
the bank would pay and the difficult nature of the intent proof are taken into 
consideration. Fourthly, English courts have burdened the party seeking their 
protection, by means of injunctions in order to restrain the fraudsters from obtaining 
the letter of credit amount, with very difficult requirements. These requirements 
comprise: an established proof of fraud, a cause of action and a balance of 
convenience which requires the applicant for an injunction to show the defendant’s 
inability to compensate him if an injunction is not granted and, at the same time, his 
ability to compensate the defendant if he fails later to support his preliminary claims 
before a full trial court. The current author argues that while stipulating for some of 
these requirements has been exaggerated, other requirements have been misplaced and 
misapplied frequently by English courts. 
Taking the above observations into consideration, it is recommended that the English 
courts should reform their approach to this area of law in the following manner: 
firstly, it is suggested that banks should not become embroiled in disputes pertaining 
to underlying contracts’ but that they should merely scrutinize to ascertain whether 
documents’ submitted are genuine or not. The application of the fraud exception at 
this stage should be replaced by a pre-requisite of genuinity and, accordingly, a bank’s 
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attention should be directed to the documents’ themselves rather than the intent 
behind them. In this regard, the current author urges the English courts to reconsider 
the United City Merchants case.
2
 In the same manner, because its uncertainty 
compromises its acceptability, the current author suggests that the nullity exception 
has no application in this context.
3
 Secondly, this work advocates that the theoretical 
distinction between fraud in the documents and fraud in the underlying transaction 
should be refuted and ignored. Thus, it is suggested that English courts should 
develop practical techniques to mitigate fraud rather than finding theoretical 
justifications in order to escape adjudicating such matters. Their aim should be to 
prevent fraud irrespective of the point at which it occurs. 
Thirdly, instead of the common law fraud standard which has proved difficult and 
unattainable, the author proposes that an objective test of fraud which focuses on the 
state of the goods rather than the beneficiary’s intent should be embraced by English 
courts in documentary credit cases. Such a proposed test would make the fraud 
exception an obtainable relief before a defrauded applicant who seeks a court’s 
protection. In contrast, due to the special features and characteristics which an 
independent guarantee enjoys, this work suggests that the fraud exception would not 
mitigate fraudulent conducts which might occur in such a context. These special 
characteristics encompass the lack of utilised documents in independent guarantees 
and the fact that, unlike documentary credits which usually facilitate a sale of goods, 
the purpose of such guarantees would be difficult to ascertain. Moreover, it is 
submitted that the Singaporean unconscionability exception should be refuted as 
                                                 
2
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [1983] 1 
A.C. 168; [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039 (House of Lords) 
3
 The nullity exception has been discussed in chapter 3. 
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well.
4
 Such a refusal could be attributed to the uncertainty intrinsic in such a concept. 
In this work, it is suggested that English courts should adopt the underlying contract 
exception in this context.
5
 Indeed, through utilising such an exception, an applicant 
can restrain the beneficiary from acquiring the independent guarantee amount where 
the latter is breaching the underlying contract terms which condition the independent 
guarantee’s payment. Interestingly, recent English cases do show a trend which calls 
for the adoption of this exception which reflects the parties’ expectations.6 
Finally, the current author recommends that English courts should review their 
application to injunctions in this area of law. In view of that, English courts should 
keep in mind that the conditions which an injunction requires differ where a bona fide 
holder in due course is involved from cases where there are no such parties. A proof 
of an established fraud in the former case is well-understood where such a condition 
works to protect bona fide parties who have duly fulfilled their commitments. 
However, requiring such a concrete proof where no holders in due course are existent 
serves neither legal nor commercial purposes. By the same token, the requirement of a 
cause of action, which dictates that the bank’s knowledge about the alleged fraud 
should be proved, is well appreciated in cases which involve a holder in due course. 
For instance, unless a confirming bank knows about the fraud before it has paid, an 
issuing bank should not be restrained from reimbursing the former in a documentary 
credit context. However, to require such knowledge in cases which do not involve 
bona fide parties does not stand accurate legal or commercial analysis.  
                                                 
4
 The unconscionability exception has been discussed in chapter 5. 
5
 The underlying contract exception has been discussed in chapter 5. 
6
 Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 657 (TCC); [2011] B.L.R. 340; [2011] C.I.L.L. 
3009 (first instance); Sirius Insurance Co v FAI General Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 470 (CA) [2004] 
UKHL 54; [2004] 1 WLR 3251 (House of Lords); TTI v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd [2003] EWHC 762 
(TCC); [2003] 1 ALL ER (Comm) 914 
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Moreover, it is suggested that a balance of convenience has no application in the 
injunctions context of this area of law. Under English law, a balance of convenience 
weighted against a bank would interrupt the injunction’s application and as a result 
will let the fraudulent beneficiary escape with the money he obtains through fraud. 
Hence, it is submitted that whilst banks should not get embroiled in underlying 
contracts and with the question of whether fraud has been perpetrated there or not, the 
balance of convenience should be always implicitly weighted against the fraudulent 
beneficiary and not banks. English courts should take this into consideration in order 
to make an injunction a practical weapon in the hands of aggrieved applicants who 
seek their help.  
On the other hand, it is suggested in this work that such misapplications might occur 
at an Arabian Middle Eastern level where there are no rules in the different law 
sources which regulate the fraud exception application. Due to such lack of rules, this 
work submits that this would not guarantee the outcome or direction of future 
litigation in this regard. In fact, misapplications have been seen in some of the 
analysed cases. This included, for example, the fraud proof standard and the cause of 
action requirement.
7
 
In the meantime, the current author suggests that Arabian Middle Eastern countries 
should adopt the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of 
Credit in order to address the shortage of law which they suffer from regarding fraud 
perpetrated in the independent guarantees context.
8
 Nevertheless, taking into 
consideration the legislative vacuum concerning documentary letters of credit fraud at 
                                                 
7
 See chapter 7 for more in this regard. 
8
 It is noteworthy that out of the few countries which have ratified the Convention there are two 
Arabian Middle Eastern Countries, namely Kuwait and Tunisia. Indeed, it is recommended that the 
other Arabian Middle Eastern Countries take the same initiative and ratify this Convention. 
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the national and the international levels, it is suggested that the only aid is expected to 
come from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) draftsmen.  
Whilst the autonomy principle does play an important role in the independent 
guarantees and documentary credits practice, this work has argued that courts of these 
countries should keep in mind that such a principle is not of an absolute nature. Such a 
principle should not be blindly applied and should not automatically prevail over 
other equitable or contractual doctrines. Whenever a court hears a case in such a 
context, it should weigh the different and, sometimes, contradicting considerations 
against each other in order to decide this case. The courts should keep in mind the 
expectations of the different involved parties, the purpose of the utilised instrument 
and the maintenance of the international utility of these instruments. 
Fraud is a major concern for banks that handle documentary credits and independent 
guarantees and any attempt to mitigate its occurrence should be applauded. Therefore, 
the fraud exception boundaries should be understood. The court when looking to this 
area of law should distinguish between different dictums and criteria which have been 
developed in such a context. Blindly applying these dictums and criteria without 
appreciating their applicability and validity in respect of the facts of each different 
case would have harmful consequences. While some of these dictums can be applied 
in many cases, this should not be unconditional. Hence, courts are invited to test 
whether a certain statement, which has been made by earlier courts, applies to the case 
which they might have before them. Documentary credits and independent guarantees 
are international financial instruments which involve many different parties and many 
different kinds of contracts and which, accordingly, open the door for many different 
and varying disputes to occur. Hence, what is a good law in a certain case might not 
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be the same in another case and therefore the facts of each case should be considered 
cautiously. 
It is true that it was previously thought that the autonomy principle was of an absolute 
nature and that there was no exception to such a principle.
9
 Yet, sooner rather than 
later it has been recognised that an exception to this principle is needed where blatant 
cases of abuse and fraud start to show up and as a result a fraud exception has been 
established. Similarly, the fraud exception had been considered as the only and unique 
exception. Nevertheless, soon demands arose to recognise other exceptions and in 
virtually all jurisdictions exceptions have been recognised. Therefore, it is common to 
witness the widening of the conventional common law English fraud exception and to 
see other exceptions recognised where the former does not provide the parties with the 
protection that they envisage. Indeed, what was the consensus view in this area of law 
10 years ago would not go unchallenged nowadays.
10
 It should not be forgotten that 
“The documentary credit is a creature of the early twentieth century, somewhat later 
but nonetheless from an era when trading conditions were different from today”11 and 
hence it is a corollary to see this area of law developing from time to time. However, 
it is true that “in order for points of law to be established we have to wait for the right 
facts to present themselves and for the right arguments to be run”.12  
In an independent guarantee context, whilst there are no protections offered under the 
fraud exception umbrella in cases where the beneficiary demands payment in an 
abusive manner, it would be normal to see other exceptions like the unconscionability 
                                                 
9
 United Trading Corporation SA v Allied Arab Bank [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 554, 561 
10
 Mugasha, A. ‘Enjoining the Beneficiary’s Claim on a Letter of Credit or Bank Guarantee’ [2004] 
J.B.L. 515 at p. 537 
11
 Todd, P. “Bills of Lading and Bankers’ Documentary Credits” (Informa Law, 4th ed., London, 2007) 
at p. 283 
12
 Hughes, M. ‘Standby Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees’ [2005] B.J.I.B. & F.L. Vol. 20(5), 
174 at p. 174  
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and the underlying contract exceptions evolving in order to fill the existent protection 
gap. By the same token, in a documentary credit context, where the common law 
fraud standard is not efficient to combat fraud practices and to offer the applicants the 
desired protection, it would be normal to see propositions which call to widen the 
fraud standard limits or to embrace other exceptions occasionally. In this regard, 
suggestions which call for accepting the risk of such fraudulent and abusive demands 
and considering them as a risk which the parties have accepted to take are 
ingenuous.
13
 If fraud is left as a gap in order to maintain the attraction of documentary 
credits and independent guarantees as a result of their autonomous character, the rise 
in fraud will remain and losses will become substantial. Ultimately, the risk of fraud 
will diminish the attractiveness of these instruments. 
8.2. Limitations and further possible research 
 
The fraud exception of the autonomy principle is a large area which would provide an 
unlimited amount of discussion and analysis. However, the limited scope of this work 
does not allow for an extensive treatment of the different issues in this regard. Whilst 
this work has examined other exceptions, such as the nullity exception, the 
unconscionability exception and the underlying contract exception, because of their 
overlap with the fraud exception, this work is not intended to examine other potential 
exceptions to the autonomy principle of such instruments.
14
 Hence, it is suggested that 
future work, if pursued in this area of law, should take these potential exceptions into 
consideration. 
                                                 
13
 Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159, 170 & 176  
14
 The illegality exception is one of these well-established exceptions nowadays. For a good discussion 
on the illegality exception, for example, see: Enonchong, N. ‘The Autonomy Principle of Letters of 
Credit: An Illegality Exception?’ [2006] L.M.C.L.Q. Vol. 3, 404; Enonchong, N. “The Independence 
Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees” (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011); 
Horowitz, D. “Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment” (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 
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This work is also not intended to cover the subject of conflicts of law which might 
occur in such an area of law.
15
 If time is sufficient, taking into account the existence 
of different parties who are located in different countries in this context, this study 
would have explored the subject of conflicts of law in this regard. Besides, this work 
does not cover issues of assignments, transfers and other different relationships which 
might arise between the different parties involved in this context.
16
 Appreciating these 
different relationships is so important in this context. For example, as has been seen in 
chapter six, being a holder in due course rather than a normal beneficiary has affected 
the fraud exception application in this regard. Had this study given more time, an 
examination to these different relationships would have been completed. 
Moreover, electronic means which have recently been introduced in this context are 
not discussed in this work.
17
 While it was noted a few years ago that the: “Letters of 
credit practice is still grounded in a paper mentality”18 and that it is not expected that 
the electronic medium will make significant changes to the paper based letters of 
credit market for another couple of years,
19
 it is submitted that it might be the proper 
time now to examine the viability and implications of such electronic medium. Such 
an examination is well-appreciated where the Supplement to the Uniform Customs 
and Practice for Documentary Credits for Electronic Presentation (well-known as the 
                                                 
15
 For a good discussion in this regard, see: Malek, A & Quest, D. “Jack: Documentary Credits” (Tottel 
Publishing, 4
th
 ed., Sussex, 2009); Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and Practice of Documentary 
Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010); King, R. “Gutteridge & Megrah’s Law of Bankers’ 
Commercial Credits” (Europa Publications Limited, 8th ed., London, 2001) 
16
 The following provide good working examples in this regard: Ellinger P. & Neo, D. “The Law and 
Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit” (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010); Bertrams, R. “Bank 
Guarantees in International Trade: The Law and Practice of Independent (First Demand) Guarantees 
and Standby Letters of Credit in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions” (Kluwer Law 
International, 3
rd
 ed., The Hague (Netherlands), 2004); Mugasha, A. “The Law of Letters of Credit and 
Bank Guarantees” (Federation Press, Sydney, 2003) 
17
 For more regarding this point, see: Malek, A & Quest, D. “Jack: Documentary Credits” (Tottel 
Publishing, 4
th
 ed., Sussex, 2009) 
18
 Barnes, J. ‘E-Commerce and Letter of Credit Law and Practice’ [2003] Documentary Letter of Credit 
World Vol. 5(7), 30, at pp. 32-33 
19
 Christensen, K. ‘Will the UCP Help Electronic Trade Grow Up?’ [2003] DCInsight Vol. 9(1), 16, at 
pp. 16-17 
310 
 
eUCP) has come into force recently in order to accommodate presentation of 
electronic records alone or in combination with paper documents in this context.
20
 
As seen in chapter seven, while the work has examined the current position in other 
Arabian Middle Eastern countries, the focus of the discussion was the Jordanian 
jurisdiction in particular. Taking into consideration the current legislative vacuum, 
such a limitation was due to the fact that, unlike the Jordanian courts, other Arabian 
Middle Eastern courts did not witness fraud disputes. It is suggested that if these 
courts have the opportunity to hear similar cases in the future, a more comprehensive 
study of this region could be pursued. Such a possible study could be pursued as well 
if any of these countries enunciate some provisions to tackle the fraud exception 
application to this area of law. 
Finally, it should be remembered that, where the documentary credits and independent 
guarantees law is still developing, it will be customary to see the fraud exception 
developing from time to time. Bearing this in mind it will be necessary to examine 
this exception every once in a while in order to evaluate further developments to this 
area of law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 The eUCP supplements the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (2007 Revision 
ICC Publication No. 600) 
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Mees Pierson v Bay Pacific (S) Pte Ltd [2000] 4 S.L.R. 393  
Min Thai Holdings Pte Ltd v Sunlabel Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR 368 
Newtech Engineering Construction Pte Ltd v BKB Engineering Constructions Pte Ltd 
and Others [2003] 4 SLR 73 
Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong & Anor, Suit 1715/95, 11 July 1996, 
unreported 
Samwoh Asphalt Premix Pte Ltd v Sum Cheong Piling Pte Ltd [2002] Build LR 459 
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Case law in Arabic 
 
Jordanian Cases 
 
The Jordanian Court of Appeal decision num. 1130/2004. Issued on 2004. Not 
published.  
The Jordanian Court of Appeal decision num. 1586/2003. Issued on 2003. Not 
published.  
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 12/75. Issued on 1975. Available at 
the Journal of Jordanian Bar Association (1975) at p. 1214  
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 1215/2005. Issued on 2005, Adaleh 
Centre for Legal Information publications (the 11
th
 issue, 2009). Available also 
at the Journal of Jordanian Bar Association (2005) at p. 189 
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 152/75, Issued on 1975. Journal of 
Jordanian Bar Association (1976) at p. 173 
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 1554/1999. Issued on 1999. 
Available at Adaleh Centre for Legal Information (the 11
th
 issue of publications, 
2009) 
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 170/1986. Issued on 1986. Available 
at the Journal of Jordanian Bar Association (1988) at p. 1345  
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 1776/1998. Issued on 1998. 
Available at Adaleh Centre for Legal Information (the 11
th
 issue of publications, 
2009) 
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 2077/1998. Issued on 1998. 
Available at Adaleh Centre for Legal Information (the 11
th
 issue of publications, 
2009) 
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The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 2462/1999. Issued on 1999. 
Available at the Journal of Jordanian Bar Association (2002) at p. 1713  
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 350/1996. Issued on 1996. Available 
at the Journal of Jordanian Bar Association (1998) at p. 1063  
 The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 511/1995. Issued on 1995. Available 
at Adaleh Centre for Legal Information (the 11
th
 issue of publications, 2009) 
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 650/69. Issued on 1969. Available at 
the Journal of Jordanian Bar Association (1970) at p. 95  
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decision num. 835/2004.Issued on 2004. Available 
at Adaleh Centre for Legal Information (the 11
th
 issue of publications, 2009) 
The Jordanian Court of first instance decision num. 2419/89. Issued on 1989. Not 
published.  
The Jordanian Court of first instance decision num. 2622/2001. Issued on 2001. Not 
published.  
The Jordanian Court of first instance decision num. 407/2009. Issued on 2009. Not 
published  
The Jordanian injunction number 233/2009. Issued on 2009.  Not published 
 
Egyptian Cases 
 
The Egyptian Court of first instance decision num. 1189/49 on 13-02-1984. Not 
published.  
The Egyptian Court of first instance decision num. 2084/58 on 29-05-1989. Not 
published. 
The Egyptian Court of first instance decision num. 249/35 on 27-05-1969. Not 
published.  
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The Egyptian Court of Appeal decision num. 785 on 19-02-1963. Not published.  
The Egyptian Court of first instance decision num. 106/37 on 04-03-1973. Not 
published. 
The Egyptian Court of first instance decision num. 648/48 on 12-04-1984. Not 
published. 
 
Emirati Cases 
 
The Emirati Court of first instance of Abu Dhabi decision num. 894/79 on 16-03-
1981, available at Majalet Al-Adaleh number 33 of the ninth year, 1982, at p. 86 
Saudi Cases 
 
The Saudi Arabia Dispute Settlement Committee decision num. 422/1420 on 25-01-
2000, Not published. 
 
Legislation 
 
England’s Bills of Exchange Act of the year 1882 
The American Uniform Commercial Code 
The Bahraini Commercial law Number 7 of the year 1987 
The Egyptian Commercial law Number 17 of the year 1999 
The English Civil Procedure Rules of the year 1998 
The English Fraud Act of the year 2006 
The Iraqi Commercial Law Number 30 of the year 1984 
The Jordanian Civil Act Number 43 of the year 1976 
The Jordanian Civil Procedure Act Number 24 of the year 1988 
The Jordanian Commercial Act Number 12 of the year 1966 
The Kuwaiti Commercial Law Number 68 of the year 1980 
The Lebanese Commercial Law Number 304 of the year 1942 
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The Omani Commercial Law Number 55 of the year 1990 
The Qatari Commercial Law Number 27 of the year 2006 
The Syrian Commercial Law Number 33 of the year 2007 
The United Arab Emirates Commercial Transactions Law Number 18 of the year 
1993 
The Yemeni Commercial Law Number 32 of the year 1991 
 
International Initiatives 
 
The International Standby Practices (ISP98) 
The UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit   
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) 
The Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees (URCG)  
The Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG) 
 
Electronic Sources 
 
http://www.adaleh.com  
http://www.icc-ccs.org  
http://www.uncitral.org 
SITPRO, Report on the Use of Demand Guarantees in the UK (2003) at 
http://www.sitpro.org.uk 
www.bolero.net 
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Appendix 
 
                                            The Interviews’ Mechanism 
  
Empirical research is important where secondary data sources prove insufficient to 
test the researcher’s hypothesis. Empirical research may be divided into two main 
approaches; qualitative and quantitative research.
1
 On the one hand, for quantitative 
research in this area the foremost method is the social survey which through the 
researcher will be able to generate quantifiable data relating to a large number of 
people who are selected in order to test hypotheses, and this is why it has been so 
widely used.
2
 Surveys can be made through distributing questionnaires to a group of 
people who are experienced in the area to be researched and whose views are worth 
ascertaining. All that the researcher has to do is to plan, design and distribute the 
questionnaires to the group to be researched. After the group has responded to the 
questionnaire, the researcher will be able to analyse the new collected data.  
The use of questionnaires can save time and effort where the group of people to be 
researched is large.
3
 Moreover, using this method produces speedy results, can be 
completed at the respondent’s convenience and has the merit of confidentiality. 
However, many disadvantages can attach to the use of this method. For example, this 
method does not allow for the probing or clarification of the responses collected if this 
is needed, especially where responses are vague or do not deal with the point expected 
by the researcher.
4
 Moreover, because of the nature of their work, in the course of 
which potential respondents may be asked frequently to fill in surveys, surveys do not 
                                                 
1
 Salter, M. & Mason, J. “Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of 
Legal Research” (Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 2007) at p. 166; Dawson, C. “Practical Research 
Methods” (How To Books Ltd, Oxford, 2002) at p. 15 
2
 Denscombe, M. “The Good Research Guide” (Open University Press, 3rd ed., England, 2007) at p. 
154 
3
 Dawson, C. “Practical Research Methods” (How To Books Ltd, Oxford, 2002) at p. 14 
4
 Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 2 
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always motivate the respondents to participate in the research.
5
 Additionally, whether 
or not it is most appropriate to use questionnaires may depend largely on the nature of 
the research which is to be conducted.
6
 
On the other hand, qualitative research is concerned with the quality of the 
information collected rather than its quantity.
7
 In other words, the researcher, rather 
than concentrating on large groups of people, will concentrate on small groups related 
to the area to be researched. For qualitative research in this area the foremost method 
for collection of data is the interviews which through the researcher will be able to 
generate data relating to a small number of people who are selected in order to test or 
generate the hypotheses drawn by his research.
8
 Interviews can be made through 
meeting those authoritative people who are related to the area to be researched.  
It could be said that the use of interviews needs more time than is the case if a 
questionnaire is used.
9
 However, the fact that the group of people interviewed will be 
smaller than that used for a questionnaire would lead to a contrary conclusion.
10
 
Indeed, the number of people will be fewer and accordingly the data collected, while 
might be of a greater value, will also be less.
11
 The questions used in an interview can 
                                                 
5
 Denscombe, M. “The Good Research Guide” (Open University Press, 3rd ed., England, 2007) at p. 
170 
6
 Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 5 
7
 Denscombe, M. “The Good Research Guide” (Open University Press, 3rd ed., England, 2007) at p. 
202 
8
 Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 1 
9
 Denscombe, M. “The Good Research Guide” (Open University Press, 3rd ed., England, 2007) at p. 
203; Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 3 
10
 Dawson, C. “Practical Research Methods” (How To Books Ltd, Oxford, 2002) at p. 49; Brenner, M. 
Brown, J. & Canter, D. “The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches” (Academic Press, London, 
1985) at p. 4 
11
 Dawson, C. “Practical Research Methods” (How To Books Ltd, Oxford, 2002) at p. 15 
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be divided into two categories: structured questions and semi-structured questions.
12
 
In the first category the questions used are planned in advance by the researcher and 
when he conducts his interview he will not be able to deviate from these questions.
13
 
Accordingly, as is the case with questionnaires, the researcher will not be able to 
probe or clarify his interviewees’ responses when he needs to do that. However, in the 
category of semi-structured interviews the researcher will prepare some general 
questions to be discussed with his interviewees, but, unlike the structured interviews, 
he will be able to deviate from the general questions in the way that he thinks it will 
provide more value for his research.
14
  
In this work, the author has chosen to conduct semi-structured interviews in order to 
collect the data needed to fill the secondary data gap related to the fraud exception 
application in the Jordanian law. The reasons for such a choice can be attributed to, 
firstly, the small number of people who are aware of and have the knowledge needed 
regarding the researched area. Secondly, the probing or clarification of the responses 
which the use of interviews provides is well appreciated if the difficulty and 
complexity of the topic researched is taken into consideration.
15
 As has been 
mentioned above, interviews allow the researcher to probe more deeply into the 
interviewees’ views and hence collect more in-depth details than is possible by a 
survey method.
16
 Thirdly, taking into consideration the nature of the research, the 
                                                 
12
 Salter, M. & Mason, J. “Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of 
Legal Research” (Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 2007) at p. 167 
13
 Dawson, C. “Practical Research Methods” (How To Books Ltd, Oxford, 2002) at p. 29 
14
 Salter, M. & Mason, J. “Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of 
Legal Research” (Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 2007) at p. 167; Drever, E. “Using Semi-
Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for Research in Education, Glasgow, 
1995) at p. 1; Brenner, M. Brown, J. & Canter, D. “The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches” 
(Academic Press, London, 1985) at p. 3  
15
 Denscombe, M. “The Good Research Guide” (Open University Press, 3rd ed., England, 2007) at p. 
176; Brenner, M. Brown, J. & Canter, D. “The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches” (Academic 
Press, London, 1985) at p. 3 
16
 Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 3 
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researcher found that conducting interviews would be more helpful than surveys. For 
example, by using interviews the researcher can determine whether the person 
interviewed has a sufficient background in order to duly answer the planned 
questions. However, in a survey it would be difficult to ascertain whether the 
respondent has the knowledge required or whether he just claims to have.
17
 
The choice of the group of people to be interviewed was considered very important 
because it would affect the research.
18
 The researcher initially found that four groups 
of people, which deal with issues regarding documentary credits and guarantees, 
might be interviewed. These four groups of people are, notably, judges, lawyers, 
bankers and legal scholars. However, the researcher has decided to confine the 
interviews to judges. Jordanian scholars have been excluded because the author, after 
a long search and investigations, has not found even a single jurist expert in the field 
of the fraud problem in this context. For the same reason lawyers have been excluded. 
Bankers, while they largely deal with these instruments, look at these instruments 
from a business perspective rather than a legal one and accordingly have been 
excluded. Indeed, bankers are concerned, in the first place, with the documents’ facial 
conformity as they are ill-equipped to deal with issues which do not appear upon a 
document’s face.19 As seen in many cases, banks when faced by a fraud issue request, 
either themselves or by instructing the credit’s applicant, the courts’ help by means of 
injunctions to stop the payment of the credit.
20
  
                                                 
17
 Ibid. at pp. 2-3 
18
 King, N. & Harrocks C. “Interviews in Qualitative Research” (Sage Publications Ltd, London, 2010) 
at p. 29; Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 33 
19
 Bertrams, R. “Bank Guarantees in International Trade: The Law and Practice of Independent (First 
Demand) Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions” 
(Kluwer Law International, 3
rd
 ed., The Hague (Netherlands), 2004) at p. 408 
20
 See, for example; Turkiye Is Bankasi v Bank of China [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 per Waller J; 
Groupe Josi Re v. Walbrook Insurance [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152; Kurkela, M. “Letters of Credit and Bank 
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Yet, in a country like Jordan, where a legislative vacuum exists, it is judges, who 
represent the foremost institution which interprets and applies laws, who would 
usually substitute such a vacuum by borrowing from and implementing other law 
supplementary sources. To this effect, in a letter of credit fraud dispute, while they are 
controlled to some extent by general law principles and rules, the first and last 
decision will be for these judges. For example, in deciding whether fraud that can stop 
the payment of an independent guarantee should be confined to documents or whether 
it should be extended to include fraud in the transaction, the last view and that which 
will decide the dispute will be the judges’ view. 
It is a fact that most of the Jordanian judges are not familiar with the fraud problem in 
this context.
21
 Hence, the study is limited to those judges who have the relevant 
backgrounds for this study.
22
 Those judges have been selected through a snowball 
sampling.
23
 Indeed, in a snowball collection the researcher has to: 
“…identify a few key informants: the main people involved in the activity 
[which he] is studying. When he approaches them or interviews them, [he] 
ask[s] them to suggest other people to whom [he] should speak to gain a 
full and balanced picture…The snowballing can continue until [he] finds 
[that he] is not getting any new names. In which case [he] can feel 
confident that [he] interviewed the people most central to [his 
research].”24 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Guarantees Under International Trade Law” (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2007) at p. 180; Dolan, 
J. “The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits” (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 
Revised ed., Boston, 1996) at 7-38; Goode, R. ‘Abstract Payment Undertakings’ in Cane P. & 
Stapleton, J. (eds.), “Essays for Patrick Atiyah”, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 209, at p. 234; 
Leacock, S. ‘Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment of Letters of Credit in 
International Transactions’ [1984] Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 885 at p. 899 
21
 An interview with Judge D, of the Court of Cassation, on 19-09-2011 
22
 Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 34 
23
 King, N. & Harrocks C. “Interviews in Qualitative Research” (Sage Publications Ltd, London, 2010) 
at p. 34; Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at p. 37 
24
 Drever, E. “Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research” (Scottish Council for 
Research in Education, Glasgow, 1995) at pp. 36-37 
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It should be noted that some of the judges who were interviewed have been involved 
in such fraud disputes.
25
 Other judges have a background relevant to this issue; for 
example, it is noteworthy that many of these judges have contributed to the field of 
the study through their own postgraduate Masters dissertations, PhD theses or other 
various kinds of publications.
26
 While many of these judges welcomed publishing 
their interviews’ contents and attaching their names to this work, some others have 
shown a desire to remain anonymous and accordingly the information acquired from 
the latter group will be referred to, quoted and analysed anonymously. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that some judges have refused to become involved in the interviews.  
Interviews have been conducted during September 2011. Eight Jordanian judges have 
been interviewed. These judges were from the different levels of courts, some being 
from the Court of First Instance, while others are judges from the Court of Appeal and 
the Court of Cassation. The judges who welcomed publication of their interviews and 
attaching their names to this work are: Judge Hazem Al-Smadi, of the Palace of 
Justice Court of Appeal, Judge Israa Al-Kharabsheh, of the North Amman Court of 
First Instance, Judge Amjad Al-Shraideh, of the North Amman Court of First Instance 
and Judge Nash’at Al-Akhras of the Palace of Justice Court of Appeal. The Judges 
who have shown a desire to remain anonymous have been given pseudonyms and 
therefore are referred to as Judge A, Judge B, Judge C and Judge D. A thank you goes 
to these judges who gave the researcher lengthy periods of time out of their busy days 
in order to help this work reach completion.  
                                                 
25
 For example: Judge A, of the South Amman Court of first instance. 
26
 For example, Judge Israa Al-kharabsheh, who sits as a judge in the Court of first instance, has 
contributed to this field by her Master’s dissertation under the title “Fraud in the Underlying Contract 
as an Exception to the Independence Rule of Documentary Credits” submitted to the University of 
Jordan on 2010. This dissertation is available at the University of Jordan’s Library. 
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Is fraud a recognised exception to the autonomy principle in Jordan? If yes, in which 
situations can a bank that issued a letter of credit refuse the beneficiary’s demand on 
the basis of fraud? Does the bank have to establish fraud in order to refuse a non-
genuine document or does the fact that a document presented contains some falsity 
allow the bank to refuse the beneficiary’s presentment? Does proving the 
beneficiary’s fraudulent intent constitutes a compulsory condition in order to stop 
payment? Have the Jordanian courts limited the application of the fraud exception to 
what has been described as fraud in the documents or does what has been described as 
fraud in the transaction suffices in order to trigger the fraud exception? Has this 
jurisdiction allowed the use of injunctions in this respect and, if yes, in what 
circumstances and under what conditions is such a relief granted? Should the ICC 
carry on its approach which neglects the fraud problem in such a context or is it going 
to be a better approach if such a problem is given more attention and so as a result has 
a place in its next new publications? These questions were the questions discussed 
mainly in the interviews and they are the same questions which have been discussed 
in chapters three, four, five, and six in order to illustrate the fraud meaning, scope and 
implications in this context. The above-mentioned questions were answered through 
both the secondary research data provided by the cases heard by the Jordanian courts 
in conjunction with the data collected through the interviews which have been 
conducted with these learned judges. 
 
 
